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1 
NEGOTIATING FEDERALISM 
Erin Ryan* 
Abstract: Bridging the fields of federalism and negotiation theory, Negoti-
ating Federalism analyzes how public actors navigate difficult federalism 
terrain by negotiating directly with counterparts across state-federal lines. 
In contrast to the stylized, zero-sum model of federalism that pervades po-
litical discourse and judicial doctrine, the Article demonstrates that the 
boundary between state and federal power is negotiated on scales large 
and small, and on an ongoing basis. It is also the first to recognize the 
procedural tools that bilateral federalism bargaining offers to supplement 
unilateral federalism interpretation in contexts of jurisdictional overlap. 
 The Article begins by situating its inquiry within the age-old federalism 
discourse about which branch can best safeguard the values that give fed-
eralism meaning: Congress, through political safeguards; the Supreme 
Court, by judicially enforceable constraints; or the Executive, through 
administrative process. Yet each school of thought considers only how the 
branches operate unilaterally—on one side of the state-federal line or the 
other—missing the important ways that each one also works bilaterally 
across that line to protect federalism values through various forms of ne-
gotiated governance. Because unilateral interpretive methods fail to es-
tablish clear boundaries at the margins of state and federal authority, reg-
ulators increasingly turn to bilateral intergovernmental bargaining to 
allocate contested authority and facilitate collaboration in uncertain fed-
eralism territory. Procedural constraints available within these negotia-
tions can help bridge the interpretive gaps unresolved by more conven-
tionally understood forms of interpretation. 
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 Creating the first theoretical framework for organizing federalism bar-
gaining, the Article provides a taxonomy of the different opportunities 
for state-federal bargaining available within various constitutional and sta-
tutory frameworks. Highlighting forms of conventional bargaining, nego-
tiations to reallocate authority, and joint policymaking bargaining, the Ar-
ticle maps this vast, uncharted landscape with illustrations ranging from 
the 2009 Stimulus Bill to Medicaid to climate policy. The taxonomy dem-
onstrates how widely federalism bargaining permeates American govern-
ance, including not only the familiar example of spending power deals, 
but also subtler forms that have escaped previous scholarly notice as 
forms of negotiation at all. 
 The Article then reviews the different media of exchange within feder-
alism bargaining and the legal rules that constrain them, together with 
supporting data from primary sources. Finally, it evaluates how some forms 
of federalism bargaining—legitimized by the procedural constraints of 
mutual consent and the procedural engineering of regard for federalism 
values—can supplement unilateral interpretation. Differentiating itself 
from previous process-based claims, the analysis provides new theoretical 
justification for the interpretive work that federalism bargaining presently 
provides and calls for greater judicial deference to qualifying examples. 
Having offered recommendations about the kinds of federalism bargain-
ing that should be encouraged, the Article offers recommendations for 
legislators, executive actors, stakeholders, practitioners, and adjudicators 
about how best to accomplish these goals. 
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Introduction 
 Opponents of Congress’s 2010 Medicaid expansion decried the 
move as a “gross federal overreach,”1 invoking familiar tropes about the 
bitter contest between state and federal authority in contexts of juris-
                                                                                                                      
1 See, e.g., Press Release, Tex. Office of the Governor, Statement by Gov. Rick Perry on 
Passage of Federal Health Care Bill (Mar. 21, 2010), available at http://governor.state.tx. 
us/news/press-release/14396/ (official statement on passage of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119). 
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dictional overlap. But state and federal regulators in the trenches of 
health care law know that the truth is more nuanced—that the Medi-
caid program really represents a site of extensive negotiation between 
state and federal actors about the specifics of each state plan, set within 
purposefully broad federal boundaries.2 Those who opposed the 2009 
Stimulus Bill on federalism grounds3 similarly discounted the substan-
tial role of state actors in negotiating the terms of the federal law.4 And 
those who challenged the Clean Water Act’s stormwater regulations on 
federalism grounds missed the pivotal role state and municipal actors 
played in negotiating the terms of the rule—which itself became a fo-
rum for ongoing negotiation between state and federal regulators 
about how each municipality would ultimately comply.5 
 Such instances of intergovernmental bargaining offer a means of 
understanding the relationship between state and federal power that 
differs from the stylized model of zero-sum federalism dominating po-
litical discourse, which emphasizes winner-takes-all jurisdictional com-
petition.6 Contemporary judicial doctrine presents a similarly wooden 
view of sovereign antagonism within American federalism.7 But count-
less real-world examples show that the boundary between state and 
federal authority is actually negotiated on scales large and small, and 
on a continual basis. Working in a dizzying array of regulatory contexts, 
state and federal actors negotiate over both the allocation of policymak-
ing authority and the substantive terms of the mandates policymaking 
will impose. Bargaining takes place both in realms plagued by legal un-
certainty about whose jurisdiction trumps, and in realms unsettled by 
uncertainty over whose decision should trump, regardless of legal su-
premacy. Reconceptualizing the relationship between state and federal 
power as one heavily mediated by negotiation demonstrates how feder-
                                                                                                                      
2 See infra notes 328–344 and accompanying text (discussing the Medicaid demonstra-
tion waiver program). 
3 See, e.g., Some State Lawmakers Fighting Federal Stimulus, Ariz. Republic, Mar. 2, 2009, 
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/03/02/20090302stimulus-states0302-ON.html 
(reporting on efforts to “fight against decades of federal overreach, culminating in the stimu-
lus package”). 
4 See infra notes 117–122 and accompanying text (discussing state roles in negotiating 
the stimulus bill). 
5 See infra notes 283–290 and accompanying text (discussing the Phase II Stormwater 
Rule). 
6 See, e.g., Ed Hornick, ‘Tenther’ Movement Aims to Put Power Back in States’ Hands, CNN (Feb. 
10, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/02/10/tenth.amendment.movement/in- 
dex. html. 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“The Constitution 
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”). 
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alism practice departs from the rhetoric, and offers hope for moving 
beyond the paralyzing features of the zero-sum discourse. 
 This Article explores the role of state-federal bargaining in areas of 
concurrent regulatory jurisdiction, where both state and federal actors 
hold legitimate regulatory interests or obligations.8 Even as jurists re-
main mired in debate over how to resolve regulatory competition, reg-
ulators working in contested contexts have learned to confront this un-
certainty simply by negotiating through it. Working directly or 
indirectly with counterparts across state-federal lines, regulators reach 
consensus about sharing or dividing contested authority (and how to 
implement it) in order to move forward with needed governance. 
When they do so in processes consistent with the principles of fair bar-
gaining and federalism, they are negotiating the answer to federalism’s 
most critical question in a manner that vindicates constitutional goals. 
Indeed, they are interpreting federalism. 
 In the face of persistent uncertainty about the boundaries between 
state and federal reach, the Article demonstrates how government ac-
tors move forward by substituting procedural consensus for substantive 
clarity about the central federalism inquiry—who gets to decide?—in indi-
vidual regulatory contexts. Procedural consistency with fair bargaining 
and federalism principles yields instances in which the very process of 
intergovernmental bargaining proves more able to preserve constitu-
tional values than judicial or legislative decisions alone. Recognizing 
how intergovernmental bargaining supplements these more conven-
tionally understood means of allocating authority provides a new lens 
for understanding the uniquely collaborative process of American gov-
ernance. 
 Using the negotiation theorist’s definition, the Article broadly un-
derstands bargaining as “an iterative process of joint decision-making,”9 
encompassing conventional political haggling (as over the terms of the 
Stimulus Bill), formalized methods of collaborative policymaking (as in 
the Medicaid partnership), and even more remote signaling processes 
by which state and federal actors share responsibility for public decision 
                                                                                                                      
8 See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the In-
terjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 Md. L. Rev. 503, 567–95 (2007) (describing the phenomenon 
of jurisdictional overlap). 
9 Adopting the definition of negotiation theorists, I define bargaining as any iterative 
process of communication by which two or more parties seek to influence the outcome of 
a joint decision. Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agree-
ment Without Giving In, at xvii (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 2d ed. 1991) (1981); 
Richard Shell, Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reason-
able People 6 (1999); infra note 99. 
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making over time (as they have over medical marijuana enforcement). 
I use the word “substantive” to refer to the substance of a legal rule or 
negotiated outcome, and “procedural” to refer to the process by which 
that rule or outcome was reached. Because “state-federal intergovern-
mental bargaining” is a mouthful, I use the term “federalism bargain-
ing” to refer collectively to the forums in which state and federal actors 
engage in these processes of joint decision making, focusing on the ver-
tical federalism relationship within each given array of state and federal 
participants.10 
 Given the foundational role that negotiated federalism plays in the 
American system of dual sovereignty, academics would be wise to better 
understand it: where and how it happens, what works well and what 
does not, and what legal constraints should apply. Most importantly, we 
should understand how procedural tools within negotiated governance 
can assist the navigation of difficult federalism terrain that other means 
of interpretation have failed to clarify. Incorporating general bargain-
ing principles of mutual consent and the procedural application of 
core federalism values, negotiated governance opens possibilities for 
filling interpretive gaps in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence or con-
gressional legislation. This Article thus moves beyond the historic de-
bate about the unilateral roles of the Court, Congress, and the Execu-
tive in protecting federalism11 and provides the first recognition that 
bilateral federalism bargaining is itself a means of interpreting the 
                                                                                                                      
10 This inquiry considers municipal participants in intergovernmental bargaining as 
agents of the state, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of municipal activ-
ity under its Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U.S. 833, 838–40 (1976) (affirming that the Tenth Amendment protects both state and local 
entities), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985). For a more modern example, see Environmental Defense Center v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 
844–45 (9th Cir. 2003), where the court considered an anticommandeering challenge to a 
federal law applying to municipal permitting. For discussion about how independent mu-
nicipal activity further complicates the analysis, see infra notes 78–80 and accompanying 
text. 
11 E.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 588 (1954) (ar-
ticulating the “political safeguards” theory that trusts federalism constraints to Congress); 
Morton Grodzins, The American System 8, 60–153 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., Transaction 
Books 1984) (1966) (describing the cooperative federalism model based on the political 
safeguards theory); Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 951, 952 (2001) (endorsing the move toward judicially enforce-
able constraints in the New Federalism model); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institu-
tional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727, 755–56, 759 (2008) (arguing that executive agencies 
do not warrant the same deference as Congress in preempting state law); Brian Galle & 
Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the 
Edge of Federal Power, 57 Duke L.J. 1933, 1940 (2008) (making the opposite argument). 
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Constitution. When the procedural criteria are met, intergovernmental 
bargaining enables a partnership of state and federal actors to interpret 
constitutional directives bilaterally, through negotiated exchange across 
the state-federal divide. 
 Part I situates the inquiry within the iconic federalism discourse 
about which branch can best safeguard American federalism: Congress, 
through political safeguards; the Court, by judicially enforceable con-
straints; or the Executive, through administrative process.12 Views have 
vacillated over whether Congress or the Supreme Court should be the 
final arbiter of compliance with federalism directives, and more recent 
scholarship addresses the positive and negative contributions of admin-
istrative agencies.13 These arguments, however, focus exclusively on uni-
lateral branch activity, eliding the important ways that public actors 
work bilaterally across state-federal lines to safeguard federalism by ne-
gotiating the terms of governance with important federalism implica-
tions.14 Federalism scholars have neglected the significance of negoti-
ated federalism, which presents on a continuum from the obvious to 
the subtle, because it has never before been surveyed. 
 To remedy this gap, Part II offers the first theoretical framework for 
cataloguing this uncharted landscape in a taxonomy of the opportuni-
ties for state-federal bargaining available within various constitutional 
and statutory frameworks.15 Highlighting categories of conventional 
bargaining, negotiations to reallocate authority, and joint policymaking 
bargaining, the taxonomy reviews familiar forms of negotiation used in 
lawmaking (such as the Stimulus), negotiations over various kinds of law 
enforcement (such as immigration or pollution), negotiations under 
the federal spending power (such as the No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001), and negotiations for exceptions under otherwise applicable laws 
(such as the Endangered Species Act).16 It then considers the more in-
                                                                                                                      
12 I have previously argued that the best way to understand federalism is in terms of 
the good governance values it fosters, including the checks and balances between local 
and national levels of government that safeguard individual rights, the benefits of variation 
and innovation that accrue to localism, the need for governmental accountability that 
enables meaningful democratic participation, and the synergistic problem-solving capacity 
that accords a federal system. See generally Ryan, supra note 8. This values-based understand-
ing of federalism is also the subject of a forthcoming book, Erin Ryan, Federalism and 
the Tug of War Within (forthcoming 2011). 
13 See sources cited supra note 11; infra notes 28–95 and accompanying text. 
14 Ryan, supra note 8, at 567–91. 
15 See infra notes 96–399 and accompanying text. 
16 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6, 19, 26, 42, and 47 U.S.C.); Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 287, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 
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teresting, less obvious forms of negotiated policymaking, including ne-
gotiated federal rulemaking with state stakeholders (as was used to regu-
late stormwater pollution), federal statutes that share policy design with 
states (such as Medicaid), staggered programs of iterative shared poli-
cymaking (as used to regulate auto emissions), and intersystemic signal-
ing negotiations, by which independently operating state and federal 
actors trade influence over the direction of evolving interjurisdictional 
policies (as reflected in medical marijuana enforcement).17 The taxon-
omy demonstrates how federalism bargaining permeates American gov-
ernance, from familiar examples under the spending power to the sub-
tler forms that have previously escaped scholarly notice as forms of 
negotiation at all. 
 In fleshing out these details, one normative purpose of the piece is 
simply to call attention to how much federalism-sensitive governance is 
already negotiated, belying the zero-sum discourse. This should not be 
surprising, given the negotiation features built into the very structure 
of American government. The bicameral nature of the legislature, the 
presidential veto, and even the subtle invitation to iterative policymak-
ing afforded by judicial review—prompting Congress to try again to 
meet constitutional muster, or signaling the concerns future legislators 
must heed18—all speak to the way American governance is, by design, 
an iterative process of joint decision making. Indeed, the interest group 
representation model of democratic governance itself anticipates how 
lawmaking will reflect the results of bargaining between competing in-
terest groups.19 But even beyond these features of the American system 
(and in contrast to the more privately bargained-for governance advo-
cated by the New Governance movement),20 it is striking how much 
                                                                                                                      
U.S.C. § 1357 (2006)); Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. 
L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (enacted Jan. 8, 2002) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 20 U.S.C.); infra notes 110–250 and accompanying text. 
17 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315, 1396n (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 122.34 
(2010); infra notes 251–399 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
18 For example, Congress designed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000 in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1997 invalidation of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as exceeding legislative authority under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2006)); RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488 (1993), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
19 Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 
18 & n.48 (1997). 
20 See generally William Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, 
in Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott 
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federalism-implicating governance is accomplished bilaterally, whether 
by conventional or dialogic processes. Examples are especially preva-
lent in environmental law, where jurisdictional overlap is particularly 
acute and where the federalism discourse is most driven to extremes.21 
 After mapping this landscape and identifying commonalities, Part 
III draws on both primary and secondary sources to evaluate the differ-
ent sources of trade in federalism negotiations—exploring the media of 
exchange, or what it is that the parties are actually bargaining for.22 Fed-
eralism bargainers trade on the various aspects of governing capacity 
available to each side, including financing, resources, and expertise to 
accomplish specific regulatory goals, and release from inhibiting legal 
obligations that one side may hold over the other. In addition, the nor-
mative power of federalism itself forms important leverage at the bar-
gaining table—often by clever statutory design—constraining the results 
of negotiations in which participants are also motivated by other con-
cerns. Part III also considers what constitutional or jurisprudential rules 
constrain different negotiating currencies.23 Without additional judicial 
or legislative guidance, some forms of bargaining may remain mired in 
the kind of legal uncertainty that can inhibit optimal results or strain 
public faith in the process.24 To that end, another purpose of the Article 
is to call attention to instances of mismatch between legal limits and 
empirical needs in federalism bargaining, where constraints occasionally 
operate unnecessarily and license elsewhere may call out for structure. 
 This positive account ultimately provides foundation for Part IV’s 
critical normative claim that the robust recourse to bargaining is not 
                                                                                                                      
eds., 2006) (articulating the principles of the New Governance movement); Amy J. Cohen, 
Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 Law & Soc. Inquiry 503 
(2008) (examining the New Governance and negotiation literature and points of conver-
gence between them); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Ex-
perimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998) (identifying and discussing a decentralized 
model of governance in which actors are able to effectively utilize their local knowledge); 
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342 (2004) (contrasting the New Deal and New Govern-
ance regulatory models). In contrast to federalism bargaining between state and federal 
actors, the New Governance movement advocates devolution of national command-and-
control regulation to locally mediated negotiation among private stakeholders. 
21 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 716 (2006) (adjudicating overlap in 
wetlands regulatory jurisdiction); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (ad-
judicating jurisdictional overlap in radioactive waste siting). 
22 See infra notes 400–549 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 400–549 and accompanying text. 
24 Cf. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1960) (arguing 
that bargaining produces efficient results when transaction costs are low, but that transac-
tion costs—like uncertainty—can hinder efficiency). 
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merely a de facto response to regulatory uncertainty on the part of the 
Supreme Court or Congress. There, I make the case that federalism 
bargaining can itself be a legitimate way of interpreting federalism, 
when federalism interpretation is understood as a way of constraining 
public behavior to be consistent with constitutional values. Some forms 
of federalism bargaining provide legitimate means for answering who 
gets to decide? by procedurally incorporating not only the consent prin-
ciples that legitimize bargaining in general, but also the fundamental 
values that should guide federalism interpretation in any forum. 
 After all, the core federalism values—the good-governance princi-
ples that federalism helps ensure—are essentially realized through 
good governance procedure: (1) the maintenance of checks and bal-
ances to protect individual rights against government excess; (2) the 
protection of accountability and transparency to ensure meaningful 
democratic participation; (3) the preference for process that fosters 
local innovation, variation, and competition; and (4) the cultivation of 
regulatory space for harnessing synergy between local and national ca-
pacity, when needed to cope with interjurisdictional problems.25 Incor-
porating these values into the bargaining process allows negotiators to 
interpret federalism directives procedurally when consensus on the 
substance is unavailable, thereby filling the inevitable interpretive gaps 
left by judicial and legislative mandates. 
 Synthesizing these analyses, Part IV evaluates how some forms of 
federalism bargaining supplement the unilateral interpretive efforts of 
the courts, Congress, and the Executive in advancing the values of con-
stitutional federalism.26 In short, the more that federalism bargaining 
incorporates legitimizing procedures founded on mutual consent and 
federalism values, the more it warrants deference as a means of federal-
ism interpretation. Interpretive bargaining becomes less legitimate as 
factual circumstances depart from the assumptions of mutual con-
sent—in other words, when bargainers cannot freely opt out, cannot be 
trusted to understand their own interests, or cannot be trusted to faith-
fully represent their principals—and when procedures contravene core 
federalism values. Differentiating itself from previous process-based 
claims, the analysis advances the federalism discourse by providing new 
theoretical justification for the interpretive work that federalism bar-
gaining presently provides, calling for greater judicial deference to qua-
lifying examples. At a minimum, courts adjudicating federalism-based 
                                                                                                                      
25 Ryan, supra note 8, at 596–628. 
26 Infra notes 550–673 and accompanying text. 
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challenges to the results of such bargaining should consider procedural 
factors when deciding the appropriate level of deference to extend. 
 Finally, Part IV applies the interpretive framework to the taxon-
omy, analyzing the forms of federalism bargaining with the most inter-
pretive potential. After identifying the most robust forms of federalism 
bargaining for confronting various regulatory challenges, it suggests 
how legislators, executive actors, stakeholders, practitioners, and adju-
dicators can further develop the tools of federalism bargaining to navi-
gate jurisdictional overlap.27 
I. Interpreting Federalism 
 Notwithstanding the stylized narrative of federalism in rhetoric, 
the boundary between state and federal authority in practice is the sub-
ject of ongoing intergovernmental negotiation. More interesting still 
are the possibilities for federalism bargaining to fill interpretive gaps 
through recourse to procedural principles that are closely aligned with 
core federalism values. This Part situates these two normative claims 
within the existing federalism discourse and explains how a better un-
derstanding of federalism bargaining can contribute to the overall fed-
eralism interpretive endeavor. It outlines the federalism values, summa-
rizes the federalism safeguards debate, introduces the concept of 
bilaterally negotiated interpretation, and suggests insights from nego-
tiation theory that could better inform the federalism discourse. 
 By whatever means, federalism interpretation constrains public be-
havior so that it is consistent with constitutional values. Since the na-
tion’s founding, jurists and scholars have debated the roles that the 
three branches of government should play in interpreting the constitu-
tional promise of federalism. The courts explicitly interpret federalism 
directives in judicial opinions, while political actors implicitly interpret 
federalism whenever they take action implicating federalism concerns.28 
Superficially, the protection of vertical federalism is viewed as a matter 
of ensuring that the respective exercise of authority by national and lo-
cal government honor constitutional directives. But before broaching 
the venerable debate over the role of each branch in doing this, it is im-
portant to consider what “safeguarding federalism” means at a more 
fundamental level. 
                                                                                                                      
27 Infra notes 550–673 and accompanying text. 
28 Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 501, 505–06 & 505 
n.24 (2008) (listing primary texts in the political branch interpretation discourse). 
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 Located within the emerging field of dynamic federalism,29 this 
project is grounded in a values-based understanding of federalism that 
identifies its meaning in terms of the fundamental principles that fed-
eralism brings to good governance, including checks and balances, ac-
countability and transparency, local innovation, and problem-solving 
synergy.30 The checks and balances created by a federal system prevent 
both the state and national governments from becoming so powerful as 
to threaten individual liberties.31 The governmental accountability and 
transparency that should accompany federalism ensures voters’ ability 
to accurately reward and punish policymaking choices at the ballot box, 
thereby allowing them to participate meaningfully in the democratic 
process at various levels.32 Fostering local variation allows for the inter-
jurisdictional innovation and competition promised by the cherished 
federalism “laboratory of ideas.”33 Finally, federalism allows local and 
national actors to harness synergy between unique regulatory capaci-
ties, allowing them to partner more effectively in managing interjuris-
dictional problems.34 In previous work, I have argued that faithfulness 
to these values should be the touchstone when adjudicating difficult 
                                                                                                                      
29 In contrast to the strict “dual federalism” model preferred by the New Federalism 
movement, the Dynamic Federalism movement explores how simultaneous local and na-
tional activity within spheres of shared jurisdiction advances constitutional goals. See gener-
ally Erwin Chemerinksy, Enhancing Government: Federalism for the 21st Century 
(2008) (envisioning federalism as the empowerment of government at multiple levels); 
Robert Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism (2009) (arguing that multiple perspectives in 
government create a more efficient, more democratic system); William W. Buzbee, Interac-
tion’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 Emory 
L.J. 145 (2007) (discussing “ceiling preemption” and “experimentalist” agency modes); 
Kiersten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 
Emory L.J. 159 (2006) (critiquing a static allocation of authority between state and federal 
levels of government); Ryan, supra note 8. 
30 See Ryan, supra note 8, at 596–658. 
31 Id. at 602–06; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (emphasizing the 
importance of preserving balance between state and federal power). 
32 Ryan, supra note 8, at 606–10; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182–
83 (1992) (discussing the importance of keeping government actors accountable in con-
texts of jurisdictional overlap). 
33 Ryan, supra note 8, at 610–20; see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal sys-
tem that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
34 Ryan, supra note 8, at 620–28. See generally Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitu-
tional Federalism, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 795 (1996) (discussing the role of subsidiarity within fed-
eralism, and how interjurisdictional deference ensures efficient and robust lawmaking). 
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jurisdictional issues that raise questions of federalism35—a principle 
that should hold true regardless of whether the decisionmaker is judi-
cial, legislative, or executive. 
 Through most of American history, the debate over which branch 
should be the final federalism arbiter has centered on whether Congress 
or the Court is best positioned to defend federalism values. In the early 
years of the new century, attention has shifted toward the role of the 
executive branch. Indeed, the debate has remained lively over time pre-
cisely because there are strong arguments to be made for the critical 
contributions of each branch. But the entire discourse has focused ex-
clusively on how the branches interpret federalism unilaterally—alone in 
their chambers on one side of the federal system or the other—when 
they decide whether to pass a law in contested regulatory space, whether 
to uphold it when challenged, and how to implement or enforce it. Act-
ing unilaterally, branch actors interpret federalism by deciphering text, 
applying precedent, and formulating substantive answers to precise 
questions about state and federal power: “Is this federal statute within 
Article I authority?” “Is this state statute legitimately preempted?” 
 This project, however, shows how actors within each branch also 
participate in bilateral federalism interpretation, negotiating the alloca-
tion of policymaking authority (and subsequent policy terms) with oth-
ers across the state-federal line. In the spaces between clearly articu-
lated substantive interpretation, state-federal bargaining offers bilateral 
interpretive tools to realize constitutional meaning, by procedurally 
yoking the allocation of contested authority to the principles that le-
gitimize bargaining generally and federalism specifically. As discussed 
in Part IV, bargaining confers procedural legitimacy on outcomes when 
the prerequisites of genuine mutual consent are met: when parties suf-
ficiently understand their interests, can meaningfully opt out of the 
agreement, and are faithfully represented at the negotiating table.36 
Federalism bargaining confers further interpretive legitimacy when ne-
gotiations are procedurally consistent with the core federalism values of 
checks, accountability, innovation, and synergy.37 
 Until now, the discourse has failed to account for the federalism 
implications that accrue—for better or worse—when state and federal 
actors resolve federalism uncertainty through negotiation. Filling this 
                                                                                                                      
35 Ryan, supra note 8, at 644–62; see also Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 1, 9–10 (2009). 
36 See infra notes 561–577 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 578–617 and accompanying text. 
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important gap in federalism scholarship, this Article explores the pos-
sibilities raised by state-federal negotiation, broadly understood, to help 
navigate public decision making in contexts fraught with federalism 
concerns, such as environmental law, financial regulation, and public 
health. Decision making in some of these contexts remains stalled due 
to genuine legal uncertainty about which side is entitled to regulate 
what, as demonstrated by the difficulties regulating water pollution af-
ter the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United States in 
2006.38 Elsewhere, federalism uncertainty revolves around preemption 
questions about who should lead in shared policymaking contexts, even 
with greater legal clarity about who could trump,39 as the need for im-
pending climate regulation demonstrates.40 
 This inquiry assesses how federalism bargaining helps bridge 
pockets of uncertainty that remain after exhausting the more conven-
tionally understood forms of federalism interpretation, to help allocate 
contested authority and shepherd interjurisdictional collaboration. It 
also considers the dangers for federalism values posed by problems of 
representation, transparency, and autonomy that may attend certain 
negotiations. Part I.A begins with a review of the central theoretical 
controversy in federalism, highlighting the unilateral focus of the dis-
course already in progress about which branch most faithfully inter-
prets federalism. 
A. Political Safeguards and New Federalism 
 For many years, the view prevailed that Congress is the ideal guard-
ian of federalism, operating within a political process that ensures local 
concerns are considered during national lawmaking. As Herbert 
Wechsler famously argued in 1954, judicially enforceable constraints 
were unnecessary because of Congress’s institutional design.41 Legisla-
                                                                                                                      
38 See generally 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (limiting the Clean Water Act’s definition of “navi-
gable waters”); Charles Duhigg & Janet Rodgers, Rulings Restrict Clean Water Act, Foiling 
EPA, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/ 
us/01water.html?emc=eta. 
39 See generally William W. Buzbee, Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law and Real-
ity of Federalism’s Core Question (2009) (detailing the variety of architectural choices 
by which federal preemption decisions can be limited to allow for the benefits of institu-
tional and regulatory diversity). 
40 See generally Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating 
State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism 
and Environmental Law?, 38 Urb. Law. 1015 (2006) (discussing the “role reversal” between 
federal- and state-level governments in addressing climate change). 
41 Wechsler, supra note 11, at 558. As Professor Wechsler has written: 
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tors are elected at the state level, they are understood to represent local 
interests during federal lawmaking, and they demonstrate keen aware-
ness of issues that matter to constituents (exemplified by the preva-
lence of local “earmark” legislation within national statutes).42 Even 
after senators were elected by popular vote rather than state legisla-
tures,43 they continued to answer to state-based constituencies. 
 Because Congress is a large, deliberative, locally elected body, the 
“Political Safeguards” view holds that courts should leave interpretation 
of close federalism calls to the political process.44 This approach— 
which assumes that Congress is properly equipped to unilaterally45 in-
terpret constitutional federalism directives through the federal lawmak-
ing process—underlies the “Cooperative Federalism” model that in-
formed the U.S. Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence between 
the New Deal and New Federalism eras.46 Later scholarship contributed 
additional process-based theories of federalism,47 echoed in judicial 
decisions such as Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.48 
                                                                                                                      
[T]he national political process in the United States—and especially the role 
of the states in the composition and selection of the central government—is 
intrinsically well-adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the 
center on the domain of the states . . . the inherent tendency in our system 
. . . necessitat[es] the widest support before intrusive measures of importance 
can receive significant consideration, reacting readily to opposition grounded 
in resistance within the states. 
Id. 
42 Id. at 558 (discussing political process); see John Dinan & Dale Krane, The State of 
American Federalism, 2005: Federalism Resurfaces in the Political Debate, 36 Publius 327, 343–44 
(2006) (discussing congressional clashes over earmarks in legislation). 
43 U.S. Const., amend. XVII. 
44 Wechsler, supra note 11, at 547 (“To the extent that federalist values have real sig-
nificance they must give rise to local sensitivity to central intervention; to the extent that 
such a local sensitivity exists, it cannot fail to find reflection in the Congress.”). 
45 The Political Safeguards/New Federalism debate evokes a separate contest over uni-
lateral federalism interpretation, with each school advocating exclusive interpretive con-
trol by Congress or the Court, respectively. For the purposes of my larger analysis here, 
however, I use the term “unilateral” interpretation to refer to interpretive activity that takes 
place exclusively on either the state or federal side of the system. 
46 The Political Safeguards model prevailed in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence 
between NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937), which upheld Con-
gress’s authority to enact the National Labor Relations Act, thereby ending a period of 
judicial rejection of New Deal legislation, and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 149 
(1992), which rejected provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments 
Act of 1985 for exceeding commerce authority and signaling a new, narrower judicial view 
of federal reach. 
47 E.g., Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the Political Process 175 (1980) 
(arguing that the judiciary should not adjudicate the limits of state and federal power); 
Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. 
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 Nevertheless, others have critiqued the assumption that political 
safeguards are sufficient to protect federalism, fearing unchecked fed-
eral expansion into traditional areas of state prerogative.49 As federal 
regulatory programs grew more ambitious regarding civil rights and 
environmental objectives, a political movement blossomed in the 1980s 
urging judicial intervention.50 The “New Federalism” movement influ-
enced a series of decisions by the Rehnquist Court that erected judi-
cially enforceable limits on federal authority.51 
 The New Federalism jurisprudence empowered the judiciary to 
unilaterally interpret federalism constraints through jurisdictional 
boundary-setting doctrines institutionally amenable to judicial over-
sight.52 For example, departing from the previous era of deferral to 
congressional fact-finding about a law’s relationship to interstate com-
merce, the Rehnquist Court articulated an “economic activity” limita-
tion on the commerce power, enabling the judiciary to establish defini-
tively whether a regulatory target was within Congress’s regulatory 
reach.53 Some scholars applaud these cases, arguing that “political safe-
guards” fail to police Congress’s expanding regulatory appetite.54 Oth-
                                                                                                                      
Rev. 215, 215 (2000) (arguing that political parties and other political institutions effec-
tively safeguard federalism). Other process-federalism scholarship focusing on congres-
sional lawmaking includes Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 
1349, 1364 (2001); Vicki Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Prin-
ciple?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2180, 2240–42 (1998); and Gardbaum, supra note 34, at 799–800. 
See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980) (articulating a general 
process-based theory of constitutional interpretation). 
48 469 U.S. 528, 550–54 (1985). More recently, the political safeguards theory ap-
peared in the dissenting opinions of Justices Breyer and Souter in United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating portions of the Violence Against Women Act). 529 U.S. 
at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 647 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
49 E.g., Baker, supra note 11, at 952 (2001) (critiquing Wechsler’s and Kramer’s politi-
cal safeguards arguments); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 Tex. L. Rev 1459, 1460–62 (2001) (making a textual 
case for judicially enforceable federalism constraints); William W. Van Alstyne, The Second 
Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1723–27 (1985) (critiquing the political safe-
guards theoretical underpinnings of the Court’s decision in Garcia). 
50 Ryan, supra note 8, at 539–41 & 539 n.145. 
51 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602 (invalidating a section of the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994 for surpassing Congress’s commerce power); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (overturning the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 for similarly 
exceeding federal power); see also Ryan, supra note 8, at 507 n.1 (detailing the standard 
canon of New Federalism cases). 
52 Ryan, supra note 8, at 551. See generally Schapiro, supra note 29. 
53 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. 
54 Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 
51 Duke L.J. 75, 128 (2001); Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 Nw. U. L. 
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ers question whether the judicial line-drawing exercise tracks the reali-
ties of interjurisdictional governance,55 and whether it ultimately serves 
federalism values.56 
B. Administrative Safeguards and the Role of the Executive 
 Even as proponents of Cooperative and New Federalism sparred 
over whether Congress or the courts should lead, most agreed that the 
Executive should be last in line.57 The unelected nature of most execu-
tive agents and branch capacity for swift, decisive federal action runs 
counter to the legislative features that convince Political Safeguards 
adherents that judicial constraints are unnecessary.58 Concerns espe-
cially revolve around the scope of executive authority to preempt state 
law through agency rulemaking.59 
 More recently, the scholarly community has divided over executive 
federalism. Some maintain that political safeguards cannot apply to 
agencies, which operate less accountably, less deliberatively, and with 
institutional focuses on narrow areas of concern.60 But an emerging 
literature makes the opposite claim, suggesting that agencies are the 
preferred guardians due to their own institutional capacity. For exam-
ple, Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld argue that agencies are 
better positioned than Congress to advance federalism interests in re-
gulating because administrative competence makes them more delibera-
                                                                                                                      
Rev. 131, 137–43 (2004); William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States, and the Tenth 
Amendment, 1987 Duke L.J. 769, 782–83, 797–98. 
55 E.g., William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 
108, 108–09 (2005); Roderick M. Hills Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813, 831–32 
(1998); Jackson, supra note 47, at 2196; Ryan, supra note 8, at 567–91. 
56 See Ryan, supra note 8, at 644–62. See generally Chemerinksy, supra note 29 (empha-
sizing the advantages of multiple sources of government power, and how overlapping ju-
risdiction advances liberty); Schapiro, supra note 29. 
57 E.g., Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 
2072–73 (1990) (arguing that distinguishing between legislative and administrative delib-
eration is important to the separation of powers). 
58 E.g., Merrill, supra note 11, at 755–56; Sunstein, supra note 57, at 2072–73. 
59 Compare Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864 (2000) (deeming pre-
empted a tort claim for failure to include airbags in an automobile that met federal safety 
standards), with Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200–01 (2009) (ruling against the 
agency but declining to overrule Geier in a case with similar facts). 
60 E.g., Nina Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
695, 699 (2008); Merrill, supra note 11, at 755–56, 759; Sunstein, supra note 57, at 2111–15. 
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tive and transparent than Congress, based on subject matter expertise 
and frequent experience working with related state agencies.61 
 Professor Gillian Metzger advocates administrative law as a subcon-
stitutional surrogate for addressing federalism concerns,62 noting that 
procedural and substantive safeguards in administrative law offer useful 
avenues for judicial federalism review that are unavailable for review of 
legislation.63 She also observes that agencies are often better-equipped 
to deal with core federalism concerns, which often arise in specific 
policymaking contexts in which agency experts are better positioned to 
investigate state interests.64 
 Professor Catherine Sharkey adds that President Clinton’s Federal-
ism Executive Order provides an excellent framework for making agen-
cies accountable to federalism concerns, and argues that it should be 
made enforceable.65 She also observes that agencies engaged in pro-
grams of cooperative federalism with state partners better heed federal-
ism concerns than those administering programs without state collabo-
ration.66 For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
which works closely with states in administering the Clean Air and Water 
Acts, has shown much greater deference to state interests than the Fed-
eral Drug Administration, whose regulations have preempted state 
common law without much sensitivity.67 
 These “Administrative Safeguards” authors skillfully highlight the 
institutional features that make agencies more responsive to state inter-
ests. They show the federalism benefits that follow intergovernmental 
interaction by demonstrating the respect for state concerns that federal 
agents gain from consistent contact. Thus, even though the arguments 
for Administrative Safeguards are implicitly framed in unilateral terms, 
the suggestion that the executive branch offers the last, best hope for 
protecting federalism is predicated on the volume of executive rule-
                                                                                                                      
61 Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1955–59; see also Catherine Sharkey, Federalism 
Accountability: ‘Agency-Forcing’ Measures, 58 Duke L.J. 2125, 2146–55 (2009). 
62 Gillian Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023, 2063–69 
(2008) (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007), conferring state standing 
to raise climate change, and Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 263–64 (2006), declining to 
preempt state law legalizing assisted suicide). 
63 Id. at 2086–88; see also Sharkey, supra note 61, at 2128–31. But see Wayne Logan, The 
Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise of Administrative Federalism, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 993, 
994–95 (2010) (contesting these claims). 
64 Metzger, supra note 62, at 2073–74; see also Sharkey, supra note 61, at 2146–55. 
65 Sharkey, supra note 61, at 2128–31, 2156–73. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 
Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999). 
66 Id. at 2155–72. 
67 Id. at 2159–61; cf. Metzger, supra note 62, at 2078. 
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making, implementation, and enforcement that is effectively negoti-
ated in consultation with state partners. 
C. Negotiating Federalism 
 The federalism safeguards debate is contentious, but the voices are 
uniform in considering only the federalism implications of unilateral 
branch activity68—even though a substantial amount of governmental 
activity is better understood as moves made within bilateral state-federal 
negotiation. The disconnect is stark, especially for the political branches, 
where negotiations are most apparent. 
 It is easier to understand this unilateral bias in certain regulatory 
contexts. For example, the Supreme Court acts fairly unilaterally by de-
sign—consulting only the Constitution and precedent—and so we natu-
rally expect unilateralism along the state-federal line when it decides 
cases with important federalism implications. It acts unilaterally when 
interpreting constitutional constraints, as it did in articulating the “eco-
nomic activity” test limiting the commerce power,69 and in upholding 
laws against federalism challenges, as it did in affirming supremacy of 
federal drug laws over state medical marijuana laws.70 The debate over 
Congress’s role also presumes unilateral action, alternatively referencing 
unilateral choices to legislate to the broadest reach of its enumerated 
powers—such as its failed attempt to expand protection for religious 
expression under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act71—or to exer-
cise restraint of the sort envisioned by the Political Safeguards model. 
 The executive branch may have the greatest institutional freedom 
to act unilaterally in every sense of the word, given the single individual 
at the top of the decision-making apex.72 Nevertheless, it also holds the 
                                                                                                                      
68 See supra note 45 (distinguishing the contest over interpretive unilateralism between 
federal branches from the federal/state-side unilateralism on which this analysis is fo-
cused). 
69 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. 
70 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
71 See Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (partially overturning the act for exceeding congressional authority 
to regulate state government); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006) (restoring protec-
tion for religious activity burdened by neutrally applicable regulations in the wake of con-
trary Supreme Court precedent) . 
72 See William G. Howell, Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, 35 Presidential Stud. Q. 
417, 418 (2005) (discussing controversial executive decisions); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2331–46 (2001) (discussing the benefits of presi-
dential control over administrative process); Matthew Stephenson, Optimal Political Control 
of the Bureaucracy, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 53, 73 (2008) (critiquing the unitary executive theory 
on the basis of accountability). 
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greatest potential to act bilaterally across state-federal lines, with re-
sponsibilities ranging from policymaking to implementation and en-
forcement. Especially in the realms of implementation and enforce-
ment, federal executive activity becomes less unilateral and more 
negotiated with state and other stakeholders.73 This high degree of in-
volvement between some federal agencies and state partners substanti-
ates the arguments for Administrative Safeguards.74 
 Yet executive agents are hardly the only federal bargainers. Some-
times Congress participates by engaging its spending power to negoti-
ate with states, creating statutory forums for more nuanced intergov-
ernmental bargaining, or enacting laws by state invitation through 
negotiated political process. One scholar even describes how the Su-
preme Court effectively bargains with state courts over the future direc-
tion of federal law (though even this novel work fails to recognize the 
indirect bargaining process that a negotiation theorist understands as 
intersystemic signaling).75 Some forms of federalism bargaining are rel-
atively straightforward, as when state actors negotiate for specific poli-
cies within federal lawmaking.76 Others partner different federal, state, 
and local actors from across the different branches on both sides of the 
line in an elaborate process with multiple stages of iterative exchange— 
such as negotiated federal lawmaking over policy, which leads to nego-
tiated rulemaking over the details of implementation, which, in turn, 
leads to a general permit system that itself become a site for continued 
negotiation over the details of individual compliance.77 
 As demonstrated in the next Part, all three branches of govern-
ment participate across state-federal lines in the iterative process of joint 
decision making that—whether or not they realize it—is the hallmark of 
bargaining. They do so in a profound variety of contexts, and with a 
startling array of participants. Although negotiations often match execu-
tive actors at the highest state and federal levels, they just as often match 
federal executive or legislative actors at various points along the authori-
tative continuum with even more local actors, representing individual 
cities, discrete municipal agencies, or national organizations of local 
                                                                                                                      
73 See infra notes 96–399 and accompanying text. 
74 Supra text accompanying notes 57–67. 
75 See Bloom, supra note 28, at 509–47 (discussed infra notes 374–399 and accompany-
ing text). 
76 See infra notes 113–127 and accompanying text. 
77 See infra notes 256–300 and accompanying text. 
2011] Negotiating Federalism 21 
governance actors.78 For the sake of simplifying an already complex 
theoretical inquiry, this Article focuses on the “bilateral” vertical federal-
ism relationship between state and federal participants, occasionally 
submerging the more multilateral matrix of inter- and intra-state and 
federal interests concealed behind that line.79 Indeed, though the con-
ceit of monolithic state and federal actors clarifies my analysis without 
violating its premise, a fuller treatment of federalism bargaining should 
take even better account of the horizontal and diagonal dimensions of 
federalism relationships, and better emphasize the ways in which mu-
nicipal actors operate independently from the states.80 
 Because federalism scholars habitually see the issue in unilateral 
terms along the state-federal axis, the bilateral interpretive enterprise 
of intergovernmental bargaining is missing from the federalism safe-
guards discourse. But recognizing how much federalism practice is suf-
fused in negotiation opens up new possibilities for managing federal-
ism controversies, and new theoretical tools for analyzing them. 
 Negotiation theory offers well-developed conceptual frameworks 
for understanding the dynamics and dilemmas of federalism bargain-
ing, including issues of representation, commitment, leverage, sources 
of trade, competition, collaboration, and ethics.81 Negotiation theorists 
                                                                                                                      
78 See Judith Resnik, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Trans-
local Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS), 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 709, 711, 739–48 (2008) 
(describing the role of the “Big 7” and other translocal organizations in the adaptation of 
legal norms). 
79 Certainly, different federal agents can conflict over a negotiated outcome, as can 
states on the other side, and localities within states. See generally, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Di-
agonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 Ala. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (describing diagonal federalism relationships). 
80 See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of 
State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959, 960 (2007) (discussing interjurisdictional governance 
partnerships between municipal and federal actors that bypass the state level). See generally 
Osofsky, supra note 79; Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Feder-
alism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 Emory L.J. 31 
(2007) (disaggregating state and local interests in horizontal federalism terms). 
81 See generally Fisher & Ury, supra note 9; David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The 
Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain (1986) 
(discussing negotiation and its managerial applications); Howard Raiffa, The Art and 
Science of Negotiation: How To Resolve Conflicts and Get the Best Out of Bar-
gaining (1982) (discussing interpersonal and analytical aspects of negotiation theory); 
The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agree-
ment (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (describing an approach to negotiation whe-
reby groups jointly develop solutions that are more widely supported than those enacted 
through traditional decision making); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal 
Negotiation: The Structure of Legal Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754 (1984) (discussing 
the merits of “problem-solving” as opposed to zero-sum negotiations). For an excellent 
collection of essays reviewing the practical insights of negotiation theory in specific dispute 
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have harnessed insights from law, economics, game theory, psychology, 
and organizational behavior to build an extensive and interdisciplinary 
vocabulary for discussing the mechanics of bargaining, analyzing them 
simultaneously within frameworks of decision theory, societal norms, 
economic exchange, group dynamics, and cognitive science.82 In addi-
tion, negotiation theory offers negotiated governance new means to 
accomplish effective democratic participation, incorporate contingent 
and revisable decision making, manage barriers to consensus, and max-
imize integrative (rather than purely distributive) solutions to resource 
allocations whenever possible.83 
 Negotiation theory becomes especially valuable when disaggre-
gating federalism bargainers into the matrix of separate local, state, and 
federal actors that may have independent interests behind the state-
federal line.84 The multilateral characteristics of federalism bargaining 
align with many of the central problems with which multiparty negotia-
tion theorists have long wrestled,85 including group behavior,86 coali-
tion dynamics,87 process management,88 and representation and agency 
tensions.89 Negotiation theorists’ application of game theory, decision 
analysis, and behavioral economics could shed light on perverse incen-
tives and irrational outcomes in federalism bargaining contexts, as well 
as means for overcoming multiparty process impediments such as ex-
                                                                                                                      
resolution contexts, see The Handbook of Dispute Resolution (Michael L. Moffitt & 
Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005). 
82 See sources cited, supra note 81; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Roots and Inspirations: 
A Brief History of the Foundations of Dispute Resolution, in The Handbook of Dispute Reso-
lution, supra note 81, at 13. 
83 E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Comments on Collaborative Envi-
ronmental Dispute Resolution Processes, 8 Nev. L.J. 835, 836 (2008). In negotiation theory, an 
integrative solution is one that incorporates as much interest-based value into the decision 
as possible, uncovering potentially beneficial trades between parties’ differing interests 
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Ury, supra note 9, at 40–80. 
84 See supra notes 13–14. 
85 See generally Lawrence Susskind & Larry Crump, Multiparty Negotiation (2008). 
86 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale 
L.J. 71 (2000). 
87 See generally James Sebenius & David Lax, Thinking Coalitionally: Party Arithmetic, Proc-
ess Opportunism, and Strategic Sequencing, in Negotiation Analysis 153 (H. Peyton Young 
ed., 1991); James Sebenius, Sequencing To Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk First?, in 
Wise Choices: Decisions, Games, and Negotiations (Richard Zeckhauser et al. eds., 
1996). 
88 See, e.g., David Strauss, Managing Meetings to Build Consensus, in The Consensus 
Building Handbook, supra note 81, at 287. See generally Lawrence Susskind & Jeffrey 
Cruikshank, Breaking Robert’s Rules (2006). 
89 See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning 69–92, 178–203 (2004). 
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clusion and holdout.90 The multilateral nature of federalism bargaining 
offers unexplored possibilities for interest linkages and the kind of in-
tegrative value creation that negotiation theorists have demonstrated 
among multiple dovetailing interests.91 Federalism bargainers would 
also do well to heed research by negotiation theorists on the powerful 
heuristic biases that compromise negotiations.92 The architects of fed-
eralism bargaining forums could especially learn from the emerging 
field of dispute systems design, which applies negotiation theory in or-
ganizational structure to reduce the drag of conflict on institutional 
goals,93 and new governance theorists’ experimentation with process 
pluralism and iterative self-assessment criteria.94 
 Drawing insights from this literature, this Article fords new theo-
retical territory to assess how intergovernmental bargaining contributes 
to the overall federalism interpretive project. Building on previous ne-
gotiated governance scholarship,95 it reconceptualizes the boundary 
between state and federal authority as a project of ongoing negotiation 
across the regulatory spectrum. It shows how government actors navi-
gate the challenges of federalism not by virtue of unilateral good (or 
bad) faith, but through bilateral exchange with counterparts across the 
                                                                                                                      
90 See Leigh L. Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 189–94, 198–
203 (2d ed. 2001). See generally R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Deci-
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Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty (1997). 
91 See, e.g., Fisher & Ury, supra note 9, at 40–80; Lax & Sebenius, supra note 81, at 88–
116; Raiffa, supra note 81, at 131–47; see also Michael L. Moffitt, Disputes as Opportunities to 
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92 See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, in 
The Negotiator’s Fieldbook 351 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman 
eds., 2006). See generally Barriers To Conflict Resolution (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 
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Solving Organization, 8 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 133, 133–57 (2003). See generally William Ury 
et al., Getting Disputes Resolved: Design Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict 
(1993). 
94 See sources cited supra note 20. 
95 See generally, e.g., Bruce Babbit, ADR Concepts: Reshaping the Way Natural Resources Deci-
sions Are Made, 19 Alternatives to High Cost of Litig. 13, 13 (2001); Freeman, supra 
note 19, at 4, 8–31 (proposing a model of collaborative governance as an alternative to the 
model of interest representation); Brad Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: 
Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 Va. Envtl. L.J. 189 (2002) (discussing the emergence of 
a new model of collaborative ecosystem governance). 
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divide. It explores how procedural bargaining tools can supplement 
other interpretative methods to fill inevitable gaps, advancing the val-
ues that give federalism meaning. 
 But to fully understand the collaborative project of American fed-
eralism and the tools intergovernmental negotiation yields for navigat-
ing it, the first step is to explore the previously uncharted federalism 
bargaining landscape, the task of Part II. 
II. A Taxonomy of State-Federal Bargaining 
 This Part provides a positive account of federalism bargaining to 
substantiate the normative claims of the piece and empirically demon-
strate the breadth and depth of negotiated governance in federalism-
sensitive contexts. Responding to calls within the literature for “thick 
description” of collaborative governance—especially “in the context of 
enormously complex problems that implicate multiple jurisdictions 
and a great variety of parties”96—it identifies the primary ways in which 
state and federal actors negotiate with one another, grouping selected 
examples into a theoretical framework that establishes key commonal-
ities across the spectrum. 
 The resulting taxonomy focuses on opportunities for federalism 
bargaining within the structure of specific constitutional and statutory 
laws. The categories and examples are illustrative but not exclusive, and 
the taxonomy itself is loose, affording overlap between some categories. 
The discussion balances brevity with the detail needed to substantiate 
the analysis. Despite shortcomings, the taxonomy provides vocabulary 
for my subsequent analysis and a critical mass of examples from which 
to generalize, paving the way for future research. 
 By way of executive summary, state-federal bargaining is endemic to 
American governance and pervasive in many substantive areas of law. 
Negotiations take place over both the allocation of policy or decision-
making authority and the content of policies made pursuant to that au-
thority. Many negotiations are of the standard variety, neatly book-ended 
in space and time and conducted among self-identified participants.97 
Yet some of the most interesting examples evoke a broader understand-
ing of negotiation because they take place over longer periods of time, 
                                                                                                                      
96 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 83, at 850. The brevity of taxonomic descriptions may 
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97 See, e.g., infra notes 123–127, 148–157, 158–162 and accompanying text (discussing, 
in part, banking and financial services regulation, immigration, and the Clean Water Act’s 
pollution permitting program). 
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with a broader array of participants, or otherwise depart from the 
bounded exchange conjured by conventional images of the negotiating 
table.98 This Article adopts the broad definition of bargaining that nego-
tiation theorists prefer: an iterative process of communication by which 
multiple parties seek to influence one another in a project of joint deci-
sion making.99 Unified by this definition, the taxonomy sketches a con-
tinuum of negotiating formats that range from familiar forms of face-to-
face bargaining to remote exchanges between separately deliberating 
groups. 
 State-federal negotiations that follow the conventional model are 
easily recognizable. For example, state and federal executive actors fre-
quently negotiate in a conventional manner over the details of federal 
law that may impact the states, about law enforcement matters in which 
both hold interests, and over administrative details within cooperative 
programs that include state and federal participation.100 In addition, 
Congress frequently uses its spending power to bargain with state poli-
cymakers in areas of law traditionally associated with state prerogative, 
such as education, family law, and health policy.101 
 Other forums for intergovernmental negotiation have conven-
tional features, but are more deeply buried within other legal frame-
works. For example, within some spending power-based programs of 
cooperative federalism, Congress invites further state-federal bargaining 
by creating statutory invitations for states to propose innovations to ex-
isting federal programs, the details of which are often heavily negotiated 
with the overseeing federal agencies.102 In addition, some federal agen-
cies invite state stakeholders to the negotiating table early in the process 
of administrative rulemaking, thereby affording them a greater oppor-
tunity to influence the process than is possible under traditional notice-
and-comment rulemaking.103 
                                                                                                                      
98 See, e.g., infra notes 352–358, 376–392 and accompanying text (discussing Clean Air 
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 Still other forms depart even further from the conventional mod-
el, and may be overlooked as state-federal bargaining entirely. For ex-
ample, states have occasionally negotiated with Congress to become 
bound by enforceable federal laws, and Congress has occasionally cre-
ated forums for long-term, iterative sharing of policymaking authority 
with states.104 In the most exotic examples, participants may not have 
even recognized what they were doing as negotiation—such as the “it-
erative federalism” provisions of the Clean Air Act’s two-track vehicular 
emissions program,105 or the intersystemic signaling between state and 
federal policymakers that is currently underway regarding medical 
marijuana.106 Nevertheless, they meet the criteria of joint consensus 
that sets negotiated decision making apart from other forms of state-
federal interaction. 
 Defining negotiated governance so broadly invites the fair ques-
tion of what acts of governance would not be considered some move 
within a larger negotiation. If intersystemic signaling between state and 
federal lawmakers over medical marijuana policy counts, what about 
amicus briefs by state actors in federal court, or even less formal means 
by which state and federal actors influence one another’s decisions? In 
fact, our tradition of deliberative democracy within a federal system 
creates an almost infinite array of possibilities for federalism bargain-
ing, and demonstrating that array is a central purpose of the piece. 
Still, only the most formalized methods—those most amenable to pro-
cedural constraints, public scrutiny, and judicial review—are candidates 
for the interpretive deference discussed in Part IV. 
 The taxonomy that follows reviews ten basic types of federalism 
bargaining, identifying common norms and illustrating each with sub-
ject-matter examples. The types are roughly organized into three over-
arching categories: conventional examples, negotiations to reallocate 
authority, and joint policymaking negotiations. Some types of bargain-
ing fit into more than one structural group, and some statutory exam-
ples include more than one type of bargaining. Although some are 
more easily recognizable as negotiation than others, each contains the 
core bargaining constraints that render them candidates for procedural 
interpretive legitimacy. 
                                                                                                                      
104 See the discussion of bargained-for commandeering and modified bargained-for 
commandeering, infra notes 183–210 and accompanying text, and the discussion of itera-
tive federalism bargaining, infra notes 350–373 and accompanying text. 
105 See infra notes 352–358 and accompanying text. 
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 The first group encompasses the most conventional examples of 
federalism bargaining, where the iterative process most resembles col-
loquial understandings of bargaining as a simple exchange, or a pur-
poseful and time-bounded collective deliberation.107 These include: (1) 
interest group representation bargaining, by which state actors lobby 
federal lawmakers; (2) enforcement negotiations, including those over 
individual enforcement cases, state-federal enforcement partnerships, 
and enforcement matters within programs of cooperative federalism; 
and (3) negotiations over more administrative details, resource alloca-
tion, or settlement of litigation. (Spending power deals and negotiated 
rulemaking also reflect conventional bargaining, but they are ad-
dressed in categories that focus on their more interesting features.) 
 The second category includes negotiations to reallocate authority 
or to depart from an otherwise established legal order.108 These take 
place in contexts of overlap in which a constitutional or statutory provi-
sion provides an initial answer to the question of who gets to decide, 
but the parties choose to bargain around that line. Examples include: 
(4) spending power bargains, in which the federal government negoti-
ates to extend its regulatory reach into zones otherwise constitutionally 
reserved to the states; (5) bargained-for encroachment and comman-
deering, two closely related (but occasionally unconstitutional) forms 
in which states bargain to assume federal power or become bound by 
federal law; and (6) negotiations for various exceptions and permis-
sions within frameworks of statutory law. 
 Finally, the taxonomy turns with greatest attention to joint policy-
making bargaining, the most theoretically interesting category, which 
draws elements from the prior two.109 Joint policymaking forms in-
clude: (7) negotiated rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure 
Act; (8) policymaking laboratory negotiations, by which federal laws 
create “fill-in-the-blank” state policymaking zones and otherwise invite 
state proposals to modify federal law; (9) iterative policymaking nego-
tiations, which create a limited forum for shared state-federal 
policymaking over time; and (10) intersystemic signaling negotiations, 
by which separately deliberating state and federal actors trade influence 
over the direction of shared policy. Negotiations within this final 
category receive the most sustained attention because they hold the 
most meaningful promise for federalism interpretation. 
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 The many subject-matter examples in the taxonomy demonstrate 
the Article’s central claim that the boundary between state and federal 
authority is more porous than political rhetoric suggests, and more 
contingent than federalism jurisprudence has acknowledged. They also 
highlight under-theorized issues in federalism bargaining, and provide 
supporting data for the analysis in Parts III and IV. The discussion of-
fers rich analysis of a variety of contexts in which federalism bargaining 
takes place, building a platform for future research. 
A. Conventional Forms of Federalism Bargaining 
 The most familiar examples of federalism bargaining may be the 
most frequently used. The first category encompasses these most con-
ventional examples, where the iterative process best resembles collo-
quial understandings of bargaining as a simple exchange or a time-
bounded collective deliberation. These include: (1) interest group rep-
resentation bargaining, by which state actors lobby federal lawmakers;110 
(2) enforcement negotiations, including those over individual enforce-
ment cases, state-federal enforcement partnerships, and enforcement 
matters within programs of cooperative federalism;111 and (3) negotia-
tions over more administrative details, resource allocation, or in settle-
ment of litigation.112 
 The conventional negotiations involve a wide array of participants 
and variously address policymaking, implementation, and enforcement. 
Although the result of these negotiations usually becomes a matter of 
public record, the process itself may be hidden from public view, such 
that details are ascertainable only through first-hand accounts. In that 
regard, though these familiar forms of federalism bargaining may raise 
the fewest eyebrows, they may also be the most vulnerable to conven-
tional negotiating concerns about transparency, inclusion, third-party 
impacts, and principal-agent tensions. 
1. Interest Group Representation 
 Though hardly unique to federalism bargaining, state agents nego-
tiate with federal policymakers just like any other lobby to protect their 
interests during federal lawmaking. These negotiations reflect the 
normal workings of our interest group representation model of gov-
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ernance, in which stakeholders leverage their representation to accom-
plish their preferences during the legislative process.113 In these con-
ventional negotiations, state actors voice concerns, rally supporters, and 
pressure representatives to secure favorable legislative outcomes. Al-
though Congress retains the ultimate decision to enact a law (and the 
President retains veto power), the sausage-making process by which a 
bill is created and shepherded through passage is always an elaborate 
multiparty negotiation between the various stakeholders and their rep-
resentatives.114 
 The mechanics of this conventional form of bargaining would be 
familiar to any dealmaker, but interest group negotiations present in-
teresting questions about who best represents state interests. As collec-
tive bargainers have long understood, leverage often follows clout, and 
states often work together to accomplish common legislative prefer-
ences in Congress through national organizations such as the National 
Governors Association (NGA), the National Conference of State Legis-
latures (NCSL), the National Association of Attorneys General, and the 
United States Conference of Mayors.115 Nevertheless, consensus is often 
hard-fought even within those organizations.116 When interests diverge 
among the states, state actors lobby or otherwise negotiate with federal 
lawmakers independently, as demonstrated by the special interests tak-
en by New York State in federal financial services regulation, or by Cali-
fornia in federal environmental policy. In this context, negotiations are 
usually initiated by state interests, sometimes to spur desired federal 
policy, and other times in response to federal movement toward unde-
sired policies. 
a. Stimulus Bill 
 For example, the states shared fairly uniform interests in President 
Obama’s $787 billion stimulus proposal, and played a formidable role 
in designing the resulting American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009.117 Although the policy decisions associated with the stimulus 
package are usually attributed to the Obama administration, extensive 
lobbying by the NGA and NCSL secured the substantial provision of 
                                                                                                                      
113 Freeman, supra note 19, at 18. 
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115 E.g., Resnik, supra note 78, at 726–69. 
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islatures ( Jan. 15, 2010). 
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(codified as amended in scattered sections of 6, 19, 26, 42, and 47 U.S.C.). 
30 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1 
direct relief to support state infrastructure and public education.118 The 
NGA lobbied Congress to fund state projects that could quickly chan-
nel stimulus money into jobs,119 while NCSL urged the President to aid 
fiscally hemorrhaging states because their need to cut spending and 
raise taxes (to meet state constitutional balanced-budget requirements) 
would inevitably worsen the national slump.120 In the end, the Stimulus 
Bill included over $250 billion in direct assistance to states,121 approxi-
mately one-third of the total funds allocated.122 
b. Banking and Financial Services Regulation 
 Some states with unique financial regulatory interests have also 
negotiated tenaciously with federal lawmakers over recent proposals to 
regulate banking and financial services in the wake of the 2008 crisis. 
For instance, the recently passed Restoring Financial Stability Act of 
2010 creates both a Financial Stability Oversight Council and a new 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency housed within the Federal Re-
serve.123 States lobbied hard to accomplish their legislative preferences 
in the crafting of these proposals, which could dramatically impact 
their own regulatory jurisdiction (as the former could wrest regulatory 
control from dozens of state and federal agencies, and the latter would 
set consumer protection standards that could alternatively undergird or 
preempt existing state laws).124 Some negotiations evidence jealous bat-
                                                                                                                      
118 Robert Jay Dilger, Cong. Research Serv., RS 22849, States and Proposed 
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tles for regulatory turf,125 while others demonstrate the potential for 
effective collaboration in areas of jurisdictional overlap.126 For example, 
New York State regulators have also collaborated with federal counter-
parts to bilaterally regulate hot-button issues like executive compensa-
tion.127 
2. Enforcement Negotiations 
 State and federal executive actors frequently negotiate over mat-
ters of enforcement where jurisdiction overlaps—ranging from indi-
vidual criminal cases to enforcement responsibilities within complex 
programs of cooperative federalism. Ongoing state-federal partnerships 
have been negotiated to cope with chronic enforcement issues involv-
ing gun violence and child pornography, and to extend federal en-
forcement authority to state actors in contexts where states possess crit-
ical enforcement capacity, such as immigration law.128 State and federal 
actors also negotiate over enforcement policy and individual enforce-
ment actions arising within cooperative federalism programs, such as 
the Clean Air, Clean Water, and Superfund Acts. 
a. Criminal Enforcement Cases 
 State and federal law enforcement agencies regularly negotiate 
responsibility for investigating and prosecuting criminal activity pun-
ishable under both state and federal law, often involving drug traffick-
ing, alien smuggling, racketeering, or conspiracy cases.129 Negotiations 
over individual cases are usually informal and rarely adversarial; par-
ticipants range from top lawyers at the Justice Department to individual 
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investigators.130 Federal agencies usually become involved only after 
criminal activity has exceeded state and local law enforcement capac-
ity.131 Negotiations then begin early because decisions about where the 
case will be prosecuted determine the allocation of resources and inves-
tigative responsibilities.132 
 In contrast to state-federal competition over policymaking jurisdic-
tion, state actors usually welcome federal intervention in criminal en-
forcement matters, especially those involving terrorism and immigra-
tion issues, because the deployment of federal resources frees up scarce 
state resources for other cases.133 In addition, state and federal agencies 
occasionally negotiate collaborative “strike force” agreements, a coop-
erative enterprise for investigating and prosecuting interjurisdictional 
crime.134 State district attorneys and lawyers from the state attorney 
general’s office are occasionally deputized to act as U.S. Attorneys in 
order to collaborate in these interjurisdictional partnerships.135 
i.  Project Safe Neighborhoods 
 Collaborative state-federal programs have been especially popular in 
efforts to combat gang violence.136 Building on successful pilot programs 
in Virginia and Massachusetts, the Department of Justice has joined with 
the National District Attorneys Association and the International Associa-
tion of Chiefs of Police to administer the Project Safe Neighborhoods 
program, which partners regional U.S. Attorney’s offices with corre-
sponding State Attorney General’s offices, the FBI, ATF, state and local 
police, and state probation and parole officers to coordinate the deter-
rence, investigation, and prosecution of gun violence in metropolitan 
areas.137 Nearly all such initiatives also involve local government and 
community representatives, with explicit recognition of the benefits of 
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drawing on both local and national capacities.138 Similar enforcement 
partnerships have been established to combat child predation through 
the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Program.139 
b. Cooperative Federalism Enforcement Actions 
 Copious negotiation also takes place during individual enforce-
ment cases that arise within complex programs of cooperative federal-
ism. In these situations, state and federal regulators assume distinct but 
interlocking roles to accomplish complex regulatory objectives. 
i. Environmental Statutes 
 For example, EPA often negotiates with state counterparts in pri-
oritizing and implementing enforcement actions against in-state viola-
tions under the Clean Air and Water Acts.140 In one recent instance, 
EPA collaborated with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP) in an attempt to bring a Pennsylvania foundry into 
compliance with Clean Air Act emissions standards, prompting the De-
partment of Justice to file a federal suit against the foundry on behalf 
of EPA and the Pennsylvania DEP.141 Congress also amended the Clean 
Water Act in the 1970s to require EPA to follow a state list of priority 
water pollution cleanup projects, rather than allowing EPA to create its 
own list based on need and public health dangers. As a result, EPA 
must negotiate with states about which treatment facilities to build 
where and when.142 (Allocation by the Clean Air and Water Acts of state 
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implementation responsibilities also engendered a distinct form of po-
licymaking bargaining discussed under the Policymaking Laboratory 
category in Section C.2, below.)143 
 Similarly, the Superfund Act144 effectively requires state-federal 
negotiation over enforcement priorities by mandating that states pay at 
least ten percent of remedial action to qualify for certain federal clean-
up funds.145 Because EPA cannot force a state to pay more than it is will-
ing to spend, states are effectively empowered to negotiate with EPA 
over the priority and intensity of proposed cleanups insofar as they can 
limit cleanup costs to what the relevant state is willing to pay.146 
c. Shared Enforcement Policy Negotiations 
 Congress has also created specific forums for state-federal en-
forcement bargaining in more purposeful ways. Some statutes author-
ize state-federal negotiation over memoranda of agreement (“MOAs”) 
that govern state-federal enforcement partnerships, as in immigration 
enforcement and environmental permitting contexts.147 
i.  Immigration and Nationality Act ACCESS Program 
 The Immigration and Nationalization Act enables U.S. Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to delegate certain enforcement 
authority to state and local law enforcement agencies under the 
Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and 
Security (ACCESS) program.148 Provided that local officers receive 
proper federal training and supervision, the program allows state and 
local patrol officers, detectives, investigators, and correctional officers 
to be equipped with resources and authority to pursue matters other-
wise within the exclusive jurisdiction of ICE, including human smug-
gling, gang activity and organized crime, money laundering, and nar-
                                                                                                                      
“efforts to grasp a large pot of money triumphed over technical efforts to achieve water 
pollution control”). 
143 See infra notes 301–349 and accompanying text. 
144 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006)). 
145 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(C). 
146 Emails from Howard Latin to author, supra note 142. 
147 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006); 33 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1342 (West 2008). 
148 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (commonly referred to as “287(g)” agreements, these au-
thorize state employees to perform “function[s] of an immigration officer in relation to 
the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States” under the 
terms of a MOA). 
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cotics smuggling.149 At present, 63 separate ACCESS agreements have 
been negotiated and 840 local officers trained.150 Since 2006, more 
than 70,000 immigration violators have been identified through the 
program.151 
 The MOA at the center of the ACCESS program defines the scope 
and limitations of the designated law enforcement authority.152 Until 
recently, ACCESS agreements have varied between jurisdictions,153 hig-
hlighting the degree to which terms are negotiated.154 Although a 
model agreement has circulated among some localities, many agree-
ments have been tailored to meet the specific interests and needs of 
individual state or local governments.155 Variation between MOAs can 
also reflect concerns of the federal agency, especially when local and 
federal immigration priorities diverge. For example, ICE limited the 
scope of shared enforcement authority with Phoenix, Arizona based on 
concerns that a Maricopa County sheriff’s aggressive enforcement activ-
ity was inconsistent with federal practice.156 Many agreements now limit 
local authority to investigating incarcerated suspects, and only a few 
allow for a more expansive local role.157 
                                                                                                                      
149 See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, Co-
lo. Department Pub. Safety (Aug. 18, 2008), http://cdpsweb.state.co.us/immigration/ 
Meetings/October21/ (follow “Delegation of Immigration Section 287(g)” hyperlink) 
(handout at October 21, 2008 meeting of Colorado Department of Public Safety’s Immigra-
tion Working Group). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152Id. Section 1357(g) of title 8 outlines some of the details regarding scope and limita-
tions that are to be included in memoranda between local law enforcement and ICE. 
153 See Lisa Seghetti et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL 32270, Enforcing Immigra-
tion Law: The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement, Congressional Research 
Service Report 15–18 (2004). Former variation between MOAs focusing on detention 
facility and field screening are coalescing into relatively standardized agreements, the “Jail 
Enforcement” model and the “Task Force” model. 2009 ACCESS MOAs, U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/foia/readingroom.htm#. 
154 For a review of negotiated immigration policy in other contexts, see Miriam J. 
Wells, The Grassroots Reconfiguration of U.S. Immigration Policy, 38 Int’l Migration Rev. 
1308, 1328–31 (2004). 
155 For example, although the first two MOAs with Florida and Alabama contained 
similar training and federal tort claims provisions, only Florida’s included minimum edu-
cational criteria, and only Alabama’s secured federal representation for state officers in 
ACCESS-related litigation. Seghetti et al., supra note 153, at 17–19. 
156 J.J. Henley, Sheriff Arpaio May Lose Immigrant Authority, Ariz. Republic, Oct. 3, 2009, 
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2009/10/03/20091003arpaio-
ice1003.html (discussing changes in the MOA stripping local enforcement authority on 
the streets and limiting it to county jails). 
157 See 2009 ACCESS MOAs, supra note 153. 
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ii. Clean Water Act NPDES Program 
 States also assume in situ enforcement authority over the heart of 
the Clean Water Act’s pollution permitting program through negotiated 
MOAs. Administered by EPA, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES) program prohibits the discharge of pollutants into 
federally protected water bodies without a permit, and allows EPA to 
delegate permitting authority to willing states.158 All but a few states have 
chosen to self-administer the NPDES program because it allows them to 
control in-state water resources and economic development.159 
 When a state elects to assume NPDES permitting authority, it ne-
gotiates a MOA with EPA that sets forth the details about how the per-
mitting program will be implemented.160 Although most memoranda 
begin with fairly standard language, there is enough meaningful varia-
tion between them to indicate negotiated input from the states.161 Dif-
ferences range from varying time periods for review to significantly dif-
ferent allocation of permitting authority in various contexts.162 
3. Administrative Negotiations 
 State and federal executive agencies also conduct conventional 
negotiations over administrative matters with fewer policy implications, 
including some licensing decisions, resource allocation decisions in 
some of the cooperative programs discussed above, and the settlement 
                                                                                                                      
158 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b) (West 2008). 
159 E.g., NPDES State Program Authorization Briefing Paper, N.M. Env’t Dep’t ( June 2004), 
http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/swqb/PSRS/NPDES-DelegationBriefingPaper_June-04.pdf 
(discussing the benefits of self-administration); Interview with Mike Murphy, Dir. of Envtl. 
Enhancement, Va. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (DEQ), in Richmond, Va. ( Jan. 25, 2010) (noting 
that state agencies can respond to permit applications more quickly and knowledgeably than 
EPA). 
160 40 C.F.R. § 123.24(a)–(b) (2010) (detailing MOA requirements). 
161 E-mails from Robin Kundis Craig, Professor of Envtl. Law, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of 
Law, to the author ( July 3, 2009, 7:18 EST & Jan. 1, 2010, 12:32 EST). 
162 For example, in otherwise similar agreements, EPA retains authority to review any 
permits issued by the State of Maine but waives review of draft wastewater, stormwater, and 
sewage sludge permits in Texas. Compare NPDES Memorandum of Agreement Between 
the State of Maine and the United States EPA Region 1, at 5 (2000), available at 
http://www.maine.gov/dep/blwq/delegation/moa.pdf, with Memorandum of Agreement 
Between the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission and the U.S. EPA, 
Region 6, at 27 (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/region6/water/npdes/docs/texas-
moa.pdf. Other differences include provisions for permitting in Indian country, for enforc-
ing the Endangered Species Act, and for timing, notice, and review. Compare NPDES Memo-
randum of Agreement Between the State of Maine and the United States EPA Re-
gion 1, supra, at 2, 9, with Memorandum of Agreement Between the Texas Natural 
Resource Conservation Commission and the U.S. EPA Region 6, supra, at 3, 17. 
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of litigation. For example, negotiation is common in the settlement of 
litigation over interstate water allocation in which both parties have in-
terests.163 In contrast to other federalism bargaining forums, adminis-
trative negotiations involve less latitude for policymaking, fewer oppor-
tunities for impacting the ultimate objectives of a previously defined 
policy, and are often over the finer details of implementation. Never-
theless, in contrast to purely ministerial decision making (e.g., driver’s 
license issuance), administrative federalism negotiations can involve 
iterative processes that incorporate input from both sides. 
B. Negotiations to Reallocate Authority 
 The second category includes negotiations to reallocate authority 
that is already delegated to one side or the other under an established 
constitutional or statutory order. Examples include (1) spending power 
bargains, in which the federal government negotiates to extend its reg-
ulatory reach into zones otherwise constitutionally reserved to the 
states;164 (2) bargained-for encroachment and commandeering, related 
forms in which states respectively seek to expand their jurisdiction into 
federal territory or limit their own regulatory authority under binding 
federal law;165 and (3) negotiations for permissions and exceptions 
within otherwise applicable legal frameworks.166 
                                                                                                                      
163 E.g., Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Nez Perce Water Rights Settlement Bene-
fits Tribe, Idaho, Pacific Northwest (May 15, 2004), available at http://www.idwr.idaho. 
gov/waterboard/WaterPlanning/nezperce/pdf_files/press_release.pdf (describing nego-
tiations over Snake River Basin water allocation involving state, federal, tribal, and private 
participants). 
164 See infra notes 167–182 and accompanying text. 
165 See infra notes 183–210 and accompanying text. 
166 See infra notes 211–250 and accompanying text. States also trade power with the 
federal government in the negotiation of federal enclaves carved out of existing state 
lands, in which states often cede power in exchange for desired federal policies—such as 
the creation of a wanted National Park, or the application of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006), which allows the borrowing of state law when there is no appli-
cable federal statute. For more on federal enclaves, see Interdepartmental Comm. for 
the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas, Jurisdiction over Federal Areas 
Within the States 7–11 (1956), available at http://www.constitution.org/juris/fjur/1fj1-
3.htm. Another interesting arena of criminal law bargaining is the cross-deputization 
agreements between the federal government and Indian tribes expanding the jurisdiction 
of each side without compromising either’s sovereignty. Joseph P. Kallt & Joseph W. Singer, 
Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule 11 (KSG 
Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP04-016, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=529084. 
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1. Spending Power Deals 
 The most recognized form of federalism bargaining is that which 
takes place between the federal and state governments under Con-
gress’s Article I spending power.167 By conditioning the offer of federal 
funds on federally desired state action, Congress may extend its regula-
tory reach beyond that of its other enumerated powers.168 Bargaining 
with the spending power this way has become a standard congressional 
tool for influencing regulatory policy in areas of interjurisdictional 
concern since the New Deal.169 Examples pervade the regulatory land-
scape, ranging from simple exchanges sought by “federal funds with 
strings” to elaborate programs of cooperative federalism. 
 Of all federalism bargaining forms, spending power bargaining 
has received the most direct judicial and scholarly attention. Some 
scholars have critiqued spending power bargaining as an unbounded 
exercise of federal authority that cannot be reconciled with the New 
Federalism limits on federal power.170 They urge that spending power 
deals allowing federal reach into state jurisdiction cannot be consid-
ered fair simply because states consent, because the bargaining leverage 
so favors the federal side that state participation is effectively co-
erced.171 States dependent on federal funding cannot realistically opt 
out, they argue, so resulting deals are as flawed as a contract made un-
der duress.172 Yet the Supreme Court has not been receptive, reasoning 
that, like contracting individuals at common law, states hold the ulti-
mate authority to decide whether their interests are best served by tak-
ing or rejecting the proffered deal.173 The Court has never invalidated a 
deal meeting its modest spending doctrine constraints, and it rejected 
                                                                                                                      
167 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
168 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (“Here, Congress has acted indi-
rectly under its spending power to encourage uniformity in the States’ drinking ages. . . . 
[W]e find this legislative effort within constitutional bounds even if Congress may not 
regulate drinking ages directly.”); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 
(1992) (citing to Dole when considering a challenge to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1985, discussed infra notes 197–207 and accompanying text). 
169 See Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 195, 
196, 213 (2001) (critiquing the prevalence of spending power governance). 
170 See generally Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court 
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 
78 Ind. L.J. 459 (2003). 
171 Id. at 467–70, 520–21. 
172 Id. at 487. 
173 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08. 
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an invitation to extend New Federalism constraints to that doctrine in 
the late Rehnquist years.174 
 Spending power deals are exclusively at the invitation of Congress, 
to the state executive or legislative actors empowered to act on the deal. 
Yet the negotiation process usually begins in interest group bargaining 
over terms before the deal is formally proffered—and Congress does 
not always initiate this bargaining.175 For that reason, spending power 
bargains are not always federally force-fed policy directives to states; 
some represent the wishes of state advocates.176 
a. Energy Efficiency Conservation Block Grant Program 
 For example, state actors were instrumental in the genesis of the 
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007,177 which author-
ized the Energy Efficiency Conservation Block Grant program (EECBG) 
as part of a national clean energy legislative effort.178 Thanks to state 
leadership in the design of the program, federal grants under the 
EECBG program offer funds to state, tribal, and municipal governments 
in exchange for their development and implementation of community-
based projects to improve energy efficiency, reduce energy use, and re-
duce carbon emissions.179 Congress proposed $2 billion in annual fund-
ing for the EECBG program in the EISA, with 2% going to tribal pro-
grams, 28% to states, 68% to large cities and counties, and an additional 
2% for a competitive program for small cities and counties.180 
                                                                                                                      
174 Pierce Cnty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146 (2003). 
175 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 150 (discussing Congress’s reliance on 
a report by the National Governors Association in drafting the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985); Anonymous Interview, U.S. Senate, Wash., D.C. 
(Nov. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Senate Interview] (on file with the Boston College Law Review) 
(describing how state actors often initiate spending power legislation through interest 
group negotiations with federal lawmakers, including the Energy Efficiency Conservation 
Block Grant Program). 
176 See Senate Interview, supra note 175. 
177 Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 
15, 42, and 46 U.S.C.). 
178 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 17151–17158 (2006). 
179 Weatherization and Intergovernmental Program: Efficiency Conservation Block Grant Program, 
Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, http://www.eecbg.energy.gov/ (noting that DOE 
has already awarded $1.6 billion in grants to over 1400 projects). 
180 Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program—State, Local and Tribal 
Allocation Formulas, 74 Fed. Reg. 17,461 (Apr. 15, 2009); see also U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, The Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant (EECBG) 2, available 
at http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/eecbghandout.pdf. 
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b. No Child Left Behind 
 On the other hand, other spending power deals are more clearly 
driven by federal policymakers, and some are unpopular even among 
the states that choose to bargain. For example, the No Child Left Be-
hind Act of 2001181 is a standards-based education reform law that trades 
federal education funding for states’ agreement to focus on bringing 
their most disadvantaged students up to a federally mandated level of 
achievement. Although few question the value of its goals and no states 
chose to forgo needed federal funds, the Act’s assessment policies have 
proved controversial. For example, many school systems argue that the 
Act forces unbeneficial “teaching to the test,” unnecessarily usurps local 
authority, and penalizes already struggling school systems.182 
2. Bargained-for Encroachment and Commandeering 
 On the flip side of spending power bargaining are states’ occasional 
attempts to bargain around constitutionally designated lines of authority 
by negotiating to expand their jurisdiction at the expense of federal 
prerogative, or to be bound (or “commandeered”) by federal law. 
 In bargained-for encroachment, states negotiate for federal ap-
proval of interstate compacts that derogate federal power. Interstate 
compacts (which can also involve federal parties) represent the converse 
of spending power bargaining, in that states seek federal permission to 
encroach on federal jurisdiction.183 As a doctrinal matter, congressional 
approval is required whenever such an agreement would increase the 
power of states at the expense of the federal government,184 effectively 
reallocating the initial distribution of regulatory authority. 
 For example, eight states negotiated the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence 
River Basin Compact between 2001 and 2005 out of fear that proposals 
from the Army Corps of Engineers to divert Great Lakes waters to the 
high plains might trigger further federal mandates to funnel Great 
Lakes waters to arid western states.185 The compact, like many similar 
interstate water compacts, won congressional approval despite clear 
                                                                                                                      
181 Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (enacted Jan. 8, 2002) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
182 Sam Dillon, Obama to Seek Sweeping Change of the ‘No Child’ Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 
2010, at A1 (noting criticisms of the Act); Krista Kafer, No Child Left Behind: Where Do We Go 
from Here?, Backgrounder (The Heritage Found., Wash., D.C.), July 6, 2004, http://www. 
heritage.org/research/education/bg1775.cfm (full state participation). 
183 Dan Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and Resources § 10:24 (2009). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. § 10:32. 
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Supreme Court precedent establishing federal supremacy in the alloca-
tion of interstate waters.186 Notwithstanding, the compact makes it diffi-
cult to divert water from the basin, empowering state decision making 
at the expense of federal prerogative.187 
 Congressional consent also saves interstate compacts that might 
otherwise encroach on Congress’s exclusive authority over interstate 
commerce.188 For example, the terms of the Yellowstone River Compact 
contravene the Commerce Clause by requiring that Montana, North 
Dakota, and Wyoming consent to any water diversions outside the water 
basin,189 but the Ninth Circuit has affirmed that congressional approval 
of the compact immunized this consent requirement from objections 
under the dormant commerce clause.190 
 More controversially, in bargained-for commandeering, states ne-
gotiate with the federal government to bind state regulatory discretion 
under a federal law that reflects state preferences, usually to referee a 
collective action problem among the states without losing state policy 
leadership.191 When state actors have initiated this kind of bargaining, it 
is generally because they prefer the solution they are proposing to a fully 
preemptive solution imposed top-down from federal lawmakers.192 State 
consensus is often developed through the activities of a national state 
interests group, such as the National Governors Association, which then 
bargains directly with federal actors on behalf of its constituency.193 
 Federal involvement is often necessary to make these state-initiated 
agreements enforceable because state compacts are too easily aban-
doned by states that later repudiate the deal.194 Securing federal en-
                                                                                                                      
186 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953–54, 959–60 (1982). 
187 Tarlock, supra note 183, § 10:32. 
188 Id. § 10:26. 
189 Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, http://yrcc.usgs.gov/ (last visited Nov. 25, 
2010). 
190 Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
191 E.g., Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 
(1980), amended by Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. 
No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j (2006)). 
192 Ryan, supra note 35, at 33. 
193 See Mitchel N. Herian, Governors and the National Governors Association 
(NGA): Examining the Federal Lobbying Impact of the NGA 31 (2008) (finding that 
the NGA has a good success rate in achieving the outcomes for which it lobbies on behalf 
of its state-based constituencies). 
194 Ryan, supra note 35, at 35; see also Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2305–
13 (2010) (rejecting the request by members of a radioactive waste disposal state compact 
to hold North Carolina liable for damages and sanctions after it withdrew from the agree-
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forcement of a plan collectively chosen by the states behind the regula-
tory veil of ignorance allows the parties to fairly chart a course of hori-
zontal and vertical consensus before history determines the plan’s 
eventual winners and losers.195 The most famous example of this kind 
of bargaining was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court as unconstitu-
tional in New York v. United States in 1992 for violating the allocation of 
state and federal power protected by the Tenth Amendment.196 Never-
theless, as demonstrated by the Clean Water Act’s Phase II Stormwater 
Rule, weaker “modified commandeering bargains” have enabled indi-
vidual state actors to opt out of an overall agreement to reallocate state 
and federal authority. 
a. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
 In the most notorious example of bargained-for commandeering, 
the states persuaded Congress to enact the terms of the Low-Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRWPA).197 The LLRWPA created a federal 
regulatory program in which states agreed to be responsible for their 
fair share of radioactive waste. Prior to its passage, the few states with 
disposal facilities were so frustrated at being the toxic dumping grounds 
for the others that—unable to reject interstate shipments without violat-
ing the dormant commerce clause—they threatened to close their facili-
ties entirely, leaving the nation with no safe disposal options.198 To re-
solve the collective action problem without ceding all regulatory control 
to the federal government, the states unanimously negotiated with one 
another and then with Congress for a preferred solution that ultimately 
bound state legislative discretion under federal law.199 
 In a conscious attempt to respect state consensus, Congress 
adopted the state-led approach in enacting the LLRWPA and subse-
quent amendments requiring each state to either arrange for safe dis-
                                                                                                                      
ment, even though North Carolina had accepted $80 million from plaintiff states in an-
ticipation of its performance). 
195 Ryan, supra note 35, at 35. 
196 See 505 U.S. at 174–75 (“The take title provision is of a different character . . . . In 
this provision, Congress has crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coer-
cion.”). But see Ryan, supra note 35, at 13 (arguing this overbroad conclusion is inconsis-
tent with federalism when bargaining is state-initiated). 
197 Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980), amended by Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (current version 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j (2006)). 
198 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 150; Ryan, supra note 35, at 30–31. 
199 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 192 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); 
Ryan, supra note 35, at 33–34. 
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posal of in-state waste by the deadline or assume legal responsibility.200 
Although New York State helped lead negotiations with Congress, it 
had trouble siting an in-state facility and ultimately sued to repudiate 
the deal.201 The Supreme Court invalidated the key penalty provision, 
holding that the facility-siting requirement violated the Tenth Amend-
ment.202 The Court held that the law unconstitutionally comman-
deered New York’s sovereign authority, even though New York had con-
sensually negotiated the deal.203 
 New York v. United States presents a rare example of an explicit doc-
trinal barrier to potentially desirable federalism bargaining. The case 
also offers an unusually clear example of how a decision implicating an 
important policy result—one potentially resolving the ongoing radioac-
tive waste disposal dilemma204—might have come out differently had 
the justices more clearly understood the interpretive potential of state-
federal bargaining in contexts of jurisdictional overlap. By engaging in 
bargained-for commandeering, states can secure a federal umpire for 
collective action disputes and retain greater control over the policymak-
ing process than is available to them as the more passive partners in 
congressional spending power bargains. 
 Scholars have critiqued the logic of the Court’s decision in New 
York v. United States, which seems to deny state initiative and self-
determination in a way that contradicts federalism values.205 In previous 
work I have explored the anti-bargaining implications of the decision in 
detail, showing how the Court could eliminate the doctrinal barrier 
simply by revising its implicit remedy rule to enable state-initiated bar-
gaining around the anti-commandeering entitlement.206 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                      
200 99 Stat. at 1842; Ryan, supra note 35, at 33–34. 
201 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 154; Ryan, supra note 35, at 33–34. 
202 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 149. 
203 See id. at 174–75. A more interesting suit not addressed by these facts would have 
been one by a state that had not consented to the terms of the deal proffered to Congress 
by the NGA. That would have demonstrated the kind of commandeering that would 
rightly concern the Court—but the New York v. United States rule clearly declined to differ-
entiate between bargained-for commandeering with and without state consent. Id. at 180–
82 (“Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure 
from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”). 
204 See Ryan, supra note 35, at 50–55. 
205 Id. at 13, 55–64. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative 
Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256 (2009) (discussing how states use their regulatory power to 
resist federal policy); Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 
59 Vand. L. Rev. 1629 (2006) (critiquing the consequences of the anti-commandeering doc-
trine). 
206 See generally Ryan, supra note 35. 
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bargained-for commandeering remains a form of federalism bargain-
ing unavailable as a matter of constitutional law.207 
b. Modified Bargained-for Commandeering: Stormwater Regulation 
 Modified bargained-for commandeering involves a broad consen-
sus between most state actors to be bound under federally enforceable 
law, but with an opt-out provision for individually dissenting states. For 
example, drawing lessons from the failed LLRWPA agreement, the 
states later negotiated away regulatory discretion in permitting local 
construction projects through a process of negotiated rulemaking over 
the terms of the Clean Water Act’s Phase II Stormwater Rule, which 
regulates the stormwater discharges of small and medium-sized mu-
nicipalities.208 That bargain survived a Tenth Amendment challenge 
because the drafters allowed individual municipalities to opt out of the 
overall state-federal partnership in favor of a more complicated permit-
ting provision for large cities.209 
 Although the modified approach might not have worked in the 
more pressing collective action problem confronted by the LLRWPA, 
Phase II Rule negotiations show how a weaker form of commandeering 
bargaining can withstand constitutional challenge and still contribute 
to state-federal partnerships. The opt-out provision also hedges against 
the representational concerns raised in situations like this one, in 
which the negotiated consensus had been reached between EPA and an 
incomplete sample of the thousands of impacted municipalities.210 
3. Exceptions Negotiations 
 State and federal actors also negotiate for exceptions under other-
wise applicable statutory law. Most of the time, these negotiations fea-
ture state executive actors seeking release from federal executives who 
administer federal laws that apply to state activity (or private activity of 
economic interest to the state), such as the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA). In the ESA context, states negotiate to undertake otherwise pro-
                                                                                                                      
207 Id. at 39. 
208 40 C.F.R. § 122.34 (2010), discussed infra notes 283–290 and accompanying text. 
209 Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA (EDC II ), 344 F.3d 832, 845 n.18 (9th Cir. 2003). 
210 See Phase II Stormwater Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,230, 40,232 (Aug. 7, 1995) 
(“Several commentators questioned whether State and local officials had been consulted 
in developing the proposed rule . . . . Prior to publication of the direct final and proposed 
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hibited activities under “Incidental Take Permits” (ITPs), they negotiate 
over federal listing decisions that threaten state economic interests, and 
they negotiate over consultation requirements.211 In other examples, 
such as federal hydroelectric licensing, state actors hold important 
cards.212 
a. ESA Incidental Take Permits 
 The ESA213 forbids public and private actions that would harm 
plant and animal species listed under the statute as threatened or en-
dangered,214 and requires federal actors to consult with federal wildlife 
agencies before taking action that could result in harm to listed spe-
cies.215 State actors must heed listed species protections both in main-
taining state infrastructure216 and in regulating private activity.217 Nev-
ertheless, the many opportunities that have evolved to negotiate ESA 
restrictions exemplify how states negotiate for federal exceptions. 
 Most notably, although the statute prohibits human actions that 
harm (or “take”) listed species, it provides a window to negotiate excep-
tions for certain activities that might cause unintentional harm if that 
harm is sufficiently mitigated.218 When applicants create a “Habitat 
Conservation Plan” (HCP) to compensate for any harm, they can seek 
an ITP that exempts them from ESA liability.219 States have used this 
provision to negotiate exceptions for both development and conserva-
tion-oriented projects. 
 For example, California and federal agencies negotiated the com-
plex Natomas Basin HCP in 2003 to enable the Sacramento Area Flood 
Control Agency to protect the city with a needed levee system that nev-
ertheless placed habitat for listed species within the redirected flood-
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214 Id. § 1538. 
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216 See, e.g., Natomas Basin Conservancy, http://www.natomasbasin.org/ (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2010). 
217 E.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 158 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that state fishing 
permits allowing fixed nets in Northern Right whale breeding habitat constituted a vicari-
ous take). 
218 16 U.S.C. § 1539. 
219 See id. Applicants must submit a conservation plan specifying the likely impact from 
the taking, why alternatives are not preferable, and steps to minimize and mitigate nega-
tive impacts. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
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plain.220 Similarly, several northwest states have participated in the ne-
gotiation of complex HCPs to enable large-scale timber harvest on state 
forestlands.221 Sometimes (as in the Natomas Basin example), states are 
bargaining in their sovereign capacity as local regulators; elsewhere (as 
with state timber sales), they act as ordinary regulated parties in their 
proprietary capacity as landowners—a distinction that may fairly war-
rant different interpretive bargaining scrutiny.222 State-federal negoti-
ated HCPs (and others) have been lauded as striking a pragmatic bal-
ance between environmental and economic needs, but have also been 
criticized for undermining the preservation principle behind the ESA, 
which pointedly does not call for cost-benefit analysis.223 
 States have also negotiated ESA exceptions to enable even more 
ambitious conservation programs. For example, in the early 1990s, Cal-
ifornia passed the Natural Community Conservation Planning Act 
(NCCP), a voluntary conservation program to protect intact ecosystems 
rather than individual species.224 The program sought to accommodate 
compatible land use and prevent the regulatory “gridlock” that can ac-
company listing decisions by engaging interested parties before species 
became threatened.225 The NCCP was thus more ambitious in scope 
than both the ESA and the California Endangered Species Act, which 
only protect individual species that have already significantly de-
                                                                                                                      
220 See Natomas Basin Conservancy, supra note 216. The levee required a federal 
permit that could not issue because the habitat for twenty-two listed species would be 
drowned by the redirected flood. Id. However, a complex deal between federal agencies, 
state regulators, and private parties enabled an ITP on the basis of an HCP in which pri-
vate landowners surrounding the levee protected additional habitat. Id. 
221 For example, proposals to list the northern spotted owl and marbled murrelet as 
endangered in Washington State prompted state-federal negotiation of a multi-species 
HCP to enable logging while mitigating harm. See Craig Hansen & William Vogel, Forest 
Land HCPs: A Case Study, Endangered Species Bull., July/Aug. 2000, at 18, 18–19, 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/18-19.pdf. 
222 Cf. Klump v. United States, 30 F. App’x 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adjusting scrutiny 
of a takings claim against a state acting not as a sovereign regulator but as a riparian land-
owner). 
223 16 U.S.C. § 1533(1)(A) (2006) (specifying that listing determinations be made 
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benefit analysis). For the argument that HCPs simply “nickel-and-dime species toward 
extinction,” see Gregory A. Thomas, Where Property Rights and Biodiversity Converge, Part I: 
Conservation Planning at the Regional Scale, 17 Endangered Species UPDATE 139, 140 
(2000), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39357/1/als9527. 
0017.006.pdf. 
224 Cal. Fish & Game Code §§ 2800–2835 (West 2003). 
225 Natural Community Conservation Planning, Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Game, http:// 
www.dfg.ca.gov/habcon/nccp/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2010). 
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clined.226 However, the NCCP’s “all carrots and no stick” approach did 
not marshal broad participation.227 
 The state labored to procure participation until the ESA listing of 
the California gnatcatcher threatened the NCCP’s viability because ac-
tions permitted under the NCCP (as consistent with preserving the 
birds’ overall habitat) could still violate specific ESA protections for the 
birds (if individual birds were actually harmed or harassed).228 State 
regulators understood that the conflict was fatal to the NCCP, and fed-
eral regulators were open to suggestions, as corresponding federal con-
servation efforts had been hamstrung without the kinds of legal author-
ity and regulatory capacity available at the state and local level.229 
 Under the leadership of Interior Secretary Bruce Babbit, state and 
federal wildlife agencies negotiated a framework that would enable the 
NCCP to accomplish its goals without risk of participant prosecution 
under the ESA.230 Through an extensively negotiated ITP, developers of 
targeted habitat were required to participate in the NCCP,231 but ac-
tions taken in compliance with an NCCP permit were formally ex-
empted from ESA liability.232 
b. Endangered Species Act Consultation and Listing Negotiations 
 The ESA also requires that federal agencies considering action 
that could potentially impact listed species must consult with desig-
nated resource agencies to evaluate the likelihood of harm and rec-
ommend alternatives.233 Although there is no formal role for state 
agencies in this process, federal consultation often triggers state-federal 
bargaining if state and federal projects are intertwined. For example, 
California agencies have long negotiated with the U.S. Fish and Wild-
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227 Bruce Babbit, Cities in the Wilderness: A New Vision of Land Use in Amer-
ica 66 (2005); Mara A. Marks et al., The Experimental Metropolis: Political Impediments and 
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of Southern California 353, 353 ( Jennifer Wolch et al. eds., 2004). 
228 Babbit, supra note 227, at 66; DeAnne Parker, Comment, Natural Community Con-
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Envtl. L. 107, 129–30 (1997). 
229 Babbit, supra note 227, at 70 (“We had legal authority, yet there was no practical 
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230 Id. at 64–72. 
231 Marks et al., supra note 227, at 353. 
232 John M. Gaffin, Can We Conserve California’s Threatened Fisheries Through Natural 
Community Conservation Planning?, 27 Envtl. L. 791, 793 (1997). 
233 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2006). 
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life Service (FWS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Associa-
tion Fisheries (NOAA Fisheries) over consultations that impact state 
water projects.234 
 Similarly, although there is no formal invitation for state participa-
tion in decisions to list a species proposed for protection, the statute en-
courages state-federal cooperation, and listing proposals that could im-
pact important state economic interests have led to state-federal 
bargaining.235 These negotiations are controversial because they appear 
to reallocate federal decision-making authority to states in a manner 
inconsistent with the conservation goals of the statute. For example, 
Maine negotiated a five-year opportunity to experiment with state-based 
conservation efforts before its Atlantic salmon run was ultimately 
listed.236 However, eleven Midwestern states used a negotiated reprieve 
from a Black-Tailed Prairie Dog listing to successfully increase breeding 
populations while staving off the negative economic consequences of an 
ESA listing.237 
c. Federal Licensing Decisions 
 Sometimes federalism bargaining occurs in the seemingly adminis-
trative context of federal licensing decisions that impact state proprietary 
or economic interests. For example, hydroelectric licensing decisions by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) are negotiations for 
permission to violate the otherwise applicable federal navigational servi-
                                                                                                                      
234 Pervaze Sheikh & Betsy Cody, Cong. Research Serv., RL 31975, CALFED Bay-
Delta Program: Overview of Institutional and Water Use Issues 7 (2005), available 
at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL31975.pdf (describing state-federal 
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235 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006). 
236 John Elmen, Swimming Upstream: A Legal Analysis of Listing Atlantic Salmon as an En-
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enable state-led management efforts. Proposed Threatened Status for a Distinct Popula-
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Fed. Reg. 50,530, 50,539 (Sept. 29, 1995) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 17, 425 (2010)). De-
spite Maine’s conservation plan, the species was ultimately listed as endangered in 2000. 
Elmen, supra, at 334. 
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management efforts, found that the listing was no longer warranted in 2009. 12-Month 
Finding on a Petition to List the Black-Tailed Prairie Dog as Threatened or Endangered, 
74 Fed. Reg. 63,343, 63,366 (Dec. 3, 2009) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (2010)). 
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tude.238 Similarly, many federal decisions to license offshore oil drilling 
projects must receive permission from states participating in Coastal 
Zone Management Act programs.239 Both represent unusual cases in 
which the states can hold the legally trumping authority. 
i.  Hydroelectric Dam Licensing 
 Hydroelectric licensing decisions regularly feature state-federal 
bargaining because the Clean Water Act’s section 401 certification 
process gives states a regulatory hook over an otherwise federal proc-
ess.240 This provision authorizes states and tribal governments to review 
and approve, condition, or deny all federal permits or licenses that 
might result in a discharge to state or tribal waters, including wet-
lands.241 The major federal licenses and permits subject to section 401 
are FERC hydropower licenses, Rivers and Harbors Act section 9 and 10 
permits, and CWA sections 402 and 404 permits in the few states that 
have not assumed NPDES permitting authority.242 
 States wield their authority to ensure that the activity will comply 
with state water quality standards and other state water resource regula-
tions.243 When an applicant requests a license from FERC, either to re-
license an existing dam or for new construction, the state determines 
whether state standards will be attainable if the license is granted, and 
what conditions may be required in the CWA section 401 certification 
to ensure that the standards will be met.244 Because these conditions 
are incorporated into the ultimate FERC license, states are effectively 
able to dictate some of the terms of the federal license—an ability that 
                                                                                                                      
238 E.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 
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239 Infra notes 303–327 and accompanying text. 
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U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (2006) (regulating construction in navigable waters); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 
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243 Section 401 Certification and Wetlands, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/ 
fact24.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
244 See PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 710 (1994) (“The court con-
cluded that § 401(d) confers on States power to ‘consider all state action related to water 
quality in imposing conditions on section 401 certificates.’”). 
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invites a limited process of state-federal logrolling.245 States have par-
ticularly strong bargaining leverage when the project implicates a 
state’s proprietary water rights,246 or when the project is governed un-
der the Reclamation Act, which requires the Bureau of Reclamation to 
use project water in conformity with state law absent contrary congres-
sional directives.247 
ii. Offshore Drilling Licensing 
 Discussed in greater detail in the next Section, the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (CZMA)248 invites states to participate in the protec-
tion of coastal zones in which both the federal and state governments 
have significant interests. When a state elects to participate by creating a 
federally approved management plan for its coastal resources, approval 
authority for federal activities within the zone shifts to the states.249 For 
this reason, the Department of Interior must often receive state ap-
proval before issuing federal leases for offshore drilling on the outer 
continental shelf (OCS).250 
C. Joint Policymaking Bargaining Forms 
 Finally, the taxonomy turns to the most theoretically interesting 
category of joint policymaking bargaining, which often incorporates 
elements from previous categories. The forms here include: (1) negoti-
ated rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act;251 (2) poli-
cymaking laboratory negotiations, by which federal laws invite state 
proposals to create or modify federal law;252 (3) iterative policymaking 
negotiations, which create staggered dialogues of state-federal policy-
                                                                                                                      
245 Id. at 711–12 (holding that the CWA authorizes state conditions on section 401 cer-
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Act, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation & Enforcement, http://www. 
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making;253 and (4) intersystemic signaling negotiations, by which sepa-
rately deliberating state and federal actors trade influence over the di-
rection of shared policy over time.254 
 In contrast to the more conventional forms of negotiation where 
only the results become matters of public record, the process of nego-
tiation used in joint policymaking is often as available for public scru-
tiny as the results, moderating negotiated governance concerns that 
hinge on transparency.255 Although conventional federalism bargaining 
often arises spontaneously, joint policymaking bargaining is usually the 
result of premeditated design, affording legislative opportunities to en-
gineer support for federalism considerations into the process even 
when participants are distracted by more immediate goals. 
1. Negotiated Rulemaking 
 Although the most conventional of the less familiar forms, “nego-
tiated rulemaking” between federal agencies and state stakeholders is a 
sparingly used tool that holds promise for facilitating sound administra-
tive policymaking in disputed federalism contexts, such as those impli-
cating environmental law, national security, and consumer safety. 
 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the traditional “notice 
and comment” administrative rulemaking process allows for a limited 
degree of participation by state stakeholders who comment on a federal 
agency’s proposed rule. The agency publishes the proposal in the Fed-
eral Register, invites public comments critiquing the draft, and then 
uses its discretion to revise or defend the rule in response to com-
ments.256 Even this iterative process constitutes a modest negotiation, 
but it leaves participants so frequently unsatisfied that many agencies 
began to informally use more extensive negotiated rulemaking in the 
1970s.257 In 1990, Congress passed the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 
amending the Administrative Procedure Act to allow a more dynamic 
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and inclusive rulemaking process,258 and a subsequent Executive Order 
required all federal agencies to consider negotiated rulemaking when 
developing regulations.259 
 Negotiated rulemaking allows stakeholders much more influence 
over unfolding regulatory decisions. Under notice and comment, pub-
lic participation is limited to criticism of well-formed rules in which the 
agency is already substantially invested.260 By contrast, stakeholders in 
negotiated rulemaking collectively design a proposed rule that takes 
into account their respective interests and expertise from the begin-
ning.261 The concept, outline, and/or text of a rule is hammered out by 
an advisory committee of carefully balanced representation from the 
agency, the regulated public, community groups and NGOs, and state 
and local governments.262 A professional intermediary leads the effort 
to ensure that all stakeholders are appropriately involved and to help 
interpret problem-solving opportunities.263 Any consensus reached by 
the group becomes the basis of the proposed rule, which is still subject 
to public comment through the normal notice-and-comment proce-
dures.264 If the group does not reach consensus, then the agency pro-
ceeds through the usual notice-and-comment process.265 
 The negotiated rulemaking process, a tailored version of interest 
group bargaining within established legislative constraints, can yield 
important benefits.266 The process is usually more subjectively satisfying 
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for all stakeholders, including the government agency representa-
tives.267 More cooperative relationships are established between the re-
gulated parties and the agencies, facilitating future implementation 
and enforcement of new rules.268 Final regulations include fewer tech-
nical errors and are clearer to stakeholders, so that less time, money 
and effort is expended on enforcement.269 Getting a proposed rule out 
for public comment takes more time under negotiated rulemaking 
than standard notice and comment, but thereafter, negotiated rules 
receive fewer and more moderate public comment, and are less fre-
quently challenged in court by regulated entities.270 Ultimately, then, 
final regulations can be implemented more quickly following their de-
but in the Federal Register, and with greater compliance from stake-
holders.271 The process also confers valuable learning benefits on par-
ticipants, who come to better understand the concerns of other 
stakeholders, grow invested in the consensus they help create, and ul-
timately campaign for the success of the regulations within their own 
constituencies.272 
 Negotiated rulemaking offers additional procedural benefits be-
cause it ensures that agency personnel will be unambiguously informed 
about the full federalism implications of a proposed rule by the im-
pacted state interests. Federal agencies are already required by execu-
tive order to prepare a federalism impact statement for rulemaking 
with federalism implications,273 but the quality of state-federal commu-
nication within negotiated rulemaking enhances the likelihood that 
federal agencies will appreciate and understand the full extent of state 
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concerns. Just as the consensus-building process invests participating 
stakeholders with respect for the competing concerns of other stake-
holders, it invests participating agency personnel with respect for the 
federalism concerns of state stakeholders.274 State-side federalism bar-
gainers interviewed for this project consistently reported that they al-
ways prefer negotiated rulemaking to notice and comment—even if 
their ultimate impact remains small—because the products of fully in-
formed federal consultation are always preferable to the alternative.275 
 Nevertheless, the limitations of negotiated rulemaking also war-
rant attention. Some critics argue that the process does not always de-
liver the goods it promises because consensus cannot always be won.276 
To facilitate consensus, a substantial amount of pre-negotiation consul-
tation sometimes occurs, which can helpfully advance the negotiated 
rulemaking but may compromise transparency.277 There may also be 
rulemaking subjects that are simply inappropriate for negotiation, such 
as those that implicate fundamental rights (perhaps in the realm of 
family law). Similarly, it would be unwise to trust the legitimate interests 
of vulnerable and insular minorities to negotiated decision making by 
unsympathetic majorities.278 
 Another potential pitfall of negotiated rulemaking is deciding 
which stakeholders will be represented on the Advisory Committee, and 
by whom they will be represented. The process breaks down if there are 
too many negotiators involved, so agents must be selected to represent 
large groups of occasionally diverse stakeholders (such as the fifty states, 
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2011] Negotiating Federalism 55 
hundreds of large cities, and countless smaller municipalities).279 
Among stakeholders who feel poorly represented, the rule will lack the 
legitimacy that often makes the results achieved by negotiated rulemak-
ing more effective than the standard process. Nor will absent stake-
holders amass the learning benefits or become the rule evangelists that 
make negotiated rules less vulnerable to challenge, less likely to be vio-
lated, and generally less expensive to implement and enforce. The 
transparency of the negotiation process will be especially important for 
concerned stakeholders who do not participate directly. 
 Negotiated rulemaking is initiated by federal agencies, and can in-
volve the participation of state actors from all levels of government and 
from national organizations advocating state interests.280 The EPA is the 
most frequent federal user, followed by the Department of Labor, the 
Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Treasury.281 Nev-
ertheless, in the first thirteen years surrounding passage of the Negoti-
ated Rulemaking Act, only fifty federal rules were produced through ne-
gotiated rulemaking—as little as one percent of the total number of 
rules promulgated over this period.282 Standard notice-and-comment 
rulemaking clearly remains the dominant form of executive rulemaking. 
a. The Phase II Stormwater Rule 
 Negotiated rulemaking can be used to forge uniform regulations 
that best meet the interests of a large variety of stakeholders, or to forge 
regulations conferring wide discretion on regulated parties. For exam-
ple, EPA used negotiated rulemaking to forge the complex regulations 
needed to implement the Clean Water Act’s Phase II Stormwater pro-
gram.283 
                                                                                                                      
279 Cf. Robert Stavins, Another Copenhagen Outcome, EU Energy Pol’y Blog (Jan. 6, 2010, 
11:38 EST), http://www.energypolicyblog.com/2010/01/06/another-copenhagen-outcome-
serious-questions-about-the-best-institutional-path-forward/ (discussing multi-party gridlock 
in Copenhagan climate negotiations). 
280 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 562(8), 563(a) (2006). Many state agencies are also frequent users, 
as are agencies in other countries. Spector, supra note 257, at 2. 
281 Spector, supra note 257, at 2. 
282 Coglianese, supra note 276, at 1336–41 (listing negotiated rules); Spector, supra 
note 257, at 2 (noting fifty cases between 1982 and 1995). This estimate is based on reports 
that federal agencies promulgated an average of five hundred rules per year during the 
early 2000s. See John Graham, Adm’r, White House Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, 
Speech at the Kennedy School of Government (Sept. 25, 2003), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_speeches_030925graham/. 
283 EPA Office of Water, Overview of the Storm Water Program 8 (1996), avail-
able at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0195.pdf. 
56 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1 
 Situated vexingly at the crossroad between land uses regulated lo-
cally and water pollution regulated federally, contaminated stormwater 
is mostly discharged to federally protected waters by municipalities that 
collect it through curbside storm drains.284 The Phase II negotiated 
rulemaking advisory committee included thirty-five members represent-
ing municipal, environmental, and industrial stakeholder groups.285 
Reached through a decade of intense negotiation, the final rule286 em-
powers municipalities to tailor regulatory efforts as individually as possi-
ble while still accomplishing the overall federal goal, as reduced to five 
minimum criteria.287 Dischargers may develop any program that: (1) 
educates the public about stormwater hygiene, (2) incorporates public 
participation, (3) prevents illicit discharges, (4) controls construction 
debris, and (5) manages pollutant runoff from municipal operations.288 
 The rule’s flexibility reflects the impact of multiple perspectives 
during the rulemaking process, in which participants recognized that 
circumstances differed too widely for consensus on requirements more 
specific than the five minimum measures.289 Although the rule never-
theless endured legal challenges from several plaintiffs unsatisfied with 
different aspects of the rule, it withstood challenge on almost every 
point, including a federalism-based claim.290 Considering the massive 
number of municipalities it regulates, the fact that the rule was chal-
lenged by only a handful of Texas municipalities (in a lawsuit the state 
of Texas did not join) testifies to the strength of the consensus through 
which it was created. 
b. A Cautionary Tale: The REAL ID Act 
 The value of negotiated rulemaking to federalism bargaining may 
be best understood in relief against the failure of alternatives in federal-
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ism-sensitive contexts. Particularly informative are the strikingly differ-
ent state responses to the two approaches Congress has recently taken 
in tightening national security through identification reform—one re-
quiring regulations through negotiated rulemaking, and the other 
through traditional notice and comment. 
 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress ordered the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish rules regarding valid identifi-
cation for federal purposes (such as boarding an aircraft or accessing 
federal buildings).291 Recognizing the implications for state-issued driv-
er’s licenses and ID cards, Congress required DHS to use negotiated 
rulemaking to forge consensus among the states about how best to pro-
ceed.292 States leery of the staggering costs associated with proposed 
reforms participated actively in the process.293 However, the subsequent 
REAL ID Act of 2005 repealed the ongoing negotiated rulemaking and 
required DHS to prescribe top-down federal requirements for state-
issued licenses.294 
 The resulting DHS rules have been bitterly opposed by the major-
ity of state governors, legislatures, and motor vehicle administrations,295 
prompting a virtual state rebellion that cuts across the red-state/blue-
state political divide.296 No state met the December 2009 deadline ini-
tially contemplated by the statute, and over half have enacted or con-
sidered legislation prohibiting compliance with the Act, defunding its 
implementation, or calling for its repeal.297 In the face of this unprece-
dented state hostility, DHS has extended compliance deadlines even for 
those that did not request extensions, and bills have been introduced 
in both houses of Congress to repeal the Act.298 Efforts to repeal what is 
increasingly referred to as a “failed” policy have won endorsements 
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from organizations across the political spectrum.299 Even the Executive 
Director of the ACLU, for whom federalism concerns have not histori-
cally ranked highly, opined in USA Today that the REAL ID Act violates 
the Tenth Amendment.300 
2. Policymaking Laboratory Negotiations 
 Particularly powerful fora for federalism bargaining are “policy-
making laboratory negotiations,” which harness the promise of federal-
ism as a national laboratory of state-based ideas and experimentation. 
In these negotiations, the federal government invites the states to pro-
pose innovations and variations within existing federal laws that address 
realms of concurrent jurisdiction. Sometimes, Congress explicitly au-
thorizes bargaining in a statute that invites states to lead local policy-
making in support of national objectives. Other statutes invite states to 
experiment with local improvements on the general federal approach, 
realizing the “laboratory of ideas” promise of federalism. Still others 
invite states to design implementation policy in support of federally 
mandated standards. Federal agencies may use a similar process in ar-
ticulating rules to implement congressional statutes. These negotiations 
usually take place in the context of a spending power-based program of 
cooperative federalism. 
a. Policymaking Zones Partnerships 
 In some policymaking laboratory negotiations, the federal govern-
ment articulates the overall goals of an interjurisdictional regulatory pol-
icy and invites states to “fill in the blanks” on how best to get there based 
on unique economic, environmental, topographical, or demographic 
factors that vary regionally. For example, although the Phase II Stormwa-
ter Rule was created through a process of negotiated rulemaking, the 
resulting rule itself creates policymaking zones in which individual mu-
nicipalities craft unique management programs meeting minimum fed-
eral criteria.301 The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), in which 
                                                                                                                      
299 Declan McCullagh, Congress Rethinks the REAL ID Act, CNET News (May 8, 2007), 
http://news.cnet.com/Congress-rethinks-the-Real-ID-Act/2100–1028_3–6182210.html. 
300 Anthony Romero, Opinion, Repeal REAL ID, USA Today, Mar. 5, 2007, http:// 
www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/2007-03-05-opposing-view_N.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 
2010). 
301 See Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing 
Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722 (Dec. 8, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 
122, 123, 124 (2010)). 
2011] Negotiating Federalism 59 
Congress agreed to subordinate federal prerogative to an unprecedented 
degree of state control, creates an even more intriguing example.302 
i.  Coastal Zone Management Act 
 The Coastal Zone Management Act (the “CZMA”)303 is a voluntary 
cooperative federalism program designed to protect coastal resources 
from intense development pressures that isolated local land use plan-
ning could no longer contain.304 The CZMA offers federal funding and 
technical assistance for voluntary state management programs that pro-
tect resources in coastal waters, submerged lands, and adjacent shore 
lands.305 Unlike other environmental laws that promise federal control 
if states choose not to participate in administration, the Act establishes 
no mandatory compliance standards306 and does not authorize the fed-
eral government to develop programs for states that choose not to par-
ticipate.307 States have responded enthusiastically, welcoming both fed-
eral support and national recognition of the need for comprehensive 
coastal management.308 Thirty-four of thirty-five eligible states have ap-
proved coastal management plans, and Illinois, the remaining state, is 
presently composing a plan.309 The Act also provides for extensive par-
ticipation from local and municipal governments.310 
 Perhaps most significant, once a coastal zone management plan 
receives federal approval, all federal action directly or indirectly affect-
ing the coastal zone (generally extending three miles seaward from a 
state’s coastal boundary) must then receive approval by the state for 
“consistency” with the plan.311 The Department of Commerce describes 
the consistency provision as “a limited waiver of federal supremacy and 
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authority,”312 allowing states to review not only those activities con-
ducted by or on behalf of a federal agency, but also activities that re-
quire a federal license or permit, activities conducted pursuant to an 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act exploration plan,313 and any feder-
ally funded activities that may impact the coastal zone.314 States may 
disapprove activities that “affect any land or water use or natural re-
source of the coastal zone” unless they are “consistent to the maximum 
extent practicable” with accepted state management programs.315 In 
this way, the CZMA uniquely designates concurrent state and federal 
jurisdiction for the zone between state-regulated lands and federally 
regulated waters.316 
 The CZMA consistency provision thus creates a rare instance in 
which the federal government must seek state permission before taking 
action affecting the interjurisdictional zone, opening the door for fed-
eralism bargaining and regulatory variation.317 It provides a mandatory 
but flexible mechanism for resolving potential conflicts between state 
and federal priorities and, in so doing, fosters early consultation and 
negotiated coordination.318 Legislative history indicates that “the intent 
of [the bill] is to enhance state authority by encouraging and assisting 
the states to assume planning and regulatory powers over their coastal 
zones,” with “no attempt to diminish state authority through federal 
preemption.”319 Indeed, Congress amended the CZMA to be even more 
protective of state interests in 1990, clarifying that the consistency de-
termination applied not only to federal activity within the designated 
boundaries of the coastal zone but also to any activities conducted any-
where that affect resources within the coastal zone.320 
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 None of this is to say that conflicts do not persist, or that states al-
ways prevail. Disputing states and federal agencies may seek mediation 
by the Secretary of Commerce to resolve serious federal consistency 
disputes,321 and, if consensus fails, the state may request judicial media-
tion or seek other relief in federal court.322 Finally, if a federal court 
decides that the proposed federal agency activity does not comply with 
a state management program, and the Secretary certifies that media-
tion will not result in compliance, the Secretary may request that the 
President make an exemption for the federal agency action if the ac-
tion is “in the paramount interest of the United States.”323 The presi-
dential exemption has been used exceedingly sparingly, however, and 
possibly only once—when President George W. Bush controversially 
used it in 2008 to override California’s objection to the Navy’s use of 
sonar in training exercises.324 
 Nevertheless, the vast majority of state-federal interaction under 
the CZMA is harmonious, and federal consistency determinations are 
usually administered without controversy.325 NOAA reports that 
“[w]hile States have negotiated changes to thousands of federal actions 
over the years, States have concurred with approximately 93%–95% of 
all federal actions reviewed.”326 Even before the Act was amended in 
1990 to improve state leverage in consistency negotiations, states con-
curred with 93% of the 400 proposed federal activities in 1983, 82% of 
the 5500 proposed federal licenses and permits, 99% of the 435 submit-
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ted plans for outer continental shelf exploration, and 99.9% of the 
2000 proposals for federal funding and assistance.327 
 Without access to the actual decisionmakers over this time period, 
it is hard to know exactly how to interpret such high levels of consen-
sus. It is possible that they reflect the federal ability to override state 
protest through the presidential exemption, which could reduce a 
state’s incentive to expend resources fighting a battle it expects to lose. 
But given that the presidential trump has been used so sparingly—only 
once, and years after these statistics—a more likely explanation is that 
the consistency process itself moderates what federal agencies seek. 
Understanding that federal action will require state approval may pro-
mote greater federal deference to state interests in the very spirit in-
tended by the Act. After all, the process that must be navigated after a 
state objects is costly to resource-poor federal agencies as well. 
b. Demonstration Waivers 
 Another version of policymaking zones arises under the various 
federal statutes that allow states to propose variations on generally ap-
plicable standards within programs of cooperative federalism, often 
through demonstration waiver programs.328 The Social Security Act in-
cludes several demonstration waiver programs that enable states to 
propose variations to standard federal entitlement programs, including 
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, Medicaid, and other 
forms of assistance to needy children and families.329 Medicaid remains 
the leading site of state-federal negotiated social welfare policy. 
i.  Medicaid 
 The Medicaid law invites states to apply for “demonstration waiv-
ers” and “program waivers” that allow them to depart from the other-
wise applicable terms of the law to pursue an objective coincident with 
the goals of the federal program.330 The Medicaid program was initially 
designed as a classic spending power-based program of cooperative fe-
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deralism under which Congress offered the states incentive funding to 
provide for the health care needs of vulnerable populations. The base-
line legislation and corresponding rules identified the populations that 
would be covered (children living in poverty, certain expecting moth-
ers, and many other groups),331 the services that would be covered (in-
patient hospital and outpatient physician services),332 and additional 
guidelines for state programs funded by Medicaid.333 Congress had 
previously enabled states to propose beneficial departures from Social 
Security Act rules via a demonstration waiver program,334 and Congress 
extended it to Medicaid in 1965.335 
 The Medicaid demonstration waiver programs were to function as 
the hallowed federalism laboratory of ideas would intend: the goal was 
to allow a limited degree of flexibility so that each state could experi-
ment in a way that would yield learning benefits to the overall program. 
Over time, however, the waiver program has become the standard way 
that Medicaid is administered, as most states now use the waiver provi-
sions to individually tailor the terms of their own Medicaid programs.336 
The application process is extensively negotiated with the Department 
of Health and Human Services, with executive agents on both sides 
dickering back and forth over proposal terms before the application 
receives federal approval.337 
 Results of the waiver programs suggest that the policymaking labo-
ratory of ideas can work.338 Though not every waiver proposal has been 
a success, many of the proposals Congress is now considering in health 
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reform efforts began as experimental terms in state waivers.339 For ex-
ample, Massachusetts used a demonstration waiver to extend health 
insurance to all residents,340 and North Carolina used a programmatic 
waiver to experiment with a community care program that the Obama 
administration may emulate.341 As one observer described, “Doctors 
like it, patients stay healthier, and the state saves hundreds of millions 
of dollars.”342 Another state-based innovation that has altered the over-
all Medicaid program includes the increased movement of covered 
populations into managed care.343 Additional waivers have expanded 
the populations covered under original program rules in the hopes 
that preventative care to vulnerable populations will forestall more se-
rious (and expensive) emergency care later.344 
c. Cooperative Federalism State Implementation Plans 
 Finally, in many programs of cooperative federalism, such as the 
Clean Air and Water Acts, Congress allocates rulemaking authority to a 
federal agency but invites the states to implement and enforce those 
rules. Delegating the design of statewide implementation and en-
forcement programs vests an important degree of policymaking discre-
tion in the states, which wield substantial creative authority in deciding 
how to accomplish federal technical standards. 
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i.  Clean Air and Water Acts 
 Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPA sets overall standards for 
permissible levels of air pollutants, and the states generally develop indi-
vidualized implementation plans to realize them given their unique 
economic, geographic, and demographic circumstances (otherwise, 
they must submit to a federal implementation plan).345 EPA must ap-
prove the state implementation plans, however, and the process report-
edly involves a fair amount of negotiation back and forth with state 
counterparts.346 Similarly, states theoretically have some flexibility in set-
ting water quality standards under the Clean Water Act’s Total Maxi-
mum Daily Load (TMDL) program,347 but EPA retains final approval 
authority. States often use their clout to push, sometimes successfully 
and other times less so, for EPA approval of relaxed standards.348 Con-
versely, federal negotiators use their approval authority to push, some-
times successfully and other times not, for more stringent standards.349 
3. Iterative Policymaking Negotiations 
 In contrast to the formal zones and waivers of policymaking labora-
tory federalism, another type of joint policymaking negotiation happens 
so slowly that it is possible to miss as a form of negotiation at all. This type 
of negotiation, labeled “iterative federalism” by Professor Ann Carlson,350 
takes place within a regulatory regime in which the federal and state 
governments share authority to create regulatory policy in a precise and 
limited way. The federal government creates a uniform national plan 
while allowing a selected state to develop a competing standard—and 
then allows the other states to choose between the federal and single-
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state alternatives. By allowing states to choose between the two, iterative 
federalism programs—such as the CAA’s regulation of motor vehicle 
emissions—create a dynamic of regulatory innovation and competition 
by which state choices influence federal standards over time. 
 Iterative federalism strikes a wise compromise in regulatory mar-
ketplaces where legitimate concerns over stagnating regulatory mo-
nopoly compete with legitimate economic needs for regulatory uni-
formity. Regulated parties never have to cope with more than two sets 
of regulatory standards at a time, but enabling the regulatory competi-
tor to coexist with the federal baseline allows room for at least some 
innovation.351 Over time, this often means that as states gravitate toward 
the state alternative, the federal law adjusts itself toward the state alter-
native in a slow, iterative form of state-federal negotiation. 
a. Clean Air Act Emissions Standards 
 Under the Clean Air Act (the “CAA”), EPA creates national stan-
dards for emissions from mobile sources,352 saving the auto manufac-
turing industry from the crippling multiplicity of standards that might 
ensue if states were able to regulate independently. Nevertheless, Con-
gress allowed the state of California to set an alternative standard devi-
ating upward from the national floor.353 The “California exception” was 
initially created out of respect for California’s leadership in the field, 
and also because air quality in parts of the state so exceeded national 
averages that more stringent motor vehicle regulations were necessary 
to meet other CAA obligations.354 
 Congress later modified the Act to permit other states to choose 
between EPA’s standards or California’s.355 This critical structural 
change enabled a loose but powerful forum to conduct state-federal 
bargaining over the ultimate path of national emissions regulation, thus 
beginning an iterative process of subtle but joint state-federal decision 
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making. Over time, more and more states lined up behind California 
instead of EPA, such that by 2009, fourteen states had adopted the more 
stringent standards356 and up to twelve others had expressed interest in 
doing so.357 This trend has exerted pressure on EPA to raise its stan-
dards, even as California has continued to raise its own standards.358 The 
overall effect, as states vote with their regulatory feet, has been an up-
ward migration in the nation’s vehicular emissions standards. 
 Iterative policymaking provides a unique means of balancing 
competing needs for federalism innovation and economic uniformity 
in the national market for automobiles. Automobile manufacturers 
may prefer a single set of emissions standards, but building for two sets 
of standards is preferable to coping with fifty. States may prefer to set 
their own standards, but the ability to choose between two levels of 
stringency is preferable to no choice at all. Meanwhile, the iterative di-
mension of the process enables the operation of a limited level of regu-
latory innovation and competition with demonstrated effect in the reg-
ulatory marketplace. A more uniform, traditional command-and-
control regulation imposed from the top down may not have been so 
responsive. 
 The iterative policymaking structure also protects state innovators 
that invest in efforts to resolve their share of an interjurisdictional prob-
lem before the rest follow. These states would suffer disproportionately 
if forced to abandon path-breaking regulatory infrastructure to conform 
to a preemptive federal standard. Moreover, a purely preemptive policy 
would disincentivize states from taking needed action early on—at the 
most efficient opportunity for intervention—lest their investments 
prove wasted when the federal government eventually gets around to 
regulating. 
                                                                                                                      
356 James E. McCarthy & Robert Meltz, Cong. Research Serv., RL 34099, Califor-
nia’s Waiver Request Under the Clean Air Act to Control Greenhouse Gases from 
Motor Vehicles 4 n.13 (2009), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/09Mar/ 
RL34099.pdf. 
357 Emily Chen, State Adoption Status on California Vehicle Emissions Control Requirements, 
W. States Air Resources Council (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.westar.org/Docs/ 
Business%20Meetings/Spring08/ParkCity/03.2.2%20CAA%20177%20states.xls (listing states 
considering adoption of California standards). 
358 David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocat-
ing Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1796, 1840 (2008) (explaining the 
dissemination of California’s standards as other states, EPA, and automakers gradually 
adopted them). 
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b. Iterative Climate Federalism 
 A number of scholars, including Professor Carlson, have proposed 
that the CAA’s model of iterative federalism policymaking may also be a 
useful means of navigating federalism concerns in climate policymak-
ing.359 The suggestion may have merit, given the role states have already 
played in early rounds of policymaking negotiations over climate regu-
lation,360 and the collective action problems necessarily implied.361 
Nearly all of the proposals considered in recent federal climate bills— 
including renewable energy and portfolio standards, power plant emis-
sions standards, net metering, and building codes—are already in place 
among many states,362 including the centerpiece of the federal legisla-
tion proposed this year, carbon cap-and-trade.363 In the Northeast and 
Mid-Atlantic regions, ten states have joined the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI) and pledged to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
from their power sectors by 10% by 2018.364 RGGI states held their 
tenth carbon auction on December 1, 2010.365 In the West, seven states 
joined four Canadian provinces to form the Western Climate Initiative, 
with plans to begin carbon trading by 2012.366 In the Midwest, six states 
and one Canadian province formed the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Re-
duction Accord, pledging to establish a multi-sector cap-and-trade sys-
                                                                                                                      
359 Carlson, supra note 350, at 1099. 
360 See Michele M. Betsill & Barry G. Rabe, Climate Change and Multilevel Governance: The 
Evolving State and Local Roles, in Toward Sustainable Communities: Transitions and 
Transformations in Environmental Policy 201–26 (Daniel A. Mazmanian & Michael 
E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. 2009). See generally Kirsten H. Engel, Whither Subnational Climate Change 
Initiatives in the Wake of Federal Climate Legislation?, 39 Publius 432 (2009) (reviewing exist-
ing state and regional initiatives). 
361 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceil-
ing Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 579, 579–80 (2008) (proposing a collective action framework to determine 
when state law should be federally preempted). 
362 Engel, supra note 360, at 432; Katherine Probst & Sarah Szambelan, The Role of 
the States in a Federal Climate Program 3–8 (White Paper, Nov. 2009), http://www. 
rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-09-46.pdf. 
363 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) 
[hereinafter Waxman-Markey] (as passed by House, June 26, 2009). The Clean Energy 
Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Kerry-Boxer] and 
American Clean Energy Leadership Act, S. 1462, 111th Cong. (2010) are pending in the 
Senate. See Press Release, RGGI Inc., RGGI States Complete Sixth Successful CO2 Auction 
(Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.rggi.org/docs/Auction_6_Results_Release_MMrep.pdf. 
364 Press Release, RGGI Inc., supra note 363. 
365 Auction Results, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/mar- 
ket/co2_auctions/results (last visited Dec. 29, 2010). 
366 Milestones, W. Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/mile- 
stones/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2010). 
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tem to meet regional greenhouse gas reduction targets.367 The State of 
California is creating its own state-wide program, with plans to adopt 
cap-and-trade regulations by 2011 and begin trading in 2012.368 
 By these initiatives, a handful of states have organized regional po-
licymaking, in part to put pressure on the federal government to regu-
late carbon emissions.369 Success is apparent in the climate bill that 
passed the House in 2009, and suggested by the others that have made 
it to the Senate.370 Congress’s proposal to preempt regional cap-and-
trade for the first five years of a national market371 demonstrates that it 
is heeding conventional economic wisdom that a national carbon mar-
ket offers the best chance of achieving cost-efficient economy-wide re-
ductions.372 Nevertheless, after five years, a two-track iterative system 
could offer an innovation-preserving alternative to the hurdles that 
could arise if multiple cap-and-trade programs were to operate simulta-
neously. The bills also show congressional sensitivity to the federalism 
implications of enacting federal legislation in a field dominated by state 
leadership: beyond cap-and-trade, they foreclose preemption of state 
programs meeting the federal floor.373 
4. Intersystemic Signaling Negotiations 
 Iterative federalism negotiations like the CAA’s are created by inten-
tional legislative design. Indirect state-federal policymaking negotiations, 
however, can approximate iterative bargaining in unintentional contexts. 
In these situations, state actors use sovereign capacity to influence federal 
lawmakers regarding federal policies that they disapprove through inter-
systemic signaling. Intersystemic signaling negotiations arise when sepa-
rately deliberating state and federal actors influence one another’s out-
comes through indirect iterative exchange. This usually occurs in 
                                                                                                                      
367 Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord 4 (2007), available at http:// 
www.midwesternaccord.org/midwesterngreenhousegasreductionaccord.pdf. 
368 Cap-and-Trade, Cal. Air Resources Board, 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2010). The 
California Warming Solutions Act of 2006 directed the California Air Resources Board to 
develop a plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. Id.; see also Facts 
About Assembly Bill 32, Cal. Air Resources Board (Dec. 7, 2009), 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/ab32factsheet. pdf. 
369 Engel, supra note 360, at 432; Probst & Szambelan, supra note 362, at 3. 
370 Waxman-Markey, supra note 363; see Kerry-Boxer, supra note 363. 
371 Kerry-Boxer, supra note 363, tit. I, § 125; Waxman-Markey, supra note 363, tit. III, 
§ 335. 
372 Probst & Szambelan, supra note 362, at 15. 
373 Kerry-Boxer, supra note 363, tit. I, § 124; Waxman-Markey, supra note 363, tit. III, 
§ 334. 
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interjurisdictional regulatory contexts where each is vying for policymak-
ing control in the face of regulatory dissensus.374 The Supremacy 
Clause375 notwithstanding, it is not always the federal government that 
prevails—as demonstrated by the arc of national policy regarding medi-
cal marijuana, and by a provocative analysis of intersystemic signaling 
between state and federal courts, discussed below. 
a. Medical Marijuana 
 For example, several states have legalized the use of marijuana for 
medical treatment,376 even though federal law does not distinguish be-
tween marijuana consumed for medical or recreational purposes.377 In 
2005 in Gonzales v. Raich, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a standoff 
between California and the federal government on this issue by reaf-
firming the supremacy of the federal law over conflicting state laws.378 
The Court’s decision has significant federalism implications due to its 
broad interpretation of the federal commerce power.379 Nevertheless, 
states and municipalities have continued to pass contrary laws,380 and 
the conflict has prompted unusual judicial decisions that appear to fa-
vor state over federal laws in individual cases, even in federal court. In 
turn, these contrary state laws and confusing federal cases have 
prompted federal legislators to consider federal legislation to bridge 
the gap between state and federal law. 
 In one notable example, the federal government brought charges 
against Ed Rosenthal in 2003 for cultivating marijuana, despite the fact 
that he had been duly authorized by the City of Oakland to distribute 
                                                                                                                      
374 See, for example, the discussion infra notes 376–389 and accompanying text. 
375 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
376 Active State Medical Marijuana Programs, NORML, http://norml.org/index.cfm? 
Group_ID=3391 (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) (detailing legalization in thirteen states). 
377 Drug Fact Sheet: Marijuana, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., http://www.justice. 
gov/dea/pubs/abuse/drug_data_sheets/marijuana_DrugDataSheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 
9, 2010) (defining marijuana as a “Schedule 1” drug with no accepted medical use). 
378 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (determining that Congress could regulate the intrastate 
manufacture and possession of marijuana to avoid undermining the Controlled Sub-
stances Act). 
379 See id. 
380 For example, Breckenridge, Colorado recently legalized possession of small 
amounts of marijuana, despite contrary state and federal law. Colorado Ski Town Legalizes 
Pot, Wash. Times, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/04/ 
colo-ski-town-could-push-pot-legalization/. 
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the drug for medicinal purposes under California state law.381 Rosen-
thal was not able to present this information as a defense at his trial, 
however, because federal law does not recognize state laws legalizing 
medicinal marijuana.382 Without the benefit of this potentially exculpa-
tory information, Rosenthal was convicted by a jury of an offense that 
required a mandatory minimum five-year prison term.383 Nevertheless, 
the district court judge sentenced him to only one day, based on the 
“unique circumstances of the case” (a decision the government is ap-
pealing).384 In response to cases like this, federal legislators have intro-
duced the Truth in Trials Act,385 still pending, which would enable fed-
eral drug offenders to raise the affirmative defense of acting in 
compliance with applicable state medical marijuana laws.386 
 Even as such legislative proposals languish in Congress, the pres-
sure of the conflict between state and federal law has successfully 
moved federal policymaking at the executive level. The Obama admini-
stration recently announced that the Department of Justice would not 
pursue enforcement cases against medical marijuana users or distribu-
tors in states where such use is legal.387 
 With no record for review in intersystemic signaling, it is difficult to 
definitively establish the causal link between state action and federal re-
action in this situation—and there are certainly contrary examples.388 
                                                                                                                      
381 United States v. Rosenthal, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2003); see also Mi-
chael O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 783, 787 (2004) (discussing 
Rosenthal). 
382 O’Hear, supra note 381, at 787. 
383 Rosenthal, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. 
384 Id. at 1099. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately overturned 
Rosenthal’s conviction in 2006 because a confused juror (probably confused about the 
state/federal law conflict) had improperly contacted a lawyer for advice during delibera-
tions. Bob Egelko, Pot Advocate Convicted on Three Charges, but ‘Ganga Guru’ Won’t Face Fur-
ther Punishment, San Fran. Chron., May 30, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article. 
cgi?f=/c/a/2007/05/30/BAGTPQ420H5.DTL. Nevertheless, Rosenthal was re-indicted a 
few months later and was again convicted by the same judge after once more being pre-
vented from presenting evidence that he was acting pursuant to state law. Id. Still, the 
judge would not sentence Rosenthal beyond the day he had already served, and so his 
conviction resulted in no additional prison time. Id. 
385 H.R. 1717, 108th Cong. (2003) (reintroduced as H.R. 3939, 111th Cong. (2009)). 
386 O’Hear, supra note 381, at 787 n.16. 
387 David Stout & Solomon Moore, U.S. Won’t Prosecute in States That Allow Medical Mari-
juana, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/ 
20/us/20cannabis.html. 
388 See generally, e.g., Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule 
and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 
156 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1929 (2008) (arguing that national lawmakers preempt state-based 
decisions they disapprove by federalizing rights). Federal enforcers have also used su-
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Nonetheless, circumstantial evidence of the success of such dialogic 
processes is compelling, and could soon include climate change.389 In 
addition, Arizona’s aggressive new immigration law—the most stringent 
in the nation—may be viewed as an attempt at intersystemic signaling 
with Congress in an effort to nationalize immigration policy.390 The 
most aggressive portions of the law have been enjoined pending suit by 
the U.S. Attorney General; the suit claims that Arizona’s foray into new 
immigration policy is preempted by federal law.391 But in an unlikely 
coincidence, after years of inaction and within only weeks of the date 
that Arizona’s new law went into force, Congress returned from an Au-
gust recess to pass an immigration enforcement bill funding greater se-
curity measures along the southwestern border.392 The flurry of state 
laws limiting the use of eminent domain for private economic develop-
ment after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London393 
provides another example of this fascinating dialectic.394 
                                                                                                                      
premacy to undermine contrary state policies by prosecuting crimes permissible under 
state laws, such as the previous practice of prosecuting for possession of medical mari-
juana. O’Hear, supra note 381, at 810–11. 
389 See generally Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivat-
ing State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Feder-
alism and Environmental Law?, 38 Urb. Law. 1015 (2006) (arguing that subnational efforts 
to combat global warming will prompt national and international regulatory response). 
390 Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
24, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig. 
html (reporting that the law requires immigrants to carry documents at all times and al-
lows police to question anyone of uncertain citizenship). 
391 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Citing Conflict with Federal 
Law, Department of Justice Challenges Arizona Immigration Law ( July 6, 2010), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-opa-776.html (arguing that the Arizona 
law exceeds a state’s role with respect to aliens, interferes with the federal government’s 
balanced administration of the immigration laws, and critically undermines U.S. foreign 
policy objectives); see also Randall C. Archibold, Judge Blocks Part of Arizona’s Immigration 
Law, N.Y. Times, July 28, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/ 
us/29arizona.html (reporting that one day before the law was to take effect, a federal 
judge blocked the statute's most controversial provisions, including those requiring offi-
cers to affirmatively check immigration status and immigrants to carry immigration docu-
mentation at all times). 
392 Julia Preston, Obama Signs Border Bill to Increase Surveillance, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 2010, 
at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/us/politics/14immig.html. 
393 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005) (holding that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment does not prohibit this use of eminent domain). 
394 Cf. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 Minn. 
L. Rev. 2100, 2114–49 (2009) (listing state legislative responses). 
2011] Negotiating Federalism 73 
b. State and Federal Courts 
 Although this project primarily analyzes negotiations between the 
political branches, a compelling research project identifies a pattern of 
intersystemic signaling negotiations by which state courts have sought 
to alter binding rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court.395 Challenging the 
idea of the Court’s interpretive monopoly, Professor Frederic Bloom 
has described a dynamic by which state courts have occasionally defied 
binding Court precedent in order to signal the need for its reversal.396 
Moreover, Professor Bloom argues that in these cases, the Supreme 
Court has effectively signaled its willingness to be influenced by state 
courts in unsettled areas of its jurisprudence: 
Nearly all of [the Court’s calls for state court disobedience] 
come in coded legal whispers—about strategically unsettled 
constitutional substance and over generous decision-making 
procedures—instead of dramatic doctrinal shouts. But quietly 
and methodically, the Supreme Court has encouraged state 
courts to ignore binding Court precedent—to act, in other 
words, as “state courts unbound.” We should hardly be sur-
prised when state courts agree.397 
 If Professor Bloom is right, then even the seemingly remote judi-
cial branches participate in federalism bargaining, and to worthwhile 
effect. By Professor Bloom’s account, state courts have succeeded at 
renegotiating U.S. Supreme Court precedent in the areas of matrimo-
nial domicile, criminal sentencing reforms, and juvenile death sentenc-
ing.398 Even the implicit conversations between federal and intermedi-
ate state courts under the Erie doctrine (over uncertain state precedent 
in federal cases) might be understood as negotiation.399 
                                                                                                                      
395 Bloom, supra note 28, at 503. 
396 Id. at 504. 
397 Id. 
398 Id. at 516, 533, 544. 
399 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938) (establishing that a federal 
court in diversity must apply substantive state law). For a more overt example of judicial 
bargaining in a different context, see Linda Greenhouse, Clarence Thomas, Silent but Sure, 
Opinionator (Mar. 11, 2010, 9:37 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/ 
11/clarence-thomas-silent-but-sure/ (describing a series of invitations within Justice Tho-
mas’s dissents to challenge various Supreme Court precedents). See generally Gerald Frug, 
The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715 (1978) (describing executive and judi-
cial collusion in adversarial proceedings seeking judicial decrees that would require legis-
lative authorization and funding for legal and social reform). 
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III. Marketplace Norms and Sources of Trade 
 Furthering the Article’s positive account of federalism bargaining, 
this Part incorporates data from the taxonomy and interviews with a 
limited sample of bargaining participants400 to analyze federalism bar-
gaining norms and sources of trade. Precious few generalizations apply 
to so diverse an array of intergovernmental bargaining, but useful 
commonalities can be drawn about the four kinds of currencies with 
which participants bargain, and the legal constraints and uncertainties 
that restrict them. Consulted primary sources especially support the 
Article’s normative account of the role of negotiated federalism. 
A. Marketplace Norms 
 The following analysis reveals soft generalizations about the norms 
that operate in commonplace markets for state-federal bargaining, in-
cluding participation, rites of initiation, bargaining mechanics, negoti-
ating leverage, and the uncertainty about roles and limits that often 
characterizes the federalism bargaining marketplace. 
1. Participation: Executive Dominance, with Exceptions 
 Most federalism bargaining takes place between the executive ac-
tors on either side of the state-federal divide; it is axiomatic in en-
forcement negotiations and in most permitting and licensing negotia-
tions. For example, EPA and state environmental agencies generally 
negotiate the terms of state implementation programs under the Clean 
Air Act,401 while HHS and state health and social service agencies nego-
tiate the terms of Medicaid demonstration waivers.402 When federal ex-
ecutive agencies initiate negotiated rulemaking with state input, state 
participants are usually members of the executive branch.403 That ex-
ecutive actors lead in many instances of state-federal bargaining is not 
surprising, as they are charged with the details of statutory implementa-
                                                                                                                      
400 My small, non-statistical sample included five state agents and five federal agents 
who regularly engage in federalism bargaining, as well as five legal scholars who research 
regulatory overlap, and five who research some of the relevant bargaining venues. Several 
requested anonymity to avoid the appearance of making official pronouncements. 
401 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006) and related discussion, supra notes 345–346 and 
accompanying text. 
402 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315, 1396n and related discussion, supra notes 330–344 and ac-
companying text. 
403 See, for example, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006), 
discussed, supra notes 213–237 and accompanying text. 
2011] Negotiating Federalism 75 
tion and possess the most reliable substantive expertise about what 
each side can accomplish. Although high-ranking executive officials 
can play important roles in the process, the most important players are 
often the career agency staff on both sides.404 
 That said, there are many exceptions. For example, Congress is the 
federal negotiator in all spending power deals, in most policymaking 
laboratory and iterative federalism negotiations, and in much interest 
group representation bargaining. Sometimes Congress convenes the 
process of negotiated rulemaking by statute, as it initially required un-
der the REAL ID Act.405 Congress was also the federal partner in the 
LLRWPA negotiation with the states,406 and it is the intersystemic signal-
ing partner targeted by states that have organized regionally on climate 
change initiatives.407 We might even consider the indirect negotiating 
roles played by judicial actors—not only as envisioned by Professor 
Bloom,408 but even that of lower court judges like the one who sen-
tenced Ed Rosenthal to one day in prison (rather than the federal 
mandatory five-year minimum) for cultivating medical marijuana un-
der a state license.409 Understood broadly, all branch actors may engage 
in federalism bargaining at one time or another. 
2. Initiation: Federal Dominance, on the Surface 
 The federal government most often initiates negotiations, espe-
cially when federal supremacy or the spending power plays an impor-
tant role. The Clean Air and Water Acts, Medicaid, and No Child Left 
Behind Act all offer good examples, although even these statutory bar-
gaining forums may obscure important state roles in interest group ne-
gotiations leading up to the statutes’ enactment.410 
 That said, sometimes states are the clear initiators. States often ini-
tiate by taking the policymaking lead in a way that evolves toward feder-
                                                                                                                      
404 Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 116. 
405 See National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 
Stat. 3638, and related discussion, supra notes 291–300 and accompanying text. 
406 See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 
(1980), amended by Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. 
No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j (2006)), and 
related discussion, supra notes 197–207 and accompanying text. 
407 See, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2006) and related discussion, supra notes 352–
358 and accompanying text. 
408 See supra notes 395–398 and accompanying text. 
409 See O’Hear, supra note 381, at 787. 
410 Supra notes 164–399. 
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alism bargaining—either formally (e.g., vehicular emissions),411 or in-
formally (e.g., medical marijuana enforcement).412 Other times, states 
initiate more straightforwardly, engaging Congress either in a spending 
power deal they have designed, as they did by lobbying for the Energy 
Efficiency Block Grant Program,413 or in bargained-for commandeering 
negotiations, like those that occurred between the NGA and Congress 
in enacting the LLRWPA.414 In each of these cases, the states seek a par-
ticular form of federal capacity that they need to implement their own 
policy preferences—either financial resources, freedom from otherwise 
operative legal rules, or legal authority to resolve a collective action 
problem among the states.415 Federalism bargaining arises from both 
ends of the state-federal divide. 
3. Mechanics: Forum-Dependent 
 The mechanics of state-federal bargaining vary depending on the 
forum, indicating various opportunities for federalism engineering in 
their design. 
 Sometimes Congress explicitly invites negotiation by statute, even 
if it leaves the particulars of the negotiating process to executive agen-
cies. Congress took this approach in the Medicaid demonstration waiv-
er programs, which invite states to propose exceptions,416 and the 
Clean Water Act, which required that EPA consult with states in devel-
oping the Phase II Stormwater Rule.417 In other examples, Congress 
enacts a statute that implicitly necessitates state-federal bargaining, as it 
did in authorizing the formation of memoranda of understanding be-
                                                                                                                      
411 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543 and related discussion, supra notes 352–358 and accompany-
ing text. 
412 Supra notes 376–387 and accompanying text. 
413 See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 
1492 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17001–17386) and related discussion, supra notes 177–180 
and accompanying text. 
414 See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 
(1980), amended by Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. 
No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j (2006)), and 
related discussion, supra notes 197–207 and accompanying text. 
415 For a more detailed treatment of when federal preemption is and is not an appro-
priate response to state collective action problems, see Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. 
Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation, 
102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 591–603 (2008). 
416 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315, 1396n and related discussion, supra note 330–344 and ac-
companying text. 
417 Supra notes 283–290 and accompanying text; see 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(p)(5) (West 
2008) (requiring EPA to consult with states in design of the Phase II Rule). 
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tween state and federal agencies in allocating enforcement authority 
for immigration violations under the ACCESS program418 and permit-
ting pollutant discharges under the NPDES program.419 Elsewhere, 
state and federal actors bargain under statutory provisions that enable 
more explicit negotiations, such as state-federal negotiations for inci-
dental take permits under the ESA.420 
 These various legislative arrangements may take advantage of the 
different institutional competencies of each branch to account for fed-
eralism concerns. For example, Congress may create explicit avenues 
for state-federal bargaining when it intends to engage the highest level 
of state government in policy design, while leaving executive agencies 
to manage the details of bargaining in individual circumstances where 
specialized expertise and particular relationships among federal and 
state negotiators will be useful. 
 In addition, federal statutes and rules incorporate features that 
cleverly motivate state-federal bargaining and collaboration where it is 
especially needed. For example, although seized criminal assets be-
come state property and enter the general treasury under most state 
forfeiture laws, federal forfeiture laws remand most seized assets di-
rectly to state law enforcement agencies.421 This creates a powerful in-
centive for state law enforcers to collaborate with federal agencies in 
investigating criminal activity in areas of jurisdictional overlap, motivat-
ing them to share information that may lead to more effective en-
forcement and more efficient allocation of scarce funding.422 The Su-
perfund Act includes a similar feature to encourage state-federal 
remediation partnerships.423 If a state partners with EPA under the 
Natural Resources Damages Assessment program, then recovered funds 
                                                                                                                      
418 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 
and related discussion, supra notes 148–157 and accompanying text. 
419 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b) and related discussion, supra notes 158–162 and accom-
panying text. 
420 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006) and related discussion, supra notes 213–217 and ac-
companying text. 
421 Telephone Interview with Roscoe Howard, supra note 133; see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 524 
(2006) (establishing the DOJ Assets Forfeiture Fund); Eric D. Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, 
Contesting Government’s Financial Interest in Drug Cases, 13 Crim. Just. 4, 5 (1999) (contrast-
ing federal and state asset forfeiture laws). 
422 Telephone Interview with Roscoe Howard, supra note 133 (“It’s a purposefully de-
signed dealmaking tool, and it works very well: bring us your big cases with federal import, 
and we’ll give you the money!”). 
423 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9628 (2006); Interview with Mike Murphy, supra note 159. 
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go to restoring the local resource—but if EPA acts alone, then 40% of 
recovered funds go into the United States’ operating budget.424 
4. Leverage: Federal Supremacy, State Capacity 
 The conventional wisdom is that the federal government possesses 
substantially more leverage in state-federal negotiations, by combined 
force of the Supremacy Clause425 and superior fiscal resources. Federal-
ism bargaining participants confirm this view in many areas of govern-
ance.426 One state agency attorney noted that “states lack leverage at 
the table . . . because they aren’t as cohesive as they could be, notwith-
standing the National Governors Assocation.”427 He explained: “Politi-
cal differences between states mean that they aren’t always on the same 
side, so they cannot get it together enough to lobby effectively as a sin-
gle force—they care about different things, so they cannot really lever-
age effectively based on their collective capacity.”428 Despite the suspi-
cion that leverage favors the federal government, however, state 
bargainers defend negotiation vigorously as a preferred tool of inter-
jurisdictional governance.429 As a National Conference of State Legisla-
tures source noted, “even if the states lack leverage, [bargaining] is still 
the best, fairest process.”430 
 Participants are also quick to note exceptions to the rule in both 
political and policymaking contexts. For example, state governors have 
formidable political leverage over their state’s federal legislators by vir-
tue of a governor’s superior local access to state media.431 The governor 
can generate serious political consequences for a legislator’s career by 
manipulating the popular opinion through statements to the press. 
State actors also possess more powerful leverage when they are the 
primary implementers of bargained-for policies.432 
                                                                                                                      
424 Interview with Mike Murphy, supra note 159. 
425 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
426 Telephone Interview with Jeff Reynolds, Staff Attorney, Va. DEQ ( Jan. 4, 2010); 
Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 116; Senate Interview, supra note 175. 
427 Telephone Interview with Jeff Reynolds, supra note 426. 
428 Id. Subject-specific state alliances, such as the Environmental Council of the States, 
are more successful at lobbying federal policymakers because member concerns are more 
unified. Interview with Mike Murphy, supra note 159. 
429 E.g., Interview with Rick Weeks, Chief Deputy Dir. of Va. DEQ, in Richmond, Va. ( Jan. 
25, 2010) (“Things typically work pretty well and leverage is not a real concern of ours.”). 
430 Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 116. 
431 Senate Interview, supra note 175. 
432 See generally Hills, supra note 55. 
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 Although the conventional wisdom about favorable federal lever-
age should not be underestimated, negotiation theory helps unpack 
bargaining leverage in ways that highlight easily missed state advantages. 
In whatever form, leverage tracks influence in deal-making. The party 
with the most leverage is best positioned to secure its preferred terms, 
assuming the leverage is effectively deployed. Conversely, the party with 
the least leverage usually has the most to lose if a deal is not reached. 
But leverage really arises in three different forms: negative, positive, and 
normative.433 Often most obvious to the naked eye, negative leverage is 
power held by one side that the other does not want it to use—like a 
state governor’s ability to generate negative local press about a senator. 
By contrast, a party exerts positive leverage in wielding power or re-
sources that the other side does want it to use—such as that Congress 
wields in bargaining with the spending power. Finally, normative lever-
age is morally based power, compelling the parties in a certain direction 
based on shared authoritative norms, such as fairness, consistency, pa-
triotism, honesty, and any other values that might apply more locally. 
 Federal actors often hold the most important negative leverage, 
given their ability to preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause, 
and at times, powerful positive leverage in the form of federal funds. 
States, however, often possess the most important positive leverage, giv-
en their generally superior capacity for enforcement, implementation, 
and innovation (and reciprocal negative leverage when they can credi-
bly threaten to withhold it). As detailed in Part III.B, states also benefit 
from the powerful normative leverage that constitutional norms and 
federalism principles exert on the federalism bargaining process. 
 In federalism bargaining, the negative leverage of federal preemp-
tion is often balanced by the positive leverage of state capacity. The 
more the implicated realm of governance depends on state capacity, 
the more power state negotiators wield at the table.434 For example, ne-
gotiating leverage is more closely matched in many environmental ne-
gotiations because participants understand that the programs of coop-
erative federalism on which the big federal environmental statutes 
depend would implode without the good faith participation of state 
                                                                                                                      
433 Shell, supra note 9, at 40–57 (discussing leverage). 
434 EPA Interview, supra note 274; Telephone Interview with Jeff Reynolds, supra note 
426; Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 116; Senate Interview, supra note 
175. 
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environmental agencies.435 In theory, EPA assumes the roles that states 
choose not to fulfill, but participants understand that EPA could never 
realistically assume responsibility for localized implementation in each 
state, or even a handful at any given time.436 As a result, state agents oc-
casionally hear EPA threats of preemption as hollow, and occasionally 
expect that EPA is more likely to support failing state programs with 
additional funding and technical assistance than it is to assume con-
trol.437 Where meaningful state participation is critical to federal suc-
cess, state bargaining power waxes.438 
 Criminal law negotiations present the opposite scenario because 
federal law enforcement agencies hold the capacity advantage in realms 
of jurisdictional overlap. Lacking legal supremacy and with fewer re-
sources to allocate over a broader array of enforcement obligations, 
state negotiators should have measurably less leverage in criminal en-
forcement bargaining. Nevertheless, some sources indicate that lever-
age conflicts are muted in this arena because conflicting interests are 
infrequent.439 According to Roscoe Howard, former U.S. Attorney for 
the District of Columbia, criminal enforcement federalism bargaining 
proceeds with surprisingly little controversy because the incentives to-
ward cooperation on both sides are powerfully aligned: 
There are very practical reasons for the copious amount of 
state-federal bargaining that goes on in the criminal realm. It’s 
unbelievably helpful, and without it, both systems would bog 
down . . . . States may have less leverage in terms of fiscal and 
legal resources, but it doesn’t really amount to much, because 
it’s not really a zero-sum game. When we cooperate, everyone 
wins because a threat is taken off the street. The only conten-
                                                                                                                      
435 See, for example, enforcement under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2006), 
and under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006); EPA Interview, supra note 274; 
Interview with Mike Murphy, supra note 159. 
436 EPA Interview, supra note 274; Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 
116. 
437 Anonymous Interview with State Agency Official ( Jan. 15, 2010) [hereinafter State 
Agency Interview] (on file with the Boston College Law Review). State agencies generally 
assume EPA is more likely to assist failing state programs than to terminate them, as may 
happen now that Michigan has requested to return delegated CWA authority due to its 
budget crisis. Interview with Mike Murphy, supra note 159 (explaining that it would cost 
EPA more to issue individual permits than to fund failing state programs); see Key Corps 
Official Faults States’ Push to Oversee Wetlands Permits, Inside the EPA, Apr. 24, 2009, available 
at 2009 WLNR 7604929 (reporting on Michigan’s request). 
438 EPA Interview, supra note 274; Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 
116. 
439 Telephone Interview with Roscoe Howard, supra note 133. 
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tious issue is credit—that’s usually when there is competition 
for jurisdiction. But state prosecutors, sheriffs, and common-
wealth attorneys are usually elected, and very sensitive to pub-
lic image. They need credit. The federal guy at the table is al-
ways appointed. So it’s usually easy to manage that.440 
Aside from rare, high-profile cases, interjurisdictional criminal matters 
are seldom tried in both state and federal forums, so credit usually rests 
with whoever prosecutes.441 (Of course, it is unlikely that all federalism 
bargaining is equally as harmonious, especially in regulatory contexts 
in which incentives are not so cleanly dovetailed.) 
 Admittedly, it can be problematic to analyze leverage according to a 
binary state-federal metric, when policymaking leverage often shifts be-
tween coalitions of different state and federal actors. For example, one 
U.S. Senate attorney described how state-federal negotiations over “cap-
and-trade” policy were complicated by the fact that state legislators did 
not want federal law to put all delegated state power into the hands of 
state governors.442 Battles over the REAL ID Act reveal similar dynamics 
of cross-party alliances within federalism bargaining. According to one 
source, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano agreed with the state criticism 
of the Act, but her only leverage to pressure congressional amendment 
was to allow the December 31, 2009 deadline to expire without exten-
sions in the face of massive state noncompliance.443 She reportedly seri-
ously considered this tactic, by which she hoped to shame her federal 
peers in Congress into revising the law, but she ultimately issued the ex-
tensions to avoid stranding millions of holiday travelers unable to board 
aircrafts without federally valid identification.444 The complex interplay 
of independent municipal actors further complicates federalism bar-
gaining dynamics.445 
                                                                                                                      
440 Id. (adding that bargaining proceeds smoothly “at least 90% of the time”). 
441 The high-profile “D.C. Sniper” case offers the rare counter-example of multijurisdic-
tional competition over prosecution rights. Virginia and Maryland competed over trying the 
defendants, and the FBI (which held the defendants after making the arrests) was ready to 
try them if the states could not agree. Virginia ultimately convicted both defendants in the 
first trials, but Maryland re-prosecuted one defendant to ensure against death penalty proce-
dural issues. FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit, Serial Murder: Multi-Disciplinary Per-
spectives for Investigators 37 (2008), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/ 
serial-murder/serial-murder-july-2008-pdf. 
442 Senate Interview, supra note 175 (describing how different state-side negotiators 
can compete with one another by negotiating directly with federal policymakers rather 
than as a unified block). 
443 Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 116. 
444 Id. 
445 See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
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5. Relationships and Consultation: Key Building Blocks 
 Participants report that positive working relationships with coun-
terparts are the bedrock of successful federalism bargaining.446 Wheth-
er bargaining takes place in a collaborative enforcement context or in a 
policymaking context fraught with preemption conflict, frequent 
communication, mutual concern for shared interests, and mutual re-
spect for differing interests are the key ingredients for progress. As an 
attorney within the EPA Administrator’s Office explained, 
We spend a lot of time communicating with people in the 
field. It’s so much harder to negotiate without that invest-
ment. If you haven’t spent time getting that information and 
building those relationships, then the likelihood that you’ll 
end up arguing over the shape of the table is much higher.447 
As Rick Weeks, Chief Deputy Director of Virginia’s Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality, explained about his negotiations with federal part-
ners, “[T]here usually is not a clear right answer—both parties can be 
right [about who should do what], so we look for solutions that work for 
everybody.”448 When asked for the most important item in his negotia-
tion toolbox, former U.S. Attorney Roscoe Howard said, “Knee pads— 
very useful when asking for things!”449 
 Subjects uniformly highlighted the importance of frequent consul-
tation with counterparts.450 Most praised their negotiating relationships 
as critical to the success of interjurisdictional governance, and agreed 
that more consultation was always preferable to less. Interview subjects 
believed the system works well as it stands, and were hesitant to suggest 
improvements (even when prompted, and even anonymously).451 Sev-
                                                                                                                      
446 Id. (“To make these efforts work, it’s all about relationship building . . . . [Who] 
matters most is the local career folks at both the state and federal levels.”); see also Tele-
phone Interview with Roscoe Howard, supra note 133; Interview with Laurie Ristino, US-
DA Gen. Counsel’s Office, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 31, 2009); Interview with Rick Weeks, supra 
note 429. 
447 EPA Interview, supra note 274. 
448 Interview with Rick Weeks, supra note 429. 
449 Telephone Interview with Roscoe Howard, supra note 133. 
450 E.g., EPA Interview, supra note 274 (“The effectiveness of regulatory structure de-
pends on [stakeholders] believing that the regulations are needed, make sense, and will be 
administered fairly—so if you have important stakeholders, be in frequent contact with 
them.”). 
451 E.g., Telephone Interview with Jeff Reynolds, supra note 426 (quoted main text); 
Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 116 (“I’d say that things are pretty 
good the way they are . . . basically, bargaining is better than the alternative, and changes 
could always make things worse.”). 
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eral opined that altering the federalism bargaining marketplace with 
additional constraints or requirements was a bad idea, even when con-
sidering negotiations in which they did not achieve preferred results.452 
On the other hand, all agreed that consultation was only helpful when 
it was genuine, and several suggested revision of requirements that re-
ward “hoop-jumping” over substantive communication.453 
 Subjects generally agreed that implementation and enforcement 
negotiations are the smoothest because they involve a level of consulta-
tion considered optimal by both sides.454 State participants noted that 
policymaking negotiations present a greater challenge because there is 
less consultation than they believe is needed.455 These negotiations are 
more fraught by nature because states are usually reluctant to cede au-
thority to the federal programs implicated—but many state participants 
do acknowledge the need for national leadership in appropriate regu-
latory realms and note the helpfulness of a federal regulatory backstop 
in contexts where local enforcement is difficult or unpopular.456 
 A more common theme of concern among state participants is 
that federal policymakers underestimate the financial burden of new 
federal laws on states, and most prescribe greater consultation as the 
remedy.457 Federal agencies often project the costs of new programs 
                                                                                                                      
452 E.g., EPA Interview, supra note 274; Telephone Interview with Jeff Reynolds, supra 
note 426; Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 116 (no matter how unsatis-
fying the result, “any kind of negotiation is preferable to the top-down approach, because 
the states come in too many different shapes and sizes for the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to 
work well”). 
453 E.g., Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 116 (noting that more 
consultation requirements “could slow down an already slow process,” but that “mak[ing] 
sure Congress is at least well-informed is a good idea”). Another interviewee distinguished 
between “real give and take” ensuring that stakeholders are actually heard, and “listening 
sessions” where “a series of state stakeholders make a five-minute speech about what they 
want while the federal people eat lunch, so they can check the box that says they listened.” 
See EPA Interview, supra note 274. This source would not support “ineffective consultation 
requirements that end up costing time and resources disproportionate to the purpose they 
should serve, or that make it impossible to do work in real time.” Id. 
454 E.g., Interview with Mike Murphy, supra note 159; Telephone Interview with Jeff 
Reynolds, supra note 426; Interview with Rick Weeks, supra note 429. 
455 Interview with Mike Murphy, supra note 159; Telephone Interview with Melissa Sav-
age supra note 116; Interview with Rick Weeks, supra note 429. 
456 EPA Interview, supra note 274 (“[T]he flip side is that [states] are closer to the 
people, who, to them, are voters—so sometimes they ask us to take the hard line because 
it’s politically safer to have us do it.”); Telephone Interview with Jeff Reynolds, supra note 
426; Interview with Rick Weeks, supra note 429 (“Having the 800-pound gorilla in the clo-
set is helpful!”). 
457 Senate Interview, supra note 175 (acknowledging the concern); see Interview with 
Mike Murphy, supra note 159 (same); Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage supra note 
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based on an assumption of full compliance at the outset, even though 
states almost always face significant enforcement expenses in bringing 
the regulated community up to new compliance standards.458 After a 
recent lobbying effort by state interest groups, at least one source sees 
encouraging signs that federal agencies understand the need to be bet-
ter informed by state partners.459 For example, the Environmental 
Council of the States persuaded EPA to form a “Cost of Rules Regula-
tory Workgroup” of EPA and state representatives to recommend re-
forms to address this problem.460 
6. Underlying Legal Uncertainty 
 A final feature warranting analysis is the substantive legal uncer-
tainty that pervades many federalism bargaining forums about respec-
tive roles and legal limits—or who, in the end, should get to decide.461 
Negotiations take place in realms of overlapping state and federal ju-
risdiction, where both governments have regulatory interests to pro-
tect, authority to wield, and obligations to fulfill.462 Together with other 
scholars, I have previously identified obstacles for policymaking in such 
realms posed by the Rehnquist Court’s resurrection of a classical dual 
                                                                                                                      
116 (emphasizing that greater state consultation would help). An attorney from the Vir-
ginia Department of Environmental Quality elaborated: 
Unfunded mandates cause good ideas to fail. . . . You can see it in failing un-
derfunded environmental programs. States could give federal agencies a real-
istic assessment of what the new law will require to make it work. States are 
different, and they have different resources—they have to be able to talk 
about this when the rule is being made, or else states end up in a bind, un-
able to get things done. 
Telephone Interview with Jeff Reynolds, supra note 426. 
458 Interview with Mike Murphy, supra note 159. 
459 Id. (noting that he serves on this new committee as one of four state agency dele-
gates). 
460 Id.; Information Management, Envtl. Council of States, http://www.ecos.org/sec- 
tion/committees/information_management (last visited Nov. 29, 2010) (providing informa-
tion on ECOS’s Data Management Work Group, which coordinates with EPA to build infor-
mation systems regarding, among other things, cost of compliance). 
461 Supra text accompanying notes 38–39. 
462 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006) (governing water qual-
ity standard setting under the Clean Water Act); supra notes 347–349 and accompanying 
text; see also 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b) (governing pollution permitting under the Clean Water 
Act); supra notes 158–162, 345–347 and accompanying text; see also Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7507 (2006) (providing states with a choice between compliance with national 
emissions standards or with California standards); supra notes 352–358 and accompanying 
text. 
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federalism ideal seeking cleaner jurisdictional separation.463 Friction 
between the interjurisdictional reality in which governance takes place 
and the theoretical model animating the Court’s adjudication of con-
flicts creates uncertainty about the kinds of federalism bargaining that 
are enforceable (and even desirable).464 As Professor Coase has pre-
dicted, such uncertainty threatens bargaining optimality as an addi-
tional transaction cost.465 If federalism bargaining plays such an impor-
tant role in already challenging realms of jurisdictional overlap, then 
optimizing results by reducing uncertainty should be a priority. 
 But even as academics continue to fret over the conflict, partici-
pants report that they rarely worry about it.466 They may not be entirely 
certain about legal constraints in the background, but they report that 
this uncertainty does not impact most negotiations, where the shared 
objective is usually to solve a clearly shared problem.467 As one state at-
torney reported, 
Nobody is thinking about the New Federalism cases, or at least 
I’m not anymore. I know they were supposed to rein in federal 
law, but that hasn’t really happened. [I work with a] problem-
atic law, and the boundaries are confusing. But everyone 
ploughs ahead with it anyway: “Forget whether we have the au-
thority—we’re just going to press ahead and do it because it’s 
the right thing to do . . . .” Let the chips fall where they may.468 
                                                                                                                      
463 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 8, at 567–95 (describing how regulatory problems requir-
ing simultaneous state and federal response grate against the classical dual federalism 
model, which idealizes mutually exclusive realms of state and federal jurisdiction). The 
federalism bargaining marketplace is broader. 
464 See, e.g., supra notes 183–210 and accompanying text (describing uncertain bar-
gained-for commandeering negotiations); supra note 194 (citing recent Supreme Court 
precedent making federally approved interstate compacts harder to enforce). 
465 Coase, supra note 24, at 15–19. 
466 Telephone Interview with Roscoe Howard, supra note 133; Interview with Mike 
Murphy, supra note 159; Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 116; Senate 
Interview, supra note 175; Interview with Rick Weeks, supra note 429. 
467 Senate Interview, supra note 175; see also Telephone Interview with Jeff Reynolds, 
supra note 426 (“As for awareness about federalism concerns—I think it goes over every-
one’s heads, at least in the terms you’re using, but they are thinking about them in other 
language. . . . It’s on people’s minds, but they just don’t know what to do with it.”). 
468 State Agency Interview, supra note 437; see also Telephone Interview with Melissa 
Savage, supra note 116 (reporting that although the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures is mindful about federalism, “court cases aren’t usually the first thing we’re thinking 
of . . . . We try to stay up to date . . . but honestly, in that whole process, the New Federal-
ism cases are pretty remote”). 
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A federal attorney similarly explained, “federalism constraints operate 
in the background, but they are not usually on the minds of most legis-
lative bargainers; the first priority . . . is to solve the problem and get a 
bill passed that can do it.”469 When I asked one state official whether he 
ever thinks about the lines of jurisdictional separation that the New Fe-
deralism cases draw, he responded simply: “No—because there are no 
bright lines [in this realm]! So no, we do not really give them much 
thought.”470 He then observed that the State Attorney General’s office 
might have a different answer, nodding humorously to the plain dis-
juncture between the focus of unilateral and bilateral federalism inter-
pretation.471 
 Other subjects reported that genuine federalism issues do arise 
during intergovernmental bargaining, even if they are not regarded in 
those terms.472 These include questions about which side must yield on 
a given implementation issue, or concerns about the appropriate degree 
of consultation in policymaking.473 Demystifying legal constraints would 
thus be an important way of bettering the federalism bargaining enter-
prise.474 And to the extent that participants do not actively consider le-
gal constraints during negotiation, careful design of the legal frame-
works that provide opportunities for federalism bargaining is important. 
B. Sources of Trade 
 Having identified the forums in which federalism bargaining takes 
place and many of the norms that operate within them, we reach the 
meat of the actual intergovernmental exchange. This Section analyzes 
what it is, exactly, that federalism bargainers are trading on, and evalu-
ates what constitutional or jurisprudential rules constrain these various 
media of exchange. 
 In all bargaining, each side possesses something the other side 
wants or needs, and these become the sources of trade for negotiation. 
                                                                                                                      
469 Senate Interview, supra note 175 (adding, “most aren’t thinking about whether 
things will be litigated for federalism reasons; maybe they did a little bit after [Lopez and 
Morrison], but that was years ago”). 
470 Interview with Mike Murphy, supra note 159. 
471 Id. 
472 Id.; Telephone Interview with Jeff Reynolds, supra note 426; Senate Interview, supra 
note 175. 
473 For example, Jeff Reynolds reports ongoing state-federal conflict over waivers of so-
vereign immunity under various permitting provisions of the CAA, CWA, and RCRA. Tele-
phone Interview with Jeff Reynolds, supra note 426. 
474 Cf. Coase, supra note 24, at 43 (“A better approach would seem to be to start our 
analysis with a situation approximating that which actually exists . . . .”). 
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Things in demand are the unique currency within any given deal, and 
there is usually more than one form operating at any given time. The 
medium of exchange can be a tangible resource, an intangible legal 
authority, or adherence to a normative principle that motivates the 
choices made in negotiation. To be sure, the details that motivate the 
parties will vary in each specific context. But the media exchanged in 
most state-federal negotiations are of the following types: money, regu-
latory capacity, permission, credit, and principle (the normative lever-
age that federalism values themselves exert on the negotiation). And 
though the legal constraints on some forms of trading are clear, others 
remain murky.475 
1. The Power of the Purse 
 When money is the most salient federal-state medium of exchange, 
it is likely a spending power deal. Federal dollars were the critical nego-
tiating currency when Congress used highway funds to bargain with 
states for a national drinking age,476 matched state funds to provide 
health insurance for poor citizens through Medicaid,477 and condi-
tioned education funds on the adoption of national standards in the 
No Child Left Behind Act (the “NCLB”).478 
a. Constraints 
 South Dakota v. Dole articulated a set of loose constraints on how 
Congress may bargain through conditional spending: conditions must 
(1) promote the general welfare, (2) be unambiguous, (3) relate to the 
federal interest or program, and (4) not offend other constitutional 
requirements.479 In other words, Congress may wield the power of its 
purse when there is a reasonable nexus between the strings attached to 
federal money and a legitimate federal purpose. Underscored by in-
validation of the LLRWPA bargained-for commandeering, negotiating 
states must have genuine choices about whether to participate— al-
though participation will be deemed voluntary even when agreed to 
                                                                                                                      
475 See, e.g., infra notes 503–510, 517–522 and accompanying text (discussing the uncer-
tain legal constraints regarding capacity and permissions trading). 
476 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). 
477 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315, 1396n (2006) and related discussion, supra notes 330–344 and 
accompanying text. 
478 See Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (enacted Jan. 8, 2002) (codified in scattered 
sections of 20 U.S.C) and related discussion, supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text. 
479 483 U.S. at 207–08. 
88 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1 
under enormous economic pressure.480 Finally, the deal cannot other-
wise violate the Constitution—for example, Congress cannot bribe 
states to restrict free speech. 
  Congress thus bargains with a relatively free hand under the 
spending power, but the doctrine still yields points of uncertainty—as 
demonstrated by a recent series of federal circuit court cases challeng-
ing the NCLB.481 Although all states have chosen to participate in the 
program (in order to continue receiving federal educational funds),482 
ten school districts around the country recently sued over an NCLB 
provision they argued failed to meet Dole’s unambiguousness require-
ment.483 
 In 2009 in School District of the City of Pontiac v. Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Education, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit con-
sidered whether states could escape a spending deal they argued was 
ambiguous, when the alternative interpretation was not one they could 
reasonably have believed at the time the deal was made.484 The plain-
tiffs argued that NCLB included a provision that could be read to pro-
hibit federal enforcement of state action (such as hiring or purchasing) 
that would require funding beyond what was provided under the Act, 
even if the disputed action were necessary to meet the federal stan-
dards designated by the Act.485 The Department of Education (the 
                                                                                                                      
480 See Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000). 
[H]ere, the Arkansas Department of Education can avoid the requirements 
of Section 504 simply by declining federal education funds. The sacrifice of 
all federal education budget, approximately $250 million or 12 percent of the 
annual state education . . . would be politically painful, but we cannot say that 
it compels Arkansas’s choice. 
Id. 
481 See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text. 
482 Kafer, supra note 181 (“So far, no state has refused to participate, although a few 
isolated districts have pulled out; apparently the money is too good to pass up.”). 
483 See generally Sch. Dist. of the City of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Dept. of Educ., 584 F.3d 253 
(6th Cir. 2009) (en banc). In this case, school districts receiving federal funds under No 
Child Left Behind sued unsuccessfully for a declaratory judgment stating compliance with 
Act’s provisions was not required if compliance led to increased costs not covered by fed-
eral funds. 
484 Id. at 259. 
485 Id. at 259–60. 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2006) states: 
General Prohibition. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize an of-
ficer or employee of the Federal Government to mandate, direct, or control a 
State, local educational agency, or school’s curriculum, program of instruction, 
or allocation of State or local resources, or mandate a State or any subdivision 
thereof to spend any funds or incur any costs not paid for under this Act. 
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“DOE”) insisted that the provision merely prohibited federal actors 
from applying more stringent standards than specifically mandated in 
the Act.486 DOE argued that the provision was unambiguous in the con-
text of the full statutory bargain, which clearly indicated that Congress 
was trading a set amount of funding for states’ agreement to meet the 
stated federal standards by whatever means.487 
 Strikingly, this seemingly generic statutory interpretation case failed 
to produce a majority opinion from the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc.488 
Sixteen judges split evenly over whether the case should be dismissed, 
embroiled in contrary positions about how the spending power’s “clear 
notice” requirement should comport with the interpretation of the 
“core bargain” under consideration in a spending power deal.489 The 
case thus asked the judges not only to evaluate ordinary statutory lan-
guage, but also, in negotiation theory terms, the core elements of a 
state-federal bargain. For example, Judge Jeffrey Sutton favored dis-
missal because the plaintiffs’ ambiguity argument would undermine the 
Act’s “central tradeoff”: providing states funds and flexibility to develop 
their own educational programs in exchange for accountability to fed-
eral standards.490 Indicating the significance of this question for federal-
ism bargaining more generally, a similar debate arose among the Su-
preme Court justices deciding New York v. United States over how to 
interpret the LLRWPA without vitiating the “core bargain” that the 
states had reached with Congress over its enactment.491 
 The Sixth Circuit’s astonishing failure to win even a narrow judi-
cial consensus in Pontiac School District indicates the sensitivity with 
which judges must employ tools of statutory interpretation within the 
federalism bargaining context. Although statutory interpretation tools 
                                                                                                                      
Id. 
486 Pontiac Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d at 284 (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting that plaintiff 
“must identify a plausible alternative interpretation”). 
487 Id. at 272–76. 
488 En Banc Sixth Circuit Rebuffs Panel, Affirms Dismissal of ‘No Child’ Challenge, U.S. L. 
Week, Oct. 27, 2009, available at 78 U.S.L.W. 1241. The district court voted to dismiss for 
failure to state a legitimate spending power claim; an appellate panel reversed, and the 
panel’s decision was vacated when the Sixth Circuit reconvened to review the case en banc. 
Id. Without a majority consensus, the district court’s dismissal stands. Id. 
489 Seven judges voted to allow the claim on the merits; an eighth judge rejected their 
rationale but voted to remand; six judges voted to dismiss on the merits; two judges voted 
to dismiss as nonjusticiable—yielding a tie on whether to dismiss. Id. 
490 Pont. Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d at 285–86 (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting that plaintiff’s 
interpretation “fail[ed] to account for, and effectively eviscerate[ed], numerous compo-
nents of the Act,” and “would break the accountability backbone of the Act”). 
491 Compare New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992), with Pontiac Sch. Dist., 
584 F.3d at 199 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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are no different in spending power cases, the court struggled with the 
federalism implications of releasing states from bargained-for federal 
obligations on an alleged technicality that half the judges believed 
would void the core essence of the bargain the states had struck when 
they agreed to take the funds.492 In addition, and contrary to popular 
criticism of the spending doctrine, the case indicates the seriousness 
with which the judiciary will evaluate clear notice questions. A similar 
case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit493 indicates 
states’ continuing dissatisfaction with NCLB. 
2. Capacity Trading 
 The spending power is often the most salient medium of exchange 
in a deal, but spending power deals are always also about a less obvious, 
equally important source of trade: state regulatory capacity. Sometimes 
the federal government buys state cooperation to advance a regulatory 
agenda exceeding clearly enumerated powers (e.g., a national drinking 
age).494 Elsewhere, Congress creates programs of cooperative federal-
ism in commerce-related realms it could manage from top to bottom— 
but chooses not to, because the federal government lacks the local ex-
pertise, regulatory authority, boots on the ground, or perceived legiti-
macy—in short, the capacity—that state government can provide.495 
 Regulatory capacity is the power to make things happen—by what-
ever resources or institutional feature enables either side to accomplish 
an objective that the other cannot do as well. In spending power deals, 
Congress trades federal fiscal capacity for state regulatory capacity to 
implement goals it lacks the expertise or resources to implement alone 
(for example, in regulating stormwater or insuring poor children).496 
The states thus wield powerful leverage in spending power negotiations 
because they control a reservoir of local expertise, resources, and au-
thority that federal counterparts cannot replicate (without replicating 
the very structure of local government that creates this capacity).497 
The previously underappreciated power of the states in spending 
                                                                                                                      
492 See Pontiac Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d at 255–56 (describing the various parts of the opin-
ions that each of the en banc judges did or did not join). 
493 See generally Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010). 
494 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206. 
495 See, e.g., Coastal Zone Management Act, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006)). 
496 See id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315, 1396n (2006) (providing for Medicaid demonstration 
waivers); discussion, supra notes 301–349 and accompanying text. 
497 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 8, at 580–84. 
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deals—first analyzed by Professor Roderick Hills498—has become in-
creasingly appreciated by all involved. Bargaining participants generally 
understand federal dependence on state cooperation, especially in the 
environmental context.499 
 State capacity is not only important in spending power deals, as 
Bruce Babbit understood when he negotiated a partnership with Cali-
fornia to link the independent ESA and NCCP regulatory programs.500 
In negotiating a straight exchange of state and federal capacity, he un-
derstood that the success of both programs would require combining 
federal multijurisdictional vision and authority with the local land use 
authority and outreach that only the state commanded: 
The jurisdiction of local officials ends at the municipal or 
county boundary; while developers continually threaten to 
pack up and go across that boundary to the next jurisdiction 
down the road where local officials will be more pliable and 
willing to accommodate their demands. Pondering how to 
engage with the community in the face of these realities, we 
circled back to the state government . . . . It was becoming ex-
cruciatingly clear that neither of us could make this work 
without the other. Though we had provided California with 
the missing ingredient of [an enforceable] development mo-
ratorium, only California could provide us with the necessary 
credibility, capacity for outreach to local communities, and 
planning capabilities. It was time to reach across partisan lines 
and try for a working partnership with the state.501 
 In other examples, federal regulatory capacity is the more impor-
tant currency of exchange. For example, the states sought federal au-
thority when they asked Congress’s blessing to violate the dormant 
commerce clause through the LLRWPA, or when they embraced EPA’s 
ability to mediate the collective action problem of stormwater manage-
ment under the Phase II Rule.502 When states lobby for federal leader-
                                                                                                                      
498 See generally Hills, supra note 55. 
499 EPA Interview, supra note 274; Telephone Interview with Melissa Savage, supra note 
116; State Agency Interview, supra note 437. 
500 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006); Natural Community Con-
servation Planning Act (NCCP), Cal. Fish and Game Code §§ 2800–2835 (2003). 
501 Babbit, supra note 227, at 70–71. 
502 See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986); Clean Water Act’s Phase II Stormwater Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 122.34 
(2010). 
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ship on climate policy, they are seeking federal capacity at levels of both 
legal authority and superior informational and financial resources. 
a. Constraints 
 At first blush, federal capacity trading seems innocuous, or at least 
no more troubling than the exchange of federal fiscal capacity for state 
regulatory capacity that regularly takes place under the spending power. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 1992 in New York v. 
United States suggests that the parties may actually be less free to bargain 
over federal capacity than they are to bargain over federal money.503 
 In New York v. United States, the Court constrained capacity bargain-
ing more tightly than spending power bargaining, at least in the bar-
gained-for commandeering context.504 After striking down the federal-
ism bargain at the heart of the LLRWPA, the Court expressly opined 
that if Congress really wanted to bind states to their promises to take 
responsibility for their radioactive waste, then it should do so in a 
spending power deal, rather than binding them directly.505 But the de-
cision misses the critical point that it was the states, not Congress, that 
initiated the negotiation. As I have previously argued, a spending power 
deal could not have replicated the particular result the states sought, 
nor would the deal seem as palatable to Congress if proposed that way 
(i.e., “Please use your regulatory capacity to allow us to negotiate 
among ourselves without violating the dormant commerce clause, and 
by the way, also give us some money!”).506 
 New York v. United States is the only Supreme Court precedent di-
rectly on point (although Printz v. United States reiterated the Court’s 
commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in prohibiting a similar 
directive to state executives).507 Yet the case clearly differentiated be-
tween the wide scope of permissible bargaining available when the me-
dium of exchange is federal dollars, and the narrower scope when the 
medium is federal regulatory capacity—even when the states consent, 
and the regulatory result is similar.508 In both cases, the states negotiate 
for a different aspect of federal capacity: fiscal or regulatory. But the 
Court was clear that, even when asked, Congress does not have the 
                                                                                                                      
503 See 505 U.S. at 182. 
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505 Id. at 158–59. 
506 Ryan, supra note 35, at 45–50. 
507 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1977). But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 
141, 150–51 (2000). 
508 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166–67, 168. 
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same latitude to agree when money is not the medium.509 As a result, 
lower courts face uncertainty in interpreting other federalism bargains 
that trade on federal capacity.510 
3. The Power of the Permit 
 A subset of capacity bargaining, the medium of exchange can also 
be permission for one side to do something the other could prohibit. 
Although permission most often runs from federal to state actors, the 
taxonomy reveals a few interesting contrary examples.511 
 Sometimes, permission is negotiated through an explicit permit-
ting program designed by Congress, such as ESA provisions allowing 
incidental take permits in exchange for a qualifying habitat conserva-
tion plan.512 Medicaid demonstration waivers present a hybrid between 
negotiations under the powers of the purse and the permit because 
they begin within a spending power deal but involve subsequent nego-
tiations for state permission to deviate from standard Medicaid re-
quirements.513 Other times, states might seek permission to modify fed-
eral law beyond the confines of a specific statute, as occurred when the 
states asked Congress to waive the dormant commerce clause.514 
 Occasionally, the power of the permit can broker trading in the 
opposite direction: the federal government negotiates for state permis-
sion to do something that the state could otherwise prohibit. The 
Coastal Zone Management Act presents the clearest example, in that 
federal activity must receive state approval when it takes place within the 
three mile zone of concurrent coastal jurisdiction.515 Similarly, thanks to 
state-protecting features in the Clean Water Act, applications for federal 
                                                                                                                      
509 See id. at 168 (noting that “[w]here Congress encourages state regulation rather 
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licensing of hydroelectric dams often require final authorization from 
state actors that the project will not compromise water quality.516 
a. Constraints 
 As a subset of capacity bargaining, federal bargaining with the 
power of the permit suffers the same uncertainty that attends federal 
capacity bargaining in general. The point has never been litigated di-
rectly, but the two iterations of the Ninth Circuit’s handling of a feder-
alism challenge to the CWA’s Phase II Stormwater Rule demonstrate 
the delicacy of the question.517 
 When the Phase II Stormwater Rule was challenged in 2003 for 
violating the Tenth Amendment in Environmental Defense Center v. EPA, 
the Ninth Circuit needed two tries to securely uphold the modified 
bargained-for commandeering in the construction-permitting meas-
ure.518 On its first try, it analogized the deal to spending power bargain-
ing, reasoning that plaintiffs had waived their Tenth Amendment ob-
jections (as they would in a spending power deal) when they bargained 
to regulate construction pollution in exchange for permission to dis-
charge polluted stormwater into federal waters.519 When challenged on 
rehearing, the panel withdrew its analogy between spending and capac-
ity bargaining, which lacked direct support in any Supreme Court 
precedent. Instead, it upheld the provision on the safer basis that the 
rule was not coercive because it allowed dissenters to opt out in favor of 
a separate permitting program for larger cities.520 The Supreme Court 
declined to hear the case.521 
 Environmental Defense Center demonstrates just how unclear the law is 
regarding the power to bargain for permission in the absence of more 
specific Supreme Court precedent. The Court could conceivably find 
the reach of permission bargaining to be indistinguishable from spend-
ing power bargaining, as many of the reasons that justify the freewheel-
ing power of the purse could also justify a freewheeling power of the 
                                                                                                                      
516 See 33 U.S.C. § 1330 (2006) and related discussion, supra notes 240–247 and ac-
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permit.522 Yet other considerations suggest that the Court may not toler-
ate as broad a reach for permissions bargaining. Permitting authority 
may be more vulnerable to bargaining abuse because inherent political 
limitations on use of the spending power may not apply to permissions 
bargaining. (After all, though Congress must enact politically unpopular 
taxes to amass negotiating currency under the spending power, it costs 
comparatively little to create permitting currency by passing new federal 
limits that states must negotiate their way out of.) Without greater clarity 
on the permissible scope of capacity bargaining, courts may continue to 
duck the issue as the Ninth Circuit did, adding to the environment of 
legal uncertainty in which federalism bargainers negotiate. 
4. The Normative Leverage of Federalism Values 
 The powers of the purse, the permit, and the power to get things 
done represent the mainstay of federalism bargaining currency, but 
there is another important medium of exchange that motivates deci-
sions at the table. State and federal negotiators are not only driven by 
issue-specific needs such as funding, authority, or other forms of regu-
latory capacity. Sometimes bargaining results are influenced by regard 
for the American system of federalism itself—the desire to reach an 
outcome that respects the constitutional design and that harnesses the 
ways in which divided local and national authority serve the ultimate 
purposes of government. This more ethereal currency may best be un-
derstood as regard among the participants for the values of federalism 
themselves, and it is often present even when negotiators are not using 
the specific vocabulary of federalism to define it.523 
 For example, Laurie Ristino of the U.S.D.A. General Counsel’s Of-
fice described how she approaches negotiations with state actors: 
As a federal attorney, you have an extra burden, you have this 
public trust. You’re an advocate for the federal government, 
but you’re also a public servant, so you have to think about 
how to uphold the law and act in a way that really advances 
the public benefit. You understand that this is a shared system 
of power, and that you have to be careful, and that preemp-
tion is not the favored approach. Sometimes you have to 
throw down the gauntlet of federal power, but as soon as you 
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do, you lose the ability to get compromise, to bring the situa-
tion to a point where everyone feels like they’re getting what 
they need and can move on. 
 
I was taught to watch my use of the Supremacy stick, to try to 
avoid using the word “preemption” or bring out the big guns. 
We work hard to find a compromise based on common 
ground, and only bring out big guns if [absolutely necessary]. 
We recognize that state actors may feel like the “little guy” 
when they have to go up against the federal government with 
all its resources and legal supremacy. They may feel like 
they’re going to get run over, so we try not to act in ways that 
justify those fears.524 
On the state side, Jeffords Reynolds, staff attorney at the Virginia De-
partment of Environmental Quality, describes his own approach to in-
tergovernmental bargaining: 
I consider myself a trench lawyer. I’m in the trenches. I started 
out in JAG as a federal criminal attorney, then I was in private 
practice on oil and gas matters, and now I work with the state 
at DEQ. I’ve been an environmental attorney for fifteen years. 
Federalism issues were raised for me [early on in my practice], 
and I’ve always been sensitive to them. Federalism issues are 
extremely important in environmental realms because of the 
boundary-crossing problems in environmental law, like the 
Chesapeake . . . . 
 
If it weren’t for federal intervention, we wouldn’t have so 
much critical [protection]. Where industry is involved, you 
really need the federal government to be forceful to achieve 
meaningful national standards. Technological and environ-
mental changes have changed federalism, broken down some 
of the local prerogative. Environmental law is one area where 
federal strength is needed and appropriate . . . . The conven-
tional wisdom is true that states lack leverage at the table. But 
do I think this means that the process is flawed? Not really. 
Things are as they should be, except that state finances need 
to be taken account of.525 
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Both lawyers indicate how the positions they take in intergovernmental 
bargaining are moderated by the values they associate with the proper 
roles of state and federal government within the American system. In 
this way, federalism values operate as an important motivator at the ta-
ble, normatively impacting negotiators’ choices just as the more mate-
rial forms of currency do. They are especially evident in negotiations in 
which federal restraint or state cooperation goes beyond the strict limi-
tations of capacity, based on constitutional and political considerations 
of role.526 
 As discussed above, negotiation theorists recognize this type of cur-
rency as “normative leverage,” or the application of norms or standards 
that are persuasive to the other side for reasons that may be unrelated to 
the specific interests at stake.527 Conventional examples of normative 
negotiating leverage include the do-unto-others principle, fair market 
value, respect for the rule of law, the persuasive value of precedent, and 
the consistency principle.528 In the context of state-federal bargaining, 
negotiators’ own regard for federalism values is a powerful source of 
leverage when it influences the outcome in ways unrelated to the indi-
vidual interests at stake in the deal. Though participants concede that 
they rarely consider federalism at the level of specific Supreme Court 
precedents,529 they report conscientious regard for the proper relation-
ship between state and federal regulatory efforts during bargaining.530 
In other words, even without the formal vocabulary of federalism, they 
are moved by the fundamental values of federalism. 
 Federalism values help explain the motivation of both sides to en-
gage in negotiated rulemaking and policymaking laboratory negotia-
tions—even those within cooperative federalism programs—rather than 
alternatives that speak to contrary interests on both sides. Federal regu-
lators have more control over administrative rulemaking through notice 
and comment, just as Congress could legislate more efficiently without 
state input in such policymaking laboratory contexts as Medicaid and 
                                                                                                                      
526 For example, the federal government has the constitutional authority to regulate 
interstate water allocation and external threats to federal lands much more than it cur-
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the Coastal Zone Management Act.531 However, the value of state and 
local participation outweighs the federal interest in control. State influ-
ence over the formulation of federal law flows from the formidable sub-
ject matter expertise states hold, and their interests as ultimate stake-
holders in the given policy arena. Federal agencies want to hear from 
state participants so that they can establish solid, workable policies that 
respect the federalism issues that inevitably attend concurrent regula-
tory realms. As a source in the Office of the EPA Administrator noted, 
We’re thinking about the role and interest of the states in vir-
tually everything we do, because the states are critical in eve-
rything we do. We don’t use the word “federalism” to describe 
what we’re thinking about, but there’s almost nothing that we 
do in the field that doesn’t involve state, local, and regional 
input. So thinking about [federalism] is a matter of agency 
culture by design.532 
 Meanwhile, states want input into federal policymaking for the same 
reasons. Neither negotiated rulemaking nor cooperative federalism pro-
grams compel state participation.533 States are never required to negoti-
ate, but the benefits of doing so include greater influence over the final 
result. States could opt for a federal implementation plan administered 
by EPA rather than designing and enforcing their own state implementa-
tion plans under the Clean Air Act, but their interests in regulatory par-
ticipation generally outweigh contrary interests in frugality.534 
 Of course, some federal policies threaten financial or regulatory 
impacts on states that provide incentive to participate beyond mere re-
spect for federalism (such as the imposition of unfunded mandates or 
preemption of state police power). Nevertheless, most values that make 
federalism good for governance—including checks, localism, and syn-
ergy—are in especially high relief in negotiated rulemaking and coop-
erative federalism programs. These values inform negotiations over the 
way that federal policies should take account of state interests—and 
                                                                                                                      
531 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006), discussed, supra notes 303–327 and accompany-
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532 EPA Interview, supra note 274. 
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534 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006); Siegel, supra note 205, at 1676 (discussing the 
fact that the majority of states create their own implementation plans, despite the option 
of relying on a federal implementation plan). 
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vice versa—as both levels of government work to solve common prob-
lems. Deputy Director Rick Weeks of Virginia DEQ described his agen-
cy’s regard for federalism values in these terms: 
We don’t think about federalism so much in the generic 
terms. But we think about it in terms of who is really the right 
agency to be doing what. There are some things that really on-
ly the national government can do. For example, you need a 
national program to deal with air emissions, because of the 
way they move across state boundaries. This is less of an issue 
for water resources, which are more local—but then you have 
the Chesapeake Bay situation . . . . And industry needs some 
certainty, which is hard to get without a national program. 
[There are other things that states do better.]535 
 Nevertheless, at least one participant commented on the way that 
the normative leverage of federalism values can also be used, disin-
genuously, to manipulate decisionmakers.536 The Senate attorney inter-
viewed described the use of normative federalism leverage in interest 
group negotiations over a bill Congress had recently considered to pro-
tect aquatic species against invasives by authorizing the Coast Guard to 
regulate ballast water.537 The new law might have preempted CWA pro-
visions that also regulate invasive aquatic species, and the environ-
mental community split over whether to support the new bill.538 As he 
explained, 
We could have passed a bill, with industry support, that would 
have imposed much stricter national standards through the 
Coast Guard, and would have been much more likely to actu-
ally solve the problem [than the existing CWA provisions]. 
But some in the environmental community were unwilling to 
see any preemption of the CWA. They argued hard against 
the bill on grounds that preempting the CWA would dissolve 
the important state-federal program of cooperative federalism 
in the CWA, and touted how valuable that was. And they ulti-
                                                                                                                      
535 Interview with Rick Weeks, supra note 429. 
536 Senate Interview, supra note 175. 
537 Id.; see also Brian Laskowski, Coast Guard Considers New Rules to Regulate Ballast, Great 
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100 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1 
mately won the day by appealing to federalism this way . . . but 
they didn’t really care about federalism! All they cared about 
was preserving their rights to litigate under the CWA.539 
Some members of Congress thus manipulated normative federalism 
leverage in persuading others to reach their preferred outcome, even 
though (according to this source) they were not personally interested 
in federalism at all. The success of the gambit demonstrates the real 
normative power of federalism—but also how vulnerable it can be to 
opportunism. That said, the same problem holds true for all other ide-
als that exert normative leverage at the bargaining table, including le-
gal precedent and even the do-unto-others principle, which are occa-
sionally used by unscrupulous negotiators to manipulate an outcome 
desired for other reasons.540 
a. Constraints 
 Negotiations in which respect for federalism is a primary currency 
require few additional constraints. No precedent addresses this bar-
gaining currency except cases praising federalism values themselves as 
worthy of legal protection.541 Some scholars have reviewed the historic 
problem of federalism opportunism, or the invocation of federalism 
values as cover for unrelated policy goals.542 However, in previous work 
I have proposed tools that could help distinguish between bargaining 
that is and is not ultimately consistent with federalism values.543 
5. Credit 
 Finally, credit represents a form of negotiating currency that trig-
gers no legal analysis but can politically motivate federalism bargainers. 
In contexts of jurisdictional overlap, state and federal actors may com-
pete for credit in situations in which it is difficult to share. For example, 
                                                                                                                      
539 Senate Interview, supra note 175. 
540 E.g., Shell, supra note 9, at 56–57 (discussing the negotiating ramifications of the 
fact that there are often two reasons people do things— “a good one and the real one”). 
541 See generally, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Ryan, supra note 8, 
at 507 n.1. 
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leverage dynamics in state-federal interest group bargaining are im-
pacted by competition between governors and federal legislators from 
their states over credit for regulatory programs the legislator enacts 
that the governor implements.544 
 Similarly, in the criminal enforcement context, contests over credit 
are the principal driver of otherwise rare jurisdictional competition.545 
Credit is harder to share in the criminal context because arrests and 
trials are usually only made once, in either state or federal hands. Al-
though federal law enforcers are appointed, state law enforcers are 
usually elected, and thus more sensitive to matters of credit and favor-
able publicity. Thus, under-resourced state prosecutors who are usually 
happy to cede cases to federal partners may balk when asked to cede a 
high-profile case that could impact public opinion, preferring to keep 
the investigation, arrests, and trial within the state system.546 At least 
one former federal prosecutor notes that federal actors are sensitive to 
this dynamic and work hard to protect the interests of their state part-
ners.547 Nevertheless, many federal prosecutors also have career ambi-
tions hinging on credit,548 and at least one former state official recalls 
vivid state resentment over issues of credit and federal intervention in 
settling enforcement cases under the Clean Air Act’s New Source Re-
view program during the early 2000s.549 
 Because of its potential to impact the personal careers of partici-
pants, negotiating credit stands apart from the other sources of trade as 
the most vulnerable to disjuncture between a federalism bargainer’s 
personal interests and her state or federal constituents’ interests. For 
this reason, negotiations in which credit forms an important medium 
of exchange may raise comparatively more serious principal-agent con-
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549 Interviews with Anonymous Official, State Attorney Gen.’s Office (May 18, 2010 & 
July 2, 2010) (on file with the Boston College Law Review). 
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cerns than others—an issue of import for the following interpretive 
analysis. 
IV. Intergovernmental Bargaining and Interpreting Federalism 
 With the preceding positive account and conceptual vocabulary of 
federalism bargaining in place, this Part advances to the ultimate nor-
mative inquiry of the project: the interpretive potential of intergov-
ernmental bargaining. The taxonomy and participant reports establish 
that federalism bargaining is widespread in areas of jurisdictional over-
lap, affording procedural response to the uncertain question of who 
decides.550 The boundary between state and federal power is far more 
contingent—and collaboratively determined—than acknowledged by 
conventional federalism rhetoric. But the fact that federalism bargain-
ing is frequently used does not resolve whether or when it warrants in-
terpretive deference. 
 Exploring the procedural basis for interpretive legitimacy and the 
role of judicial review, this Part argues that negotiated governance is 
not just a de facto response to regulatory uncertainty about who should 
decide, but can be, in and of itself, a constitutionally legitimate way of 
deciding. More than just a means to an end, carefully crafted federal-
ism bargaining can also be a principled means of allocating state and 
federal authority in realms of concurrent regulatory interest. As such, 
federalism bargaining can be part of the solution to the interpretive 
quandary that has preoccupied jurists over generations. This Part ad-
vances the federalism discourse by providing the needed theoretical 
justification to explain the critical role that federalism bargaining al-
ready plays in constitutional terms. 
 As detailed in Part I, the conventional federalism discourse has 
probed how the three branches unilaterally interpret federalism direc-
tives by defining the contours, goals, and limits implied by the American 
system of dual sovereignty.551 Yet scholars have alternatively worried that 
legislative political safeguards operate intermittently and that judicial 
constraints are ill-suited to navigating the porous boundaries of jurisdic-
tional overlap. Properly designed, some forms of federalism bargaining 
can supplement these approaches by interpreting who should decide 
within the pockets of uncertainty unresolved by unilateral interpreta-
tion. Sometimes these pockets reflect legal uncertainty about which side 
is entitled to act, and other times they reflect pragmatic uncertainty 
                                                                                                                      
550 Supra, text accompanying notes 41–67. 
551 Supra notes 28–95 and accompanying text. 
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about how best to allocate authority to advance the overall federalism 
project.552 Either way, persistent uncertainty about who decides can lead 
to litigation, regulatory stagnation, and even abdication.553 
 To resolve this uncertainty, unilateral federalism interpretation 
deciphers meaning from legal text, applies precedent, and yields sub-
stantive answers to precise questions about where federal authority 
ends and state authority begins. But where unilateral tools fall short, 
bilateral bargaining offers procedurally based interpretive tools to fill 
gaps. Intergovernmental bargaining grounds the legitimacy of its out-
come in the legitimacy of its process, when that process is consistent 
with the principles of fair bargaining on the one hand, and federalism 
values on the other. 
 The procedural principles of fair bargaining are the necessary pre-
requisite, and procedural consistency with federalism values—them-
selves procedural values of good governance—are the ultimate criteria 
for interpretive deference. Once again, the values-based theory of fed-
eralism on which this inquiry is predicated locates the central purpose 
of federalism in the good governance values that it fosters: checks and 
balances, accountability and transparency, local autonomy and innova-
tion, and the problem-solving synergy available between local and na-
tional regulatory capacity.554 Federalism bargaining that is procedurally 
faithful to these values constrains public behavior to be consistent with 
constitutional goals, just as federalism interpretation intends. 
 Although the federalism literature has previously entertained 
process-based theories of federalism that eschew judicial review of sub-
stantive rules,555 it is now realizing the benefits of partnering selected 
substantive rules with more flexible procedural constraints that can en-
force federalism norms within uncertain factual contexts.556 Because 
the process of negotiated governance is often more amenable to as-
sessment by the federalism criteria than the substantive outcome itself, 
bilateral bargaining can do interpretive work where unilateral tools are 
unavailing. Still, legislative and executive interpretive bargaining is ap-
propriately checked by limited judicial review that scrutinizes proce-
                                                                                                                      
552 Supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
553 Ryan, supra note 8, at 584–96. See generally Ryan, supra note 35 (discussing the ex-
ample of regulatory stagnation, litigation, and abdication in radioactive waste siting). 
554 See supra text accompanying notes 30–35. 
555 See Wechsler, supra note 11; supra text accompanying footnote 47. 
556 See, e.g., Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 Harv. J. 
of Legis. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1719050; Ryan, supra note 35; Young, supra note 47. 
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dure, and if satisfied, defers to substance. If bargaining challenged on 
federalism grounds meets the procedural criteria, then the court defers 
to the negotiated results; if it fails the test, then the court reviews the 
substance of the deal de novo. Qualifying examples are thus shielded 
from judicial interference, while federalism bargaining abuses remain 
subject to judicial oversight. 
 Of course, federalism bargaining is hardly collapsing from judicial 
interference; the taxonomy demonstrates a healthy variety of bargain-
ing notwithstanding doctrinal constraints. Nevertheless, Parts II and III 
also reveal several examples of judicial federalism doctrine and insensi-
tivity that frustrate certain forms of intergovernmental bargaining. The 
anti-commandeering doctrine chills strong forms of bargained-for 
commandeering,557 and sovereign immunity doctrine can interfere 
with certain bargaining between state and federal agencies.558 The Pon-
tiac School District case suggests how judicial insensitivity to bargaining 
dynamics within negotiated governance could result in unnecessary 
invalidation of potentially qualifying bargaining.559 Underlying legal 
uncertainty about the permissible scope of federalism bargaining could 
also pose obstacles to potentially fruitful bargaining if participants are 
sufficiently unnerved by these litigated examples, or by the lack of clar-
ity discussed in Part III about what legal rules operate in constraint of 
available sources of trade.560 
 The following analysis thus focuses on those forms of federalism 
bargaining that are most amenable to public scrutiny, judicial chal-
lenge, and procedural review. Less formal versions of federalism bar-
gaining (such as intersystemic signaling, amicus brief-writing, and the 
like) may serve valuable purposes within the system but do not invite 
interpretive deference, because they do not yield a record that would 
enable procedural review of the sort envisioned here. The Part con-
cludes by evaluating examples from the taxonomy and offering rec-
ommendations for stakeholders, participants, and policymakers. 
A. Procedural Tools of Interpretation 
 Bargaining brings two important sets of procedural tools to feder-
alism interpretation, the former common to all forms of negotiation 
                                                                                                                      
557 See supra notes 197–210 and accompanying text. 
558 See supra note 473. 
559 See supra notes 481–493 and accompanying text. 
560 See supra notes 475–549 and accompanying text. In Coasian terms, such uncertainty 
creates transaction costs that could cost marginal utility from underutilized bargaining. 
Supra note 465 and accompanying text. 
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and the latter specific to federalism bargaining: respectively, the legiti-
mizing principle of mutual consent, and the procedural constraints of 
federalism values. 
1. The Legitimizing Principle of Mutual Consent 
 Bargaining has always been the last resort for bridging dissensus— 
the time-honored means of moving toward “the good” in the absence 
of agreement about the perfect.561 Dissensus pervades the historical 
discourse about how the Constitution adjudicates jurisdictional compe-
tition562—and as negotiation theorists have long recognized, when con-
sensus on a substantive outcome is elusive, next best is consensus on a 
procedure for moving forward.563 In the absence of agreement over the 
precise contours of federalism directives in a given regulatory context, 
bargaining thus offers invaluable procedural tools. In the federalism 
context, as in others, the primary procedural tool offered by negotiated 
resolution is the fundamental fairness constraint of mutual consent. 
 For thousands of years, human cultures worldwide have turned to 
procedurally based negotiated outcomes when mired in substantive 
disagreement564—deferring to bargained-for results on the simple 
grounds that, even without a more convincing substantive rationale, the 
results must hold merit if all parties are willing to abide by them. In 
other words, even if the parties cannot agree on why the negotiated 
outcome is the right answer, it must be a worthy choice if the parties 
                                                                                                                      
561 Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 
Iowa L. Rev. 1, 26–27 (2000) (recognizing the bargaining environment generated by the 
modern zoning model); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as 
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 837, 849 (1983) (discussing use of bargaining 
in land use development proposals); Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking & Dealing: The Problems and 
Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 337, 348 (2002) 
(advocating bargaining as “a highly rational strategy for pursuing the public good under 
conditions of substantive uncertainty about its shape or meaning”). 
562 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 8, at 507–17. 
563 See, e.g., Fisher & Ury, supra note 9, at 56–80; Susan Carpenter, Choosing Appropriate 
Consensus Building Techniques and Strategies, in The Consensus Building Handbook, supra 
note 81, at 61–97 (outlining tools for breaking through negotiating gridlock); Dwight Go-
lann & Eric E. Van Loon, Legal Issues in Consensus Building, in The Consensus Building 
Handbook, supra note 81, at 495–522 (same). The resort to procedural solutions on sub-
stantive dissensus is demonstrated by the simplest of all negotiating tools—the “split-the-
difference” principle. See generally John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Dover 
Publications, Inc. 2004) (1920) (outlining a philosophy of pragmatism); William James, 
Pragmatism (1907) (same); William H. Simon, Solving Problems v. Claiming Rights: The 
Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 127 (2004). 
564 Cf. Shell, supra note 9, at 5 (“People negotiate in generally similar ways in virtually 
every culture in the world and have done so since time began.”). 
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earnestly believe it more desirable than no agreement at all. Lacking 
substantive consensus about why the result is legitimate, they substitute 
procedural consensus in agreeing to defer to the results of fair bargain-
ing. Mutual consent ensures fairness, on the theory that reasonable ne-
gotiators will not bargain for results that contravene their best interests. 
Thus, a deal is only reached when all parties consent to the terms. If 
negotiators truly understand their own interests and pursue them faith-
fully, then we can trust that they will not consent to terms that under-
mine their interests. And as long as they can truly walk away from the 
table when no beneficial deal is possible, then we can trust that the 
terms they negotiate benefit all parties more than no agreement at all. 
 This principle of mutual consent underlies our faith in the bar-
gaining process, conferring legitimacy on negotiated results so long as 
these three underlying assumptions are met: (1) bargaining autonomy, 
(2) interest literacy, and (3) faithful representation. The parties must 
have a genuine opportunity to walk away from the bargaining table, or 
the fact of agreement cannot substantiate its value as preferable to the 
alternatives. Similarly, to be confident that negotiated results are truly 
preferable to the status quo, we must be confident that the parties truly 
understand their best interests and are not operating under a personal 
or situational disability causing substantial misinformation or misun-
derstanding. And, of course, we must be confident that the agents in-
volved in the bargaining process are faithfully representing the interests 
of the principals on whose behalf they are negotiating, rather than con-
trary personal interests. 
 When these prerequisites are met, then bargaining can be a valu-
able means of resolving jurisdictional contest where governance must 
press forward despite legal or practical uncertainty (such as that cloud-
ing environmental, public health, and financial regulatory law). The 
more the facts in a given negotiating scenario support these core as-
sumptions, the more confidence in the legitimacy of the bargained-for 
result. When facts in the scenario apply undue stress to any of these 
assumptions, however, less legitimacy is conferred. In this regard, con-
sent-based legitimacy can suffer from several important points of vul-
nerability in the federalism bargaining context. 
a. Bargaining Autonomy and Unequal Power 
 First, some critics argue that spending power deals strain the as-
sumption of bargaining autonomy. They urge that state consent cannot 
justify the legitimacy of spending power deals because the balance of 
leverage far favors the federal government, with its daunting control 
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over fiscal resources on which state programs rely.565 The leverage im-
balance is arguably similar in non-spending power contexts, such as ne-
gotiated rulemaking, where the federal government has trumping legal 
authority, superior fiscal resources, and is often empowered as the scribe 
of the proceedings. 
 Courts have consistently rejected the argument that spending 
power deals are akin to federal contracts of adhesion, holding fast to 
the view that states are free to forgo federal funds if they really prefer 
that alternative.566 Both contract law and negotiation theory generally 
hold parties responsible for their choices when choice is available, and 
both differentiate between strong leverage and true coercion.567 Even 
when the stronger party crafts terms without input from the weaker 
party, the latter can still decide whether its interests are better served by 
taking or leaving the proffered deal. 
 In addition, the argument may elide the considerable leverage 
states wield in controlling the regulatory capacity that federal spending 
power bargainers seek, mitigating the concern.568 Much of the prior 
analysis proceeds from the premise that the reason state and federal 
actors bargain with one another is because they need each other. When 
bargaining occurs in contexts of overlap, it is because neither the fed-
eral nor state government has all the tools needed to address a given 
problem. The more the states possess capacity that the federal govern-
ment needs to accomplish a desired objective, the more leverage the 
states have in bargaining, and the less likely the federal government 
can deny them meaningful bargaining authority. Thus, at least in the 
regulatory realms where federalism bargaining is most needed, it is 
least likely to be unfair. 
 That said, as the ability of the weaker party to meaningfully impact 
the negotiated outcome wanes, so too does the force of the constraint 
in conferring procedural legitimacy. Even deals that satisfy constitu-
tional scrutiny under the spending power doctrine may be understood 
as warranting more or less interpretive deference on procedural 
grounds depending on the degree to which individual facts stress the 
                                                                                                                      
565 See Baker & Berman, supra note 170, at 517–21. 
566 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 
1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000). 
567 See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 176 (2010) (“[O]ne may not avoid a contract on the 
ground of duress merely because he or she entered into it with reluctance, the contract is 
very disadvantageous to him or her, the bargaining power of the parties was unequal, or 
there was some unfairness in the negotiations . . . .”). 
568 Supra notes 494–510 and accompanying text. See generally Hills, supra note 55. 
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assumptions of bargaining autonomy. Spending power bargaining in 
which states have more genuine input—such as the joint policymaking 
forms—may confer more interpretive legitimacy than those in which 
states consent as a legal matter but under substantial economic pres-
sure. For example, states participating in spending power deals under 
Medicaid or the Coastal Zone Management Act seem relatively satisfied 
with their autonomy, but many have expressed frustration at their per-
ceived inability to walk away from deals under the No Child Left Be-
hind Act, unable to reject the proffered federal educational funds for 
fiscal reasons, even when they dislike other terms in the deal.569 Using 
this lens of analysis, state agreement to No Child Left Behind may be 
seen as warranting less procedurally based interpretive deference than 
state agreement to the terms of the Coastal Zone Management Act. 
b. Faithful Representation of Citizens 
 Mutual consent as a meaningful procedural constraint must also 
contend with the representation-based critique that state and federal 
agents may reach consensus in collusion with one another against the 
true interests of their principals, the citizens.570 The concern that 
elected state officials might betray the interests of their constituents was 
among Justice O’Connor’s chief rationales for the anti-bargaining hold-
ing in New York v. United States.571 The tension between citizen principals 
and their elected agents in government is endemic to representational 
democracies, but I have previously shown that the danger of federalism 
collusion is least pressing when the medium of exchange is the sover-
eign authority at the heart of all federalism bargaining.572 Indeed, when 
government agents bargain with their own regulatory authority, their 
interests are more aligned with those of their constituents than in many 
legal realms where government agents freely negotiate against con-
stituents’ interests (i.e., in setting time, place, and manner restrictions 
on citizens’ exercise of free speech rights).573 Both state and federal 
                                                                                                                      
569 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006) (Coastal Zone Management Act); No Child Left 
Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (enacted Jan. 8, 2002) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315, 1396n (2006) (demonstration waivers). 
570 See John McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights, 99 Nw. L. Rev. 89, 90 
(2004) (warning that states may collude with the federal government in undermining 
federalism constraints). 
571 See 505 U.S. 144, 182–83 (1992) (worrying that “powerful incentives” might lead 
bargaining officials to betray their principals), and related discussion in Ryan, supra note 
35, at 84–87. 
572 Ryan, supra note 35, at 84–87. 
573 Id. 
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agents are unlikely to trade the basis of their power unless it is clearly 
justified by offsetting benefits (although, as noted in Part III, bargain-
ing in which credit is a particularly salient medium of exchange may 
warrant closer scrutiny).574 
 Nevertheless, the assumption that federalism bargainers faithfully 
represent their constituents underlies the principle of mutual consent 
as foundationally as the assumptions that they act autonomously and in 
appreciation of their own interests. The more the facts depart from any 
of these assumptions, the less legitimate the resulting bargain. This is 
why an important prerequisite for legitimate federalism bargaining 
must be that the process remains sufficiently transparent for monitor-
ing to ensure that the interests of principals and agents remain well-
aligned (enabling citizens to hold representatives accountable for deci-
sions made on their behalf).575 Public law scholars have long worried 
about the undue sacrifice of transparency and accountability in the set-
tlement of private litigation to promote the flexibility and creativity that 
accords negotiated dispute resolution.576 However, scholars of negoti-
ated governance have shown that there is no need to sacrifice transpar-
ency or accountability in intergovernmental negotiation when the rele-
vant stakeholders are appropriately involved and both final and draft 
documents become part of the record.577 
c. Risk of Competing Interests 
 Finally, any legitimacy conferred on federalism bargaining by the 
principle of mutual consent must confront the concern that federalism-
related interests may be overwhelmed by competing non-federalism 
interests during deal making. Long-sighted negotiators are unlikely to 
fall prey to this problem, as thorough consideration puts values of the 
                                                                                                                      
574 Supra notes 544–549 and accompanying text. 
575 Cf. Telephone Interview with Professor Lawrence Susskind, supra note 255. 
576 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 278, at 1078–82. 
577 See, e.g., Susskind & Cruikshank, supra note 88, at 176; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 Nev. L.J. 347, 348–49 (2005); Lawrence E. 
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(2009) (arguing that Fiss’s procedural critique is really embedded in a substantive vision 
advocating a particular form of public morality). 
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constitutional order in their rightful place. But what about negotiators 
preoccupied by more immediate needs? For example, consider the 
criminal enforcement negotiation in which state actors agree to cede 
jurisdiction over a case to federal agents because it will free up scarce 
local resources to investigate others lacking a federal nexus. Does the 
fact that both parties believed this result was in their best interest really 
mean that the result was consistent with their federalism-related inter-
ests? In fact, does this agreement really have anything to do with feder-
alism at all? 
 As ultimately revealed below, the answer is yes, as demonstrated by 
federalism bargaining’s other procedural tools of interpretation—those 
that inhere in the specific context of federalism-sensitive governance. 
2. The Procedural Constraints of Federalism Values 
 When substantive federalism interpretation fails to resolve jurisdic-
tional contest, federalism bargaining’s second set of procedural con-
straints can bridge interpretive gaps in ways that parallel the procedural 
benefits of generic bargaining. Just as bargaining procedurally legiti-
mizes negotiated results in the absence of substantive agreement, these 
procedural constraints legitimize interpretive bargaining in the absence 
of substantive federalism consensus. The constraints of mutual consent 
continue to operate, but validly interpretive federalism bargaining also 
affords procedural consistency with the fundamental federalism values 
of checks, accountability, localism, and synergy. 
 Interpretive process proves invaluable when substantive federalism 
interpretation becomes stymied, because achieving procedural consis-
tency with federalism values is both easier to accomplish and easier to 
assess. Why? Critically, because the federalism values themselves are es-
sentially about process. They don’t tell us anything about the actual 
substance of good government at the end of the day; rather, they tell us 
about the process by which good governance is conducted.578 Account-
ability seeks transparency in governance, requiring process conducted 
openly enough to ensure that informed citizens can participate mean-
ingfully at all levels of the democratic process.579 The localism value 
champions processes of governance that enable local variation, compe-
tition, and innovation of the sort promised by the great “laboratory of 
ideas” model of federalism.580 The problem-solving value advocates 
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process that enables the harnessing of interjurisdictional synergy be-
tween the unique capacities of local and national government where 
both are needed.581 
 Checks, accountability, localism, and synergy are not coextensive 
with all purposes of government, but they do align federalism with the 
fundamentals of good governance that extend to international norms 
(and beyond domestic “states’ rights” rhetoric).582 I have previously 
demonstrated how federalism analysis is complicated by the fact that 
these values are in tension, such that fortifying one can weaken another 
in a given scenario.583 For this reason, the Supreme Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence has vacillated over history between eras that appear to 
privilege one value and then another.584 Thus, just as no theory of bar-
gaining can forecast the outcome of every case, no theory of federalism 
bargaining can guarantee the best balance in each instance;585 this in-
quiry therefore stops short of deciphering between rightly and wrongly 
decided outcomes in individual cases. Instead, it deciphers between 
rightly and wrongly conducted processes. 
 Procedural consistency with federalism values helps ford the im-
passe caused by interpretive uncertainty just as fair bargaining princi-
ples ford generic substantive impasse. Certain areas in federalism juris-
prudence are plagued by dissensus, as demonstrated by the volume of 
controversy over recent Supreme Court federalism decisions in con-
texts of overlap, especially in environmental law.586 The federalism ca-
non demonstrates how frequently reasonable legal minds disagree 
about whether a given outcome is consistent with constitutional federal-
ism (for example, Justice White believed the LLRWPA was consistent, 
but Justice O’Connor did not).587 Part of the problem is that different 
adjudicators may be relying on different theories of federalism,588 but 
                                                                                                                      
581 Id. at 620–28. 
582 Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1942 (defining federalism interests instrumen-
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another factor is that there are so many considerations operating in 
addition to federalism concerns that it can be difficult to disentangle 
them at the level of the substantive outcome. Tension between federal-
ism values at the substantive level further compounds interpretive diffi-
culties.589 By contrast, at least when the challenged governance was ne-
gotiated, it is much easier to assess whether the federalism bargaining 
process was consistent with federalism values, redirecting the federalism 
inquiry to more fruitful territory. 
 To be sure, the process values implied within federalism can cer-
tainly be understood in relation to more substantive constitutional 
norms—for example, the importance of procedural checks and bal-
ances are rooted in the importance of protecting individual rights 
against government, and the importance of governmental accountabil-
ity and transparency is rooted in democratic ideals. Previous process-
based theories of constitutional interpretation have been ably critiqued 
for their failure to account for the Constitution’s clear commitment to 
such substantive norms as protections for human rights, free press, and 
private property, and for eliding how good constitutional process is but 
a means to constitutionally sanctioned substantive ends.590 For this rea-
son, claims to protect individual rights properly trump conflicting 
claims to protect structural federalism, as they have in various chapters 
of the nation’s struggle to achieve civil rights.591 But in evaluating a fed-
eralism bargaining challenge unencumbered by an independent rights 
claim—for example, a claim about whether the state or federal govern-
ment should decide a given environmental policy—evaluating whether 
the negotiation process honored checks, accountability, localism, and 
synergy gets as close to what we ask of the federal system as evaluating 
the policy outcome itself. 
 In contrast to adjudicating rights, a substantive realm in which the 
Constitution’s directions are relatively clear, the adjudication of federal-
ism draws on penumbral implications in the text that leave much more 
to interpretation.592 The boundary between state and federal authority 
is implied by structural directives such as the enumeration of federal 
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powers in Article I and the retention of state power in the Tenth 
Amendment,593 but neither commands the clarity of commitment that 
the Constitution makes to identifiable individual rights.594 Setting aside 
marginal uncertainty about the extent to which “no law” really means 
no law in the First Amendment context, the Constitution is compara-
tively clear in its substantive commitment to free speech and free exer-
cise.595 It is equally clear on the allocation of certain state and federal 
powers, such as which is responsible for waging war (the federal gov-
ernment) and which is responsible for setting the location of federal 
elections (the states).596 Yet the document gives less guidance about the 
correct answers to the federalism questions that become the subject of 
intergovernmental bargaining, such as how to balance local and na-
tional interests in coastal zone management, or how to allocate state 
and federal resources in criminal law enforcement.597 For these rea-
sons, negotiated federalism is not only inevitable but appropriate, and 
arguably constitutionally invited—at least when negotiations take place 
within the boundaries of federalism values that are most directly under-
stood as procedural directives. 
 Bargaining that procedurally safeguards rights, enhances partici-
pation, fosters innovation, and harnesses interjurisdictional synergy 
accomplishes what federalism is designed to do—and what federalism 
interpretation is ultimately for. As such, it warrants interpretive defer-
ence from a reviewing court, or any branch actor interrogating the re-
sult. Of course, not all federalism bargaining will warrant such interpre-
tive deference. Bargaining that allocates authority through processes 
that weaken rights, threaten democratic participation, undermine in-
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relative competence of different levels of government to deal with societal prob-
lems, the courts are no more inherently capable of correct judgment than are 
the companion federal branches. . . . [This is so] given both the highly prag-
matic nature of federal-state questions and the forceful representation of the 
states in the national process of political decisionmaking. 
Id. 
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novation, and frustrate problem solving is not consistent with federal-
ism values and does not warrant deference. The more consistency with 
these values of good governing process, the more interpretive defer-
ence is warranted; the less procedural consistency with these values, the 
less interpretive deference is warranted. 
 Just as not all federalism bargaining warrants deference, not all 
regulatory matters warrant federalism bargaining. Many regulatory 
arenas are not ripe for state-federal bargaining at all, as when they in-
volve clearly designated areas of state or federal jurisdiction about 
which there is no legitimate claim for overlap.598 Even in contexts of 
legitimate overlap, federalism bargaining should not trump all other 
means of interpretation—it merely adds tools to supplement unilateral 
interpretation at the margins where those methods falter.599 The more 
a given federalism question can be resolved through conventional in-
terpretive means, the weaker the need for bilateral interpretive tools. 
Still, these are powerful interpretive tools for use by all branches of 
government. Ex ante, consistency with federalism values, including re-
spect for clearly delineated authority, can be engineered into the bar-
gaining process. Ex post, federalism bargaining can be judicially re-
viewed for procedural consistency with these values. 
 Indeed, the important interpretive roles by political actors in verti-
cal federalism bargaining are enhanced by the horizontal check of ju-
dicial review. The availability of limited judicial review strengthens the 
institution of federalism bargaining in a variety of ways. The potential 
for neutral judicial oversight smooths leverage imbalances that could 
otherwise frustrate mutual consent, compromise checks and balances, 
and hinder local participation. Judicial review gives procedural re-
                                                                                                                      
598 For example, except in the most indirect intersystemic signaling sense, state actors 
would not normally bargain with the federal government over the prosecution of a war, or 
over foreign policy—when they have, they have faced foreign affairs preemption. See, e.g., 
Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 429 (2003) (similarly preempting a California 
law requiring insurers doing business in the state to disclose holocaust era insurance poli-
cies); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 364, 373–74 (2000) (finding a Mas-
sachusetts law limiting state entities and contractors from doing business with Myanmar 
preempted under the foreign affairs power). Similarly, federal actors would not normally 
bargain with states over the establishment of local governments within them, or the provi-
sion of local fire service. 
599 As discussed in Part I, sometimes this is due to legal uncertainty about interpreting 
constitutional principles (for example, establishing the limits of federal authority over 
intrastate wetlands after Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), 
and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006)), and sometimes it is due to practical un-
certainty about the best allocation of national and local authority where both are needed 
(for example, in a national climate regulatory policy). 
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quirements for accountability and transparency enforceable bite. Just as 
parties to a contract bargain more efficiently when secure in the know-
ledge that fair bargaining norms are protected by contract law, so too 
will federalism bargaining parties negotiate more productively when 
secure that the process must be consistent with constitutional and fair-
ness norms.600 In contrast with pure political safeguards, interpretive 
work by the political branches that is made falsifiable by judicial review 
will command greater political respect. Moreover, to the extent that the 
carrot of judicial deference provides meaningful incentive to federal-
ism engineers and participants, the proposal will encourage intergov-
ernmental bargaining that better harmonizes with federalism values, 
advancing the goals of federalism itself. 
 Nevertheless, judicial review of federalism-related challenges to the 
products of legitimate federalism bargaining should be limited by a 
threshold inquiry for interpretive integrity—sheltering instances where 
the bargaining process itself offers the best realization of federalism 
values. The reviewing court’s first task should be to scrutinize the bar-
gaining process for consistency with the procedural principles of fair 
bargaining and federalism values. If it passes, then the outcome war-
rants deference as a legitimate way of determining who gets to decide. 
The court should not interpret the allocation of rights as though le-
gitimate federalism bargaining never took place (as the Supreme Court 
did in New York v. United States).601 When federalism and fair bargaining 
principles are honored, we can trust that the process achieves constitu-
tional goals and that the need for negotiation itself provides important 
substantive checks. 
 But if the threshold inquiry shows that the bargaining process is 
not consistent with the requisite procedural principles, then the review-
ing court should be free to assess the negotiated outcome de novo. Ne-
gotiations that, on balance, violate federalism values should be rejected 
as interpretive devices. Negotiations that fail one or more of the as-
sumptions underlying mutual consent also confer weakened interpre-
tive legitimacy. Some of these failures may require less of a binary scale 
and more of a sliding one; for example, even a bargain that is consen-
sual for legal purposes may slide uncomfortably down the legitimacy 
                                                                                                                      
600 In this respect, the security afforded by judicial review confers a sort of forward-
looking exit valve to substantiate the “walk-away” principle of genuine consent, as partici-
pation may be more meaningfully consensual when parties agree from this position of 
relative security. 
601 505 U.S. at 174–75; see supra notes 291–300 and accompanying text (discussing this 
example of failed bargained-for commandeering). 
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scale as the assumptions that underlie mutual consent are stressed. 
Bargaining that strains the consensual nature of agreement, that ex-
cludes relevant stakeholders, or in which participants may not fully un-
derstand implicated interests all require more careful scrutiny. 
 Judicial review of federalism bargaining would thus be unlimited 
in three circumstances. If the challenged intergovernmental bargaining 
takes place beyond the defensible realm of jurisdictional overlap, it re-
ceives no interpretive deference. If the challenged bargaining fails the 
court’s threshold procedural review, then the court reviews the sub-
stance of the outcome de novo, applying its own interpretive judgment 
on the federalism-related challenge. Non-federalism related challenges 
to the products of valid interpretive federalism bargaining warrant or-
dinary judicial scrutiny. Judicial deference to interpretive legislative and 
executive bargaining need not undermine judicial supremacy in pro-
tecting the rights of insular minorities against the majoritarian impulses 
of the political branches in any context. Otherwise, however, judicial 
review should be limited to scrutiny for consistency of the bargaining 
process with federalism and fair bargaining principles, deferring to re-
sults in a procedural analog to rational basis review.602 This enables an 
interpretive partnership between the political and judicial branches 
that harnesses what each best contributes to federalism implementa-
tion while honoring the premise of Marbury v. Madison.603 
 In administering procedurally based deference, courts could draw 
from that applied to agency decision making under the Administrative 
Procedure Act604 (and state analogs), and the interpretive deference 
federal courts apply to agency statutory interpretation under the Su-
preme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron v. NRDC.605 New Governance 
scholars have also proposed theories of judicial review that position 
courts to monitor and incentivize problem-solving processes, rather 
                                                                                                                      
602 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (distinguishing 
rational basis review from strict scrutiny). 
603 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (affirming judicial review as a constitutional 
check on the political branches). 
604 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006) (requiring deference to 
administrative action taken in accordance with the requirements of the statute). 
605 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that courts should defer to an agency’s rea-
sonable interpretation of the statute it administers if statutory ambiguity requires interpre-
tation). Notably, the doctrine of Chevron deference was designed to limit judicial interfer-
ence in agency interpretation, but courts maintain substantial discretion in deciding the 
threshold issue of statutory ambiguity. Judicial review of federalism bargaining could take a 
similar turn, highlighting an area of uncertainty in how the proposal might evolve, and an 
opportunity for further theorizing. 
2011] Negotiating Federalism 117 
than adjudicate substantive disputes.606 Review of bargaining autonomy, 
interest literacy, and faithful representation would rely on familiar judi-
cial tools from contract and agency law,607 and courts could draw from 
established federalism jurisprudence and scholarship in articulating 
the tests for procedural consistency with federalism values.608 
 At a minimum, courts reviewing for consistency with checks and 
balances should ensure that the process did not violate other rights, 
that neither party was coerced or undermined during negotiations, and 
that any long-term impacts of the bargain on future intergovernmental 
relations were adequately considered. Accountability review should en-
sure that the process by which a bargain was reached was sufficiently 
transparent, produced an adequately reviewable record, followed any 
established protocols, maximized opportunities for public participa-
tion, and meaningfully involved affected stakeholders. Localism review 
should ensure that local interests were represented, that the process 
maximized opportunities for subsidiarity-based innovation through lo-
cal variation and competition, and that there was adequate opportunity 
for interjurisdictional experimentation prior to the implementation of 
a national solution. Synergy review should ensure that the process max-
imized opportunities to assess and exploit comparative advantages in 
allocating and coordinating authority.609 Federalism bargaining that 
yields little record for procedural review, such as intersystemic signal-
ing, warrants little judicial deference. 
 Articulating a role for judicial review raises the fair question of 
whether the need for policing bargaining abuse is worth the risk that 
courts will mis-assess procedure during their review. As with all legal 
innovations, the transition period may yield difficult cases as the judici-
ary settles into a new pattern of precedent. The overall thrust of the 
proposal, however, is to reduce judicial interference with federalism 
bargaining. It does so primarily by providing theoretical justification for 
the role intergovernmental bargaining already plays in interpreting 
federalism quandaries, offering guidance, security, and encouragement 
to the engineers and practitioners of worthy examples. It also adds a 
                                                                                                                      
606 See generally, e.g., Simon, supra note 20; Susan Sturm & Joanne Scott, Courts as Cata-
lysts, 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 565 (2007). 
607 For example, courts might assess whether the bargaining results were distorted by 
flagrant bargaining power imbalances between the parties, critical but unavailable infor-
mation, or by bargaining agents’ private financial interests or desire for personal credit. 
608 Cf. Ryan, supra note 8, at 648–58 (proposing judicial criteria for assessing substan-
tive consistency with federalism values). 
609 Id. 
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new layer of defense against whatever existing doctrinal challenges may 
threaten its results. 
 In contrast to previous process-based proposals, judicial oversight of 
federalism bargaining is available but limited in comparison to the status 
quo. Outcomes challenged on federalism grounds are assessed for pro-
cedure before substance; if the bargaining process satisfies the criteria, 
then the court defers to the substance of the negotiated result. The pro-
posal prevents the judiciary from invalidating results that are proce-
durally faithful to federalism values even if the outcome seems doctri-
nally vulnerable (as was the bargaining over the LLRWPA and the Phase 
II Stormwater Rule). Yet it does not provide any new grounds for 
challenging federalism bargaining in court. The proposal thus provides a 
new defense against negotiated federalism challenges without providing 
additional sources of doctrinal challenge—reducing the overall impact 
of judicial constraints while preserving courts’ ability to police for abuses. 
 Returning at last to the criminal enforcement example, recall the 
negotiation in which state actors cede a case to interested federal 
agents to direct scarce resources for cases without a federal nexus (and 
assume it follows the model described in the taxonomy).610 Applying 
the above analysis shows that both procedure and outcome resonate 
with both fairness and federalism values. 
 The bargaining takes place in a realm of legitimate jurisdictional 
overlap, and the bargaining parties satisfied the requirements of mu-
tual consent by agreeing freely to an outcome that advanced the legiti-
mate law enforcement interests of their principals. Checks are satisfied, 
because both parties meaningfully participated in the decision to allo-
cate authority this way, constitutional guarantees of other implicated 
rights remain in force, and the bargain does not threaten other sover-
eignty concerns in the state-federal relationship. Assuming case files are 
adequately prepared and relevant rules of criminal procedure followed, 
the bargain poses no significant tradeoffs against accountability values. 
It honors localism values by involving state participation in the decision 
making and shifting to a federal approach only after adequate local 
experience indicates the value of the trade. Finally, the regulatory part-
nership harnesses synergy in allocating authority along lines of com-
parative advantage. 
 Thus, in a world of scarce resources, what looks like a straight-
forward cost-benefit analysis proves not only a reasonable way to allo-
cate contested jurisdiction, but also a wise one that takes advantage of 
                                                                                                                      
610 Supra notes 129–135. 
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the capacity each has to offer. The deal ensures that the case at hand is 
investigated (federally) while increasing the likelihood that other cases 
get better attention from the only available (state) authority. Were the 
same decision rule applied in all such cases—such that federal en-
forcement interests in an area of concurrent jurisdiction effectively re-
moved it from state reach without benefit of public process—the quan-
tifiably different tradeoffs against checks and localism values would 
warrant closer examination. But real-world law enforcement officials 
seem to understand the difference, because state actors are generally 
unwilling to cede this kind of blanket authority for cost-saving pur-
poses,611 and federal actors that do focus on whole categories of cases 
work hard to create collaborative enforcement programs that share 
planning, oversight, and credit with state partners.612 
 Importantly, whether bargaining is consistent with federalism is not 
an inquiry into the bargainer’s subjective considerations. A procedurally 
legitimate bargain advances federalism values even if negotiators never 
think about federalism during the process. As in many areas of law, the 
focus is not on the black box of the mind, but on objective manifesta-
tions. If the negotiation process safeguards individual rights, enables 
democratic participation, fosters jurisdictional innovation, and har-
nesses problem-solving synergy—or if it does so on balance more than it 
detracts from those values—then the process is consistent with constitu-
tional federalism regardless of what the participants thought about 
while negotiating. Solid federalism engineering in design of bargaining 
forums can thus facilitate constitutional objectives just as Miranda warn-
ings engineer behavior consistent with Fourth Amendment values re-
gardless of the subjective views of individual police officers.613 
 To reiterate the critical caveat, the interpretive potential within 
federalism bargaining does not mean that every bargain between state 
and federal actors will always be faithful to federalism. Scholars have 
already shown that some instances of state-federal bargaining are more 
consistent with these values than others, demonstrating variable inter-
pretive potential.614 By corollary, federalism bargaining that fails this 
                                                                                                                      
611 Telephone Interview with Roscoe Howard, supra note 133. 
612 Supra notes 137–139 (discussing gun violence and child pornography collabora-
tions). 
613 Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 441–42 (1966). 
614 See generally, e.g., Lawrence E. Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning and Adaptive 
Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (2010) (critiquing 
an example of sub-optimal federalism bargaining for failure to allow meaningful stake-
holder participation). 
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test is not inherently bad; it merely cannot confer interpretive legiti-
macy. Fortunately, both judicial review and the political process afford 
able mechanisms for flushing out true violators. In the most egregious 
cases, bargains that violate federalism principles will reallocate author-
ity even beyond the pockets of uncertainty in existing jurisprudence. In 
these cases, bad federalism bargaining will be weeded out judicially, by 
a court applying clear precedent independent of procedural review. 
Alternatively, bargained-for results in legitimate contexts of overlap that 
are reached in contravention of good governance procedures are likely 
to distinguish themselves as bad governance. An otherwise legal bar-
gain reached in a process that blurs boundaries, obfuscates accountabil-
ity, undermines localism, and harnesses no meaningful problem-solving 
synergy is as unlikely to survive long politically as it is to withstand judi-
cial review. 
 This evaluation of bargaining procedure operates from the ex ante 
perspective, suggesting the potential for engineering federalism bar-
gaining forums for interpretive purposes. In other words, when the 
bargaining process is designed to safeguard rights, participation, inno-
vation, and synergy, we can assume that federalism bargaining will 
harmonize with federalism as a procedural matter without reference to 
the substantive results. However, bargained-for results that also substan-
tively advance federalism values are further evidence of good process. 
Indeed, the negotiation literature offers encouraging empirical evi-
dence that correlates the use of similar procedural tools with outcomes 
that are highly consistent with federalism values.615 For example, Pro-
fessor Lawrence Susskind has empirically evaluated volumes of govern-
ance outcomes against criteria of fairness, efficiency, stability, and wis-
dom, and found that negotiated governance consistently outperforms 
alternatives.616 He convincingly argues that these criteria closely align 
with federalism values, noting that the problem-solving qualities of ne-
                                                                                                                      
615 See Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, San Francisco Estuary Project, in The Consensus Build-
ing Handbook, supra note 81, at 818. See generally, e.g., Lawrence Susskind & Ole Amund-
sen, Using Assisted Negotiation to Settle Land Use Disputes: A Guidebook for Pub-
lic Officials (1999) (analyzing the results of 105 cases); Kirk Emerson et al., Environmental 
Conflict Resolution: Evaluating Performance Outcomes and Contributing Factors, 27 Conflict Re-
sol. Q. 27 (2009) (analyzing the outcomes of sixty different mediated agreements between 
local, state, and federal governments); Freeman & Langbein, supra note 266 (reporting on 
empirical data in studies of collaborative governance). 
616 Lawrence Susskind & Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual 
Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes 14 (1987). See generally sources cited supra 
note 615. 
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gotiation naturally advance localism and synergy values, while represen-
tation is the key to accountability and transparency.617 
B. Evaluating Interpretive Federalism Bargaining 
 This interpretive framework for analyzing federalism bargaining 
can now be applied to the taxonomy, indicating those forms in which 
bargaining is most useful, and those in which the bargaining process 
itself may prove more protective of federalism than judicially enforce-
able doctrine. Not coincidentally, interpretive integrity closely tracks the 
primary sources of trade, anointing bargaining in which federalism val-
ues provide important normative leverage as the most reliable. This Sec-
tion evaluates which forms of federalism bargaining hold the greatest 
interpretive potential for allocating contested authority or shepherding 
collaboration, grouped according to the primary media of exchange.618 
 Some characteristics are universal. In general, the more a regula-
tory context draws on complementary state and federal capacities, the 
more opportunities for productive integrative exchange. Regulatory 
problems characterized by rapidly changing data, which may benefit 
from adaptive management or other incremental and contingent poli-
cies, are also good candidates for intergovernmental bargaining. Un-
yielding dissensus behind the state line (leading to holdouts and other 
transaction costs) limit the scope of productive bargaining, as do un-
certainties regarding legal bargaining entitlements. The more leverage 
gaps or participation concerns strain mutual consent, the more other 
procedural constraints are needed to preserve bargaining legitimacy. 
The more evenly balanced the leverage and well-represented the stake-
holders, the more freely the rest of the bargaining may proceed. Regu-
latory matters that match a need for state land use authority or other 
basic police powers with spillover concerns requiring federal oversight 
are especially ripe for federalism bargaining, given the important inter-
                                                                                                                      
617 Telephone Interview with Professor Lawrence Susskind, supra note 255. 
These criteria are indistinguishable to me from the federalism values [of 
checks, accountability, localism, and synergy]. Preserving fairness is what 
checks and balances are for. Wisdom is about local innovation—allowing par-
ties to apply all the information at hand to do the best thing possible in their 
unique circumstances. Stability is bound up with accountability—you don’t 
have to keep revisiting the issue, because stakeholders were involved in the 
process and approved the result. Problem-solving synergy is bound up with ef-
ficiency. 
Id. 
618 See infra notes 619–643 and accompanying text. 
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est linkages, complementary regulatory capacities, and comparatively 
even positive and negative leverage. 
1. The Normative Leverage of Federalism Values 
 Unsurprisingly, bargaining in which the normative leverage of fed-
eralism values heavily influences the exchange offers the most reliable 
interpretive tools, smoothing out leverage imbalances and focusing 
bargainers’ interlinking interests.619 Negotiations in which participants 
are motivated by shared regard for checks, localism, accountability, and 
synergy naturally foster constitutional process and hedge against non-
consensual dealings. All federalism bargaining trades on the normative 
values of federalism to some degree, and any given negotiation may 
feature it more or less prominently based on the factual particulars.620 
Yet the taxonomy reveals several forms in which federalism values pre-
dominate by design, and which may prove especially valuable in fraught 
federalism contexts: negotiated rulemaking, policymaking laboratory 
negotiations, and iterative federalism.621 These examples indicate the 
potential for purposeful federalism engineering to reinforce proce-
dural regard for state and federal roles within the American system. 
 (1) Negotiated Rulemaking between state and federal actors improves 
upon traditional administrative rulemaking in fostering participation, 
localism, and synergy by incorporating genuine state input into federal 
regulatory planning.622 Most negotiated rulemaking also uses profes-
sional intermediaries to ensure that all stakeholders are appropriately 
engaged and to facilitate the search for outcomes that meet parties’ 
dovetailing interests.623 For example, after discovering that extreme 
local variability precluded a uniform federal program, Phase II storm-
water negotiators invited municipal dischargers to design individually 
                                                                                                                      
619 See supra notes 523–543 and accompanying text (discussing the normative leverage 
of federalism values). 
620 See Interview with Laurie Ristino, supra note 446; see also Telephone Interview with 
Jeff Reynolds, supra note 426. 
621 See discussion, supra notes 96–399 and accompanying text. Examples include: the 
Phase II Stormwater Rule, which was devised via negotiated rulemaking; the Coastal Zone 
Management Act, which was drafted using policymaking laboratory negotiations; and 
emissions standards under the Clean Air Act, which developed following a process of itera-
tive federalism. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006) (Coastal Zone Management Act); 42 
U.S.C. § 7543 (2006) (Clean Air Act emissions standards); 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b) (2010) 
(Phase II Stormwater). 
622 See supra notes 256–300 and accompanying text. 
623 McMahon & Susskind, supra note 263, at 154–55. 
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tailored programs within general federal limits.624 Considering the mas-
sive number of municipalities involved, the fact that the rule faced legal 
challenge from only a handful of Texas municipalities testifies to the 
strength of the consensus through which it was created. 
 By contrast, the iterative exchange within standard notice-and-
comment rulemaking—also an example of federalism bargaining—can 
frustrate state participation by denying participants meaningful oppor-
tunities for consultation, collaborative problem-solving, and real-time 
accountability. The contrast between notice-and-comment and negoti-
ated rulemaking, exemplified by the two phases of REAL ID rulemak-
ing, demonstrates the difference between more and less successful in-
stances of federalism bargaining.625 Moreover, the difficulty of asserting 
state consent to the products of the REAL ID notice-and-comment 
rulemaking (given the outright rebellion that followed) limits its inter-
pretive potential. 
 Negotiated rulemakings take longer than other forms of adminis-
trative rulemaking, but are more likely to succeed over time. Regula-
tory matters best suited for state-federal negotiated rulemaking include 
those in which a decisive federal rule is needed to overcome spillover 
effects, holdouts, and other collective action problems, but unique and 
diverse state expertise is needed for the creation of wise policy. Matters 
in contexts of overlap least suited for negotiated rulemaking include 
those in which the need for immediate policy overcomes the need for 
broad participation—but even these leave open possibilities for incre-
mental rulemaking, in which the initial federal rule includes mecha-
nisms for periodic reevaluation with local input. 
 (2) Policymaking Laboratory Negotiations, among all federalism bar-
gaining forms, offer the richest resources for productive bargaining 
and procedurally harnessing federalism values. They foster both checks 
and localism by maximizing state autonomy within national regulatory 
programs, and accountability because they proceed by formal opera-
tion of law. Advancing localism and synergy—and capitalizing on feder-
alism’s promise of the “laboratory of ideas” —they allow for localized 
innovation to confer learning benefits on the entire system, and locally 
tailored solutions that reflect unique state circumstances. For example, 
Medicaid demonstration waivers enable states to share policymaking 
design with both Congress and the DHS, harnessing the energy of state 
and local regulators to address unique circumstances while disseminat-
                                                                                                                      
624 Supra notes 283–290 and accompanying text. 
625 Supra notes 291–300 and accompanying text. 
124 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1 
ing innovation throughout the system. North Carolina’s innovative 
Community Care program has thus received attention not only from 
other states but also from the Obama administration as a potential in-
novation for national health reform.626 
 Because they represent purposeful legislative design, policymaking 
laboratory negotiations also offer the greatest opportunities for pre-
meditated federalism engineering, as recommended below. They are 
available for use by both political branches, and initiated by congres-
sional statute, such as the Coastal Zone Management Act’s creation of 
state policymaking zones for coastal management, or by administrative 
rule, such as the Phase II Stormwater Rule’s creation of municipal poli-
cymaking zones for stormwater management.627 
 Policymaking laboratory negotiations are the grandest of federal-
ism bargaining enterprises, requiring formidable regulatory architec-
ture on the front end and considerable time periods before both hori-
zontal and vertical learning benefits can be fully realized. Matters best 
suited for policymaking laboratory negotiations include those in which 
federal needs for comprehensive regulation are closely matched by the 
benefits of state regulatory autonomy. Matters least suited include those 
in which the need for national uniformity (for reasons of economic 
efficiency or justice) overwhelms the benefits of local autonomy. 
 (3) Iterative Policymaking Negotiations, a subset of policymaking labo-
ratory negotiations, allow for balance between reasonable uniformity to 
enable commercial development and critical flexibility to foster com-
petitive and adaptive policymaking. For example, the Clean Air Act’s 
two-track system for regulating automobile emissions allows states to 
choose between the federal or more stringent California standard, pre-
venting regulatory stagnation, hedging against capture, and maximiz-
ing state autonomy without unduly compromising industrial needs.628 
Similar measures have been suggested to modify federal carbon cap-
and-trade proposals, lest a fully national program fall prey to the pitfalls 
of regulatory monopoly.629 
 Iterative policymaking negotiations offer the best means of split-
ting the difference between the costs and benefits of policymaking la-
boratory negotiations. They are most appropriate when clear leader-
ship by a state or regional partnership warrants exceptional status as a 
                                                                                                                      
626 See Hoban, supra note 341. 
627 See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (Coastal Zone Management Act) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b) 
(2010) (Phase II Stormwater). 
628 Supra note 355 and accompanying text. 
629 Supra notes 369–373 and accompanying text. 
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co-policymaker with the national government, and least appropriate 
when conferring different levels of policymaking status would threaten 
values of equity among the states. 
2. Trading on Capacity 
 As discussed in Part I, one focus of contemporary negotiation the-
ory has been to facilitate the formation of integrative agreements, 
which exploit linkages between the parties’ broadly construed interests 
to uncover value-creating trades, bridge leverage imbalances, and break 
negotiating deadlocks.630 Federalism bargaining that trades on the dif-
ferent parties’ unique capacities has great integrative potential, ena-
bling the kinds of Pareto-superior trades that skilled negotiators capital-
ize on, and allowing the accomplishment of regulatory objectives that 
neither side could realize alone.631 
 For this reason, capacity-based federalism bargains, including 
those to reallocate federal authority, seem especially useful in advanc-
ing interjurisdictional synergy within the bounds of mutual consent. 
When both sides trade on unique capacity, each possesses a meaningful 
opportunity to impact the outcome. Results are less vulnerable to lever-
age imbalance because unique capacity is a powerful form of positive 
leverage that holders wield over those seeking access. Examples of ca-
pacity-based trading from the taxonomy include: negotiations within 
cooperative federalism programs, negotiations for exceptions, and en-
forcement negotiations. 
 (1) Cooperative Federalism Negotiations: Cooperative Federalism ne-
gotiations harness valuable synergy between state and federal institu-
tional capacity. For example, the Coastal Zone Management Act incen-
tivizes states to use local land use planning authority that the federal 
government pointedly lacks, in order to protect critical coastal re-
sources of both local and national importance.632 It does so while sub-
stantially protecting local policymaking authority, and erecting un-
precedented checks through the limited waiver of federal supremacy in 
the consistency provision. 
 The CZMA draws strong legitimacy from the principle of mutual 
consent because states have wide control over the degree and nature of 
their own participation. Other cooperative federalism programs put 
slightly more strain on that principle. For example, the Clean Air and 
                                                                                                                      
630 Supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
631 See, e.g., Fisher & Ury, supra note 9, at 40–80; Mnookin et al., supra note 89, at 325. 
632 Supra notes 306–310 and accompanying text. 
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Water Acts occasionally prompt state complaints about their Hobson’s 
choice between expensive implementation obligations or submission to 
federal permitting by agents lacking expertise and investment in the 
local economy.633 Nevertheless, states have ably wielded their capacity 
within these bargaining forums, negotiating air quality implementation 
plans, water quality standards, and NPDES permitting agreements. 
States retain substantial leverage in these negotiations because they 
alone possess the capacity to bring federal policies to fruition (deflating 
many threats of preemption).634 
 Regulatory matters allowing space for variation over uniform regu-
latory floors are good candidates for programs of cooperative federal-
ism like the Clean Air and Water Acts, especially when regulatory tar-
gets require state implementation capacity. These afford less state 
influence on federal policymaking than full-blown policymaking nego-
tiations (like the CZMA), but more space for negotiation than full-
blown command-and-control regulations (like the REAL ID Act). Poor 
candidates for cooperative federalism programs involve regulatory mat-
ters in which there is no space for local variation, no nexus with state 
police powers, or in which state and federal actors cannot reach basic 
agreement on policy goals, making partnership unworkable. 
 (2) Negotiations for Exceptions can also yield fruitful collaborations in 
areas of concurrent jurisdiction, reallocating authority in support of 
localism and synergy values. For example, the Interior Department and 
California broke regulatory ground in harmonizing the Endangered 
Species Act and Natural Communities Conservation Program.635 State 
and federal officials have continued to collaborate, negotiating addi-
tional incidental take permits to harmonize ESA and NCCP require-
ments regarding state water projects, such as the Bay Delta Conserva-
tion Plan.636 Exceptions negotiations open possibilities for productive 
exchange whenever the initial allocation of authority is not purpose-
fully and properly assigned to one side under a statutory or constitu-
tional inalienability rule, such as federal coinage, or state elections.637 
 (3) Enforcement Negotiations speak directly to the problem-solving 
synergy value of federalism. Unified by the shared desire to avoid public 
                                                                                                                      
633 Jonathan Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. 
L.J. 130, 169–73 (2005). 
634 Supra note 437 (discussing EPA’s “hollow threats”). 
635 Supra notes 224–232 and accompanying text. 
636 What Is the BDCP?, Bay Delta Conservation Plan, http://baydeltaconservation 
plan.com/BDCPPlanningProcess/AboutBDCP.aspx (last visited Dec. 3, 2010). 
637 Cf. generally  Ryan, supra note 35. 
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harm, participants in contexts from criminal to environmental law tend 
to cooperate smoothly and infrequently compete for jurisdiction.638 Col-
laborative criminal law enforcement partnerships have been especially 
adept at linking a wide variety of local and national expertise, such as 
the Project Safe Neighborhoods program.639 Enforcement negotiations 
are widespread and generally uncontroversial because they generally 
herald the hallmarks of both mutual consent and federalism values. 
3. Spending Power Deals 
 Spending power deals are an important means of navigating juris-
dictional overlap within the American system of dual sovereignty.640 
They are among the best understood, most popular, and least con-
strained form of federalism bargaining. Ironically, they may also rank 
among the least legitimate for interpretive purposes, in that state con-
sent is not always as free as negotiation theory would prefer. Examples 
vary widely, from programs where state consent is unquestioningly ge-
nuine, such as the Coastal Zone Management Act, to examples notori-
ously fraught with consent-based controversy, such as the pending suits 
over No Child Left Behind.641 
 No Child Left Behind provides a good example of federalism bar-
gaining that strains the principle of mutual consent, because states felt 
coerced by profound needs for federal educational funding, and the 
Act has struggled for legitimacy in federalism terms. Nevertheless—and 
attesting to the force of at least some political safeguards in the proc-
ess—the Act is currently under modification in light of state dissatisfac-
tion.642 The Obama administration’s new approach seems promising, 
adopting many of the federalism engineering devices of the successful 
policymaking laboratory negotiations in offering additional funds and 
policymaking discretion to states that compete on the strength of indi-
vidual proposals.643 
 For this reason, spending power deals should be evaluated on the 
basis of their particulars, and not as an entire category. The least worry-
ing spending power deals for interpretive purposes involve the states in 
                                                                                                                      
638 See Interview with Roscoe Howard, supra note 133; Interview with Mike Murphy, su-
pra note 159; Telephone Interview with Rick Weeks, supra note 429. 
639 Supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text. 
640 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206; discussion supra notes 167–182 and accompanying text. 
641 Supra notes 483–490 (discussing School District of the City of Pontiac v. Secretary of the 
U.S. Department of Education and the new pending suit). 
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participatory partnerships that afford genuine consultation and syn-
ergy, of the sort enabled in the joint policymaking forums. The most 
worrying are those that afford the least discretion to states and invite 
the least meaningful participation. That said, even spending power 
deals that fail the requirements of interpretive legitimacy may be legal 
(and even worthwhile) bargains; they simply warrant a different level of 
interpretive deference when challenged on federalism grounds. 
C. Toward Better Federalism Bargaining 
 The previous discussion identifies how certain forms of intergov-
ernmental bargaining can serve the purposes that federalism sets out to 
accomplish. Identifying the criteria for this assessment opens up new 
possibilities for engineering and conducting federalism bargaining to 
better accomplish these goals. Although some forms are more promis-
ing than others in their ability to navigate federalism challenges, much 
can be done to further enhance interpretive bargaining at a variety of 
intervention points. This Section offers suggestions for how legislators, 
stakeholders, negotiators, and adjudicators can help facilitate more ef-
fective and legitimate federalism bargaining. 
1. Legislative and Administrative Design 
 Legislators and administrators should draw from the lessons of fe-
deralism engineering in creating forums for state-federal bargaining. 
They should seek opportunities to reduce transaction cost barriers to 
interpretive bargaining through legal structures that could increase 
information flow, reduce strategic behavior, and build working rela-
tionships between bargaining participants.644 Congress could consider 
more explicitly empowering agencies to negotiate directly with states in 
appropriate contexts, mirroring its endorsement of negotiated rule-
making more generally.645 Executive agencies could consider institu-
tional reforms to realign internal culture toward negotiating norms, 
self-assessing against positive baselines set by model agencies.646 Law-
makers should carefully consider how their pronouncements will func-
tion as intergovernmental bargaining defaults, clarifying whether or 
not they should be subject to renegotiation. They should develop clear 
                                                                                                                      
644 Cf. generally Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 190 (2001) (discussing institutional tools for reducing bargaining costs in the re-
gional context). 
645 Supra notes 258–259 and accompanying text.. 
646 Metzger, supra note 62, at 2078; Sharkey, supra note 61, at 2159–61. 
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baseline entitlements and legal endowments, clarifying bargaining 
power and enabling better advocacy by participants.647 
 To the extent bargaining participants may stray from federalism 
concerns during negotiation, legislators and administrators can foster 
federalism values through purposeful procedural design. For example, 
Congress should consider requiring greater use of negotiated rulemak-
ing in statutes requiring regulations that preempt state authority, im-
pose significant costs, or about which states hold special expertise. Ne-
gotiating agencies’ use of professional intermediaries can also reinforce 
procedural regard for federalism values by ensuring that stakeholders 
are adequately represented during the process, fortifying bargaining 
against concerns about transparency and accountability. Congress 
could also require transparency measures to alleviate concerns about 
principal-agent tensions in federalism bargaining, such as requiring 
that draft agreements be included in the public record after final 
agreement is reached. 
 A significant contribution of negotiation theorists is the importance 
of process pluralism, which emphasizes the value of variability and flexi-
bility in process design to allow tailoring for individual circumstances.648 
Although Congress should heed this wisdom, successful federalism bar-
gaining forums may provide appropriate models for imitation in related 
regulatory contexts. For example, policymaking laboratory forums such 
as Medicaid, CZMA, and those with state implementation plans provide 
procedural assists to strengthen local input in spending power negotia-
tions that might otherwise strain the assumptions of mutual consent.649 
The CAA iterative federalism device for regulating automobile emis-
sions provides an ingenious tool for moderating between the benefits of 
jurisdictional competition and uniform industrial standards, a model 
that could prove useful in contexts facing similar tensions.650 Similar 
provisions in the Superfund Act and federal forfeiture laws incentivize 
intergovernmental enforcement partnerships; the same tool may prove 
useful in other contexts as well.651 
 Congress could also enact a statutory framework to facilitate its 
own creation of future policymaking negotiation forums, by establish-
                                                                                                                      
647 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 83, at 852. 
648 Id. at 850. 
649 See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (2006) (Coastal Zone Management Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315, 
1396n (2006) (Medicaid demonstration waivers). 
650 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2006). 
651 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
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ing templates to streamline future lawmaking. For example, Congress 
could create a uniform policymaking laboratory template based on So-
cial Security Act demonstration waivers or the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act, easing the way for process differentiation after establishing 
successful baseline terms.652 
 Finally, Congress should consider ways to maintain a meaningful 
role for states as partners in spending power deals where exit is less po-
litically available. Although not appropriate in every instance, the joint 
policymaking forums enable especially valuable spending power part-
nerships. The emerging field of Dispute Systems Design may be a fruit-
ful source of federalism engineering innovations to respond to persis-
tent state concerns about consultation during policymaking.653 The 
new behavior economics literature on suggestive policymaking may also 
provide tools,654 as may important advances in multiparty negotiation 
theory655 and collaborative governance theory.656 
2. Awareness Measures 
 Stakeholders should be made familiar with the most effective tools 
of federalism bargaining and the procedural constraints that confer 
interpretive legitimacy, empowering them to participate more mean-
ingfully. As it once did through the Negotiated Rulemaking Act,657 
Congress could statutorily encourage use of specific forms by executive 
agencies. But to improve upon the lackluster impact of that Act, Con-
gress could further require that executive agencies give written guid-
ance about specified forms to state stakeholders, enabling them to ad-
vocate for their use in appropriate circumstances. Given the rarity of 
negotiated rulemaking even after the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 
Congress should begin there.658 
                                                                                                                      
652 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (Coastal Zone Management Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315, 
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653 Supra note 92. 
654 See generally, e.g., Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Deci-
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3. Seeking Opportunities 
 Once state and federal actors better understand alternatives for 
productive bargaining, they should search actively for opportunities. 
With recommendations by executive agencies, Congress could identify 
specific zones of jurisdictional overlap where valid interpretive bargain-
ing could optimize collaboration. Even if Congress chooses not to 
mandate negotiated governance in these realms, it could require more 
meaningful consultation with state partners to inform federal lawmak-
ers, emphasizing genuine rather than box-checking exchange. 
 Executive agencies should also identify opportunities for promis-
ing federalism bargaining independently of congressional mandates. 
Federal executive agencies should choose negotiated forms of policy-
making in contested federalism arenas, such as those intersecting fed-
eral safety regulations and state tort law. Where federal agencies extend 
genuine invitations to states to negotiate, state counterparts should 
make reasonable efforts to participate. 
 Meanwhile, state actors need not wait for federal initiative. State 
executive agencies should reach out to regional federal partners in set-
ting statewide policy on matters of interjurisdictional concern, streng-
thening regulatory relationships and policy resiliency. National organi-
zations of state actors, such as the National Governors Association, the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, and the Environmental 
Council of States, can lobby on behalf of their constituents for a greater 
role in negotiating regional and federal policymaking. 
 In general, complex regulatory arenas that would benefit from 
contingent agreements with flexible terms, incremental process, and 
built-in re-evaluation mechanisms should signal the potential value of 
forums for federalism bargaining, collaborative regulatory planning, 
and adaptive management between state and federal actors.659 
4. Leveraging Leverage 
 One way of facilitating the interpretive potential of federalism bar-
gaining is to ensure that both sides meaningfully influence the out-
come by helping them understand the full array of leverage and ex-
change in play. Federal powers of the purse and the permit seem well 
understood, but some participants may not appreciate the leverage 
conferred by various forms of state and local capacity, or the normative 
power of federalism values. 
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 Negotiation theory suggests that negotiations in which leverage is 
more evenly matched will produce the most integrative, value-
encompassing results.660 Although federal negotiators will always be able 
to leverage legal supremacy and superior fisc, the preceding discussion 
reveals the significant leverage that states wield based on unique land 
use authority, local expertise, public outreach, and normative federalism 
leverage. If state actors more effectively leveraged the leverage they 
brought to the table, this might facilitate the development of more op-
timal alternatives within synergistic collaborations. At the very least, it 
would alter unfavorable negotiating dynamics. 
 Negotiation theorists also advise that parties study their best alter-
native to negotiated agreement and seek to improve it during the course 
of negotiations, if possible.661 States have demonstrated their willingness 
and ability to do this by creating regional cap-and-trade governing part-
nerships where the federal government has refused to bargain. For ex-
ample, the states forming the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Ini-
tiative and Western Climate Initiative have materially altered states’ 
leverage in interest group negotiations with federal lawmakers over the 
direction of national climate policy.662 If state actors better understood 
their alternatives to a proffered federal deal, as well as the force of fed-
eral need for state capacity in that deal, it could mitigate doubts about 
the “mutual consent” underlying some spending power deals. 
 Skilled intermediaries and better negotiation training for partici-
pants could help the parties fully understand their alternatives, ena-
bling them to identify unappreciated leverage and linkages that can 
motivate earnest trade even in the presence of power imbalances.663 
                                                                                                                      
660 This result is because parties evenly matched in leverage are more likely to fully ex-
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5. Negotiation Training 
 Indeed, both the pragmatic and interpretive potential of federal-
ism bargaining would likely improve if state and federal participants 
received formal negotiation training. Training can help even skilled 
intuitive negotiators identify opportunities for productive bargaining, 
understand leverage and alternatives, and manage the mechanics of 
difficult multiparty negotiations.664 (And for the many Americans in-
timidated by negotiation in general, it can make an even more pro-
found difference.)665 
 Negotiation skills training confers many benefits, but among the 
most important are an enhanced sensitivity to opportunities for pro-
ductive exchange and the tools to transform opportunities into mutu-
ally beneficial solutions. Training also enhances sensitivity to the nego-
tiation dynamics of social interaction, behavioral economics, game 
theory, and organizational behavior that can impede the formation or 
functioning of otherwise valuable collaboration. Federalism bargaining 
can trigger a surprisingly powerful subset of these “soft” negotiating 
obstacles, including in-group/out-group identity dynamics, affiliation 
and status sensibilities, and enforcement hurdles.666 Better still, agency 
leaders should consider strategies to build institutional negotiating 
competency beyond individual skills.667 
6. Judicial Role 
 Finally, the judiciary can aid federalism bargaining by clarifying 
and refining legal constraints as needed, acknowledging bargaining 
dynamics when interpreting negotiated results, and adopting the pro-
posed deferential procedural scrutiny. 
 Although spending power bargaining is well-treated in judicial 
opinion, other forms of federalism bargaining remain murky without 
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judicial elaboration, especially federal capacity bargaining.668 Of course, 
without recourse to advisory opinion, the Court cannot elaborate until 
an appropriate case arises. But the Court’s past precedent is responsible 
for some of this anxiety (especially New York v. United States),669 demon-
strating its lack of sensitivity to federalism bargaining at the time.670 The 
Supreme Court justices should heed this error when they encounter 
future cases that raise similar issues. In particular, the overly broad pro-
scription against “bargained-for commandeering” should be modified 
to allow consenting states to negotiate binding federal terms to resolve 
state collective action problems.671 
 Adjudicators should also give deeper consideration to the bargain-
ing factors present in Judge Sutton’s analysis in Pontiac School District 672 
and Justice White’s in New York v. United States.673 In cases interpreting 
federalism bargaining results, courts should evaluate the bargain at the 
heart of the transaction in deciding whether results are voidably am-
biguous (as alleged in Pontiac School District) or voidably nonconsensual 
(as held in New York v. United States). Just as context from elsewhere in a 
statute (or others in related fields) are used to resolve ambiguity in 
conventional statutory interpretation, so should the “core bargain” il-
luminate its terms. Otherwise, plaintiffs will opportunistically renege 
on clearly understood terms, reaping benefits without delivering on 
their own promises. Interpreting state-federal bargaining by statute—in 
which states that choose to participate play a role beyond mere compli-
ance with congressional dictates—thus demands a level of scrutiny one 
degree more complicated than ordinary statutory interpretation. 
 Finally, adjudicators should adopt the deferential interpretive scru-
tiny advanced above when intergovernmental bargaining is challenged 
on federalism grounds. Courts should defer to the allocation of author-
ity in negotiated governance that meets the basic procedural require-
ments of fair bargaining and constitutional federalism. They should not 
defer to challenged bargaining that fails the constitutional criteria, and 
they should facilitate real consequences for bargaining that violates 
fundamental fairness by stressing mutual consent to the breaking point. 
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Courts should discourage potential harm not by outlawing whole cate-
gories of federalism bargaining (such as spending power deals), but by 
scrutinizing alleged harm in individual instances, enforcing transpar-
ency requirements or due process norms as appropriate. Above all, they 
should interpret bargained-for results in the context of bargaining, and 
not as though consensual negotiations had never taken place. 
Conclusion 
 Thus, even as jurists parse the constitutional oracles on which side 
trumps where, those charged with governing in contexts of jurisdic-
tional overlap have learned to cope with federalism uncertainty 
through negotiation. In the face of persistent uncertainty about the 
boundaries between state and federal reach, regulators move forward 
by substituting procedural consensus for substantive clarity about the 
time-honored federalism quandary—who gets to decide? Federalism is 
negotiated not only between the proclamations of the Court and the 
statutory will of Congress, but also in the day-to-day activities of individ-
ual state and federal actors in all three branches. Recognizing how in-
terpretive bargaining helps allocate authority at the uncertain margins 
of state and federal power provides a new lens for understanding the 
uniquely collaborative process of American governance. 
 Federalism bargaining engages federalism values at the structural 
level, surpassing the political safeguards available through unilateral 
policymaking. The bilateral nature of the exchange balances state and 
federal interests in the first-order policy issue at hand, protecting fed-
eralism values in a way that transcends the subjective considerations of 
participants. Federalism bargaining thus provides structural support 
for federalism that is simply unavailable through unilateral safe-
guards. Although unilateral decisions may warrant deference in pro-
portion to their satisfaction of similar criteria, negotiated governance 
offers structural protection for federalism values that unilateral regu-
lation can never truly replicate. 
 Bargaining that satisfies the procedural criteria in Part IV accom-
plishes the objectives of federalism by giving expression to its core val-
ues as a procedural matter, and by leveraging the unique capacity that 
the political branches bring to federalism interpretation and imple-
mentation. Federalism bargaining in which the normative leverage of 
federalism values is institutionally engineered offers the most promise 
for bridging interpretive gaps, but all federalism bargaining would 
benefit from increased awareness at three levels: (1) more conscious 
judicial consideration of federalism bargaining and its procedural in-
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puts, (2) more thoughtful federalism engineering in statutes that create 
forums for bargaining, and (3) more opportunities for professional 
development among federalism bargaining architects and participants. 
 More work is needed to develop federalism engineering in bar-
gaining forums and to assess the full implications for judicial review 
(including, for example, issues of standing). Moving forward from this 
proposal will require more detailed attention to how courts would ac-
tually assess the outcomes of varying forms of bargaining for fealty to 
federalism values. Nevertheless, this treatment provides a starting point 
by recognizing the federalism bargaining enterprise, charting the land-
scape, building a framework of analysis, and articulating the baselines 
of a theory of procedural interpretation. In contrast to previous theo-
retical models, the proposal demonstrates instances in which the very 
process of intergovernmental bargaining proves more able to preserve 
constitutional values than judicial or legislative decisions alone. In the 
middle, perhaps, lies wisdom. 
 Most importantly, the Article provides the missing theoretical justi-
fication for the interpretive work that federalism bargainers do every 
day under clouds of doctrinal and rhetorical uncertainty. In the end, 
negotiated governance achieved by mutual consent in a process that 
safeguards rights, participation, innovation, and synergy accomplishes 
exactly what it is that federalism is designed to do. When it honors 
these principles through falsifiable process, intergovernmental bargain-
ing is itself a legitimate means of allocating authority in contexts of ju-
risdictional overlap. The state and federal actors that bilaterally negoti-
ate federalism-sensitive regulatory dilemmas are doing more than just 
solving the problems with which they are charged; they are interpreting 
the very constitutional directives that frame their obligations. Indeed, 
in negotiating federalism, they are helping to interpret federalism. 
